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ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVES: This research examines the question, "Will a women's manufacturing clothing
operation be feasible in La Paz, Bolivia?"
METHODS: The data used will be primary data consisting of interviews and observational
data. The interviews are given to three Bolivian clothing manufacturers and one fiom the United
States. The observational data consists of actual visits to the black market and different Bolivian
clothing manufacturing plants. The secondary data will be statistical data fiom the Republic of
Bolivia National Institute of Statistics.
DISCUSSION: The advantages and disadvantages to clothing manufacturing in Bolivia are
discussed. The advantages to clothing manufacturing in Bolivia are tax incentives and
inexpensive labor. The disadvantages are the bureaucratic government process, bribery, and
piracy.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Bolivia is a country experiencing changes with an enormous
potential for growth and stability making it an attractive location for clothing manufacturers
despite the bureaucratic process.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem: "Will a Women's Manufacturing Clothing Operating be Feasible
in La Paz, Bolivia?"
Introduction
More and more foreign companies have been looking to Bolivia, located in the heart of
South America, as the ideal offshore production location to reduce operating costs. Investors are
impressed to find very competitive labor rates, high productivity, low turnover and low
absenteeism. The average wage for a factory worker is about 100 dollars per month.' Although
the literacy rate is low, the work force has a tradition of manual dexterity, train ability and high
work ethics.
The country's attractiveness as a manufacturing location is further increased because
Bolivia does not have apparel quotas. In addition, special treaties and agreements are being
developed to provide preferential access to the United States and European markets.
Companies looking to source export quality garments can find an attractive existing
manufacturing facilities in place from which to undertake draw-back or full package contracting.
There are sources, like Bolivinvest which provides free technical assistance to help you develop
suppliers to hlfill your specific needs.'

'u.s. Commerce Department. (1995). Countw Commercial Guide Bolivia.
'~olivinvest.(1993). Bolivia Gatewav to Ouuortunities. (Miami: Central Press), p. 18.
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Backyround

Bolivia is after Haiti the poorest country in the Western hemi~phere.~
Modernization has
become something of a national obsession in Bolivia since entrepreneurial and visionary
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada became the country's third successive democratically elected
president in 1993. Bolivia's economy is growing steadily. Their inflation has dropped from an
astonishing 24,000 percent in 1985 to 8 percent by a radical economic adjustment p r ~ g r a m . ~
Bolivia's GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is at 4.5 percent5
Private-sector industry accounts for the production of consumer goods: food products,
cement, beverages, clothing, tobacco products, medicines, and textiles; also mineral extraction,
and the provisions of financial and other services. There are some plants that assemble tractors
and motor vehicles, although there is no heavy industry or electronics industry in the country.
The majority of manufacturing industry is privately owned, with a definite predominance of
family ~wnership.~
Bolivia is embarking upon a privatization scheme to bring internationally skilled
management and modern technology as well as capital investment to Bolivia. The state will
invite certain investors to put forward capital equivalent to the size of the state asset and earn
50% stake in new corporations. The government will then distribute its 50% share among

Bolivia's 3.2

3 ~ f i e yDennis.
,
Bolivia Moving Toward Modernization. (1994). Institutional Investor, p.8.
4 ~ f i e yDennis.
,
The Andean Region. (1994). Institutional Investor, p.4.

'u.s.Commerce Department. (1995). Countrv Commercial Guide Bolivia.
'1bid.
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million citizens, as a nationwide pension scheme.
Bolivia intends to capitalize six state monopolies: the national oil and gas company

(YPFB),the long distance telephone company (ENTEL), the railways (EWE), the national
airline Lloyd Aereo Boliviano, and the smelters (ENAF). This will raise Bolivia's economic
growth by 7% and create 500,000 jobs and will transform the social security system. But most
importantly the privatization will improve its intiastructure to enhance bu~iness.~
However, with all these capitalist ideas so strong in Bolivia and amongst the Indian
peasantry why aren't the Indians employing other Indians and building a factory? Why does
Bolivia import T-shirts from Brazil? Washing soap from Argentina? Typical of the Third World
economies, Bolivia is short on skills and technical education. Literacy is low, and bookkeeping
is unheard of. There are a few night schools or technical colleges. The physical infrastructure is
missing, like roads which are bad and underdeveloped.'
The lack of education exists but does not hamper the Indian peasantry from participating
in capitalism. They are known for selling you anything from goods to service. For example,
they will change dollars, sell fruits, cheeses, and breads, ice creams, and will fix your tire. More
importantly, they are very willing to work in factories where the pay is consistent and where
little education is needed. Foreign investors have found the labor force to be stable with high
levels of manual de~terity.~

7Marwick,Peat. Bolivia. Euromoney. (September, 1994),p.406.
'~arris,Matthew. Thatcherism's Mixed Legacy to Bolivia. (February, 1994). Investors
Chronicle, p. 16.
'u.S. Commerce Department. (1995). Countrv Commercial Guide - Bolivia.
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International Trade
Bolivia was once known for its political instability and military coups, but now Bolivia is
among South America's leaders in building democratic political institutions and in opening of its
economy. This political stability has helped the economy recover over the last ten years, and is
one reason why investors have come. But the government continues to fight corruption at all
levels, the judicial system needs to be streamlined, and the legislature must pass laws that create
clear rules of the game for busine~s.'~
President Clinton met with 34 Western Hemisphere industry leaders including Bolivia,
Chile, and Argentina in Miami, Florida to discuss establishing a Free Trade Area of the
Americas by 2005. This agreement will eliminate any trade barriers between North and South
America and will boost the economies of the participating countries of which Bolivia is
partaking. The textile and apparel industry leaders are optimistic about this agreement."
Recent delays in getting Chile and the rest of Latin America into the NAFTA Agreement
since the Summit of the Americas are caused by interest groups politics and presidential
elections where both the president and Congress are at fault. The president insists that the
agreements include labor and environmental standards backed by trade sanctions. The fall of the
Mexican peso crisis has weakened enthusiasm for free trade expansi~n.'~
Latin America is actively liberalizing their own trade agreements with each other.

llOs&off,Jim. (1994). America's Trade Zone Count Give U.S. Textile, Apparel a Hugh Boost.
Women's Wear Dailv 168, p. 113.
12

Hughes, G. Phillip. "The Americas" One Year After the Summit of the Americas". (1995).
The Wall Street Journal, Sec. A, p. 11
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Mercosur, a customs union of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay is negotiating with
Chile and Bolivia to free market access. They just signed a framework agreement with the
European Union.13
Other factors that influence the interest in foreign investment in Bolivia is that it has been
a member of the Andean Pact since 1976. It is one of the oldest free trade movements existing
today. Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela has established a fiee trade zone between
themselves in 1993. The Andean Trade Preference Act will allow duty-free imports to the U. S.
from Columbia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador upon compliance with the criteria specified in the
Act. Bolivia has an exceptional tariff requirement which is a two-tiered structure, which remains
at five percent for capital goods and ten percent of all other imports.14
Bolivia recently signed a free trade agreement with Mexico in September, 1994. Japan,
the European union and the United States allow most exports to enter their markets at duty-free
or duty-reduced rates. Bolivia acceded to GATT in 1989, and ratified its membership in the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in late 1995.

14~oore,
Paul. k Hunt, Rebecca K. The Andean Pact: In the Forefront of the Integration
Movement. (1992). Business America. 113, p. 10.
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Definition of Terms
1.

Apparel Ouotas. Restrictions on the maxim limit of apparel items that can be imported.

2.

Bilateral. Having or involving two sides.

3.

Drawback or Full Package Contracting.Ways in which firms can get local
manufacturers to produce their products.

4.

Emplovee Turnover. The rate in which employees maintain their job positions.

5.

Manufacturing. To make or produce goods on a large scale by machinery.

6.

Piracv. Occurs when one company copies and markets the designs of a more successfil
or prestigious company.

7.

Privatization. When a country invites private investors to invest in publicly owned
government companies.

8.

Vertical Integration. Broadening the scope of an organization's operations by buying a
supplier or distributor that will contribute to efficient production of primary product or
service offerings.

CHAP'mR I1
LITERATURE REVIEW
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Statement of the Problem: "Will a Women's Manufacturing Clothing Operation be Feasible
in La Paz, Bolivia?"
Introduction

Bolivia offers a business sector that is eager to cooperate and prosper jointly with
international colleagues: a low crime rate; attractive labor costs; and allows 100 percent
ownership for foreign companies.15 There is also a Free Trade Zone (FTZ) where export
processiig zones have up to 180 days duty-free treatment to assemble kits and produce parts for
exports.16
Foreign investments are welcome in Bolivia. Business can be conducted under the
following entities: (1) corporation; (2) private companies; (3) general partnership; (4) limited
partnership; (5) limited partnership company; (6) branch of a foreign company; and (7) sole
proprietorship. The Investment Law of 1991 guarantees that foreign investors will be accorded
national treatment. It also guarantees remittances of profits and dividends as well as
convertibility of currency and unrestricted imports required by domestic investments."

"~ennis,Geofiey. Bolivia Successll Reforms Continue. (1994). International Investor, p.8.
161J.S.Commerce Department. (1995). Countrv Commercial Guide - Bolivia.
"Ibid.
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Financing for Manufacturing
Some credit lines are provided at lower interest rates by International and bilateral
organizations. These lines come from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank,
and the Andean Development Corporation.

CAF is a multi-service financial institution that offers expanding financial needs to
governments, private companies and financial institutions in the Andean region when includes
Bolivia." They are committed to private sector development, offer multiple financial services and
attractive foreign investment to the region. They are stressing efforts to develop and expand efficient
private fums that can use the comparative and competitive advantages of the Andean region and their
operations, especially in export-orientedbusiness.
CAF offers short-, medium- and long-term loans. CAF also bought $7 million in shares in
Sociedad Financiers Boliviana S.A.M., a new joint venture between he Bolivian government and private
investors that will provide funds to private financial entities for projects in production, fmance and the
capital markets. CAF also provided a $60 million loan to the government of Bolivia, which will channel
the money through private banks to a variety of private sector project^.'^
Most businesses use commercial banks for loans. The current commercial bank lending rate in
Bolivia is anywhere from 18-21% in U.S. dollars. Recently, after several banks have gone bankrupt
including the Banco Boliviano Americana the government has placed strict regulations on banks in order
to step up tighter control. A substantial amount of collateral is required and impeccable credit history to
receive a commercial loan. This relatively high rate causes businesses to look for other options. Most
Bolivian clothing manufacturers prefer to acquire investors rather than commercial loans.

-

"Dennis, Geoffrey. Bolivia Successful Reforms Continue. (1994). Institutional Investor, p.6.
'%id, p.7
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Textile Availability
Bolivia has a rich textile tradition dating back to pre-Christian times. Three thousand years ago
artisans produced exquisite hand-spun fabrics, and this tradition is still done today. Bolivia produces
traditional fibers such as sheep wool and long-fiber cotton. The textile industq has been able to produce
clots of very specific textures and absorbent and thermal characteristics by the process of intertwining.20
Bolivian fibers such as alpaca, llama and angora are recognized worldwide as being of the highest
quality. These fibers come naturally in brown and natural gray tones that don't require dyeing, making
them more environmentally appealing. Also, these fibers come in white and off-white which allows
dyeing into any fashionable color.z1
Bolivia herds of alpaca and llama are being increased and refined through technical assistance
programs. The fibers generated by the herds are usually exported because of lack of technology but soon
this will change with advancements in the Bolivian textile industry.
Bolivia has a range of climatic environments, due to its unique geographic location (heart of
South America) and topography, ideal for the production of a variety of specialty fibers to suit consumers
preferences. Three hundred angora rabbits were brought from Copenhagen and bred in Tarija (major city
in the south of Bolivia), where they are producing thermal underwear and special sportswear from the
angora's fiber that is the most thermal fiber in existence." Today, more than ever, fashions are moving
towards natural fiber cloths which provide elegance, comfort and thermal insulation.

Black Market
Bolivian clothing manufacturers face great competition from the black market or counterfeit
market.

20~olivinvest.Bolivia Gatewav to Ovvortunities. (1993), p.20.
21bid,p.21.
"bid, p.21.
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The products are sold at local fairs at lower prices, where the raw materials were probably more
expensive than the final product. Korean shirts can be bought for U.S. $3.00 and sweat suits for as little

as a U.S. $1.50. This causes many private legitimate clothing manufacturers to lose employees because
sales tend to drop. One major manufacturer in Santa Cruz reduced its shifts from three to one because
monthly sales dropped flomU.S. $50,000 to $15,000. 23
Many small informal manufacturers are in production thanks to counterfeit material brought into
the country at very low prices. These manufacturers sew in foreign labels into their garments to be sold at
the black market. For example, many Korean families established in La Paz, produce sportswear, dress
shirts, and sleepwear, etc., with Korean materials and labels from different countries. These products can
be found in the black market. 24
This also happens at the local manufacturers who produce leather jackets. They copy the designs
from Argentina or Chile but are sold at a lower price because of the cheaper labor costs. Then Peruvian,
Argentinean, and Chilean businesses bring them back to their respective countries to sell. These medium
sized manufacturers have orders from exporting up to U.S. $500,000 in leather jackets and other leather
articles. ZS

In the black market articles made locally can be found, including articles with prestigious brand
names like Pierre Cardin, etc. In order to keep up with competition the best manufacturers had to use
creativity and imagination to copy the styles improving quality while finding fabrics at lower prices. 26

2

3

(Programs
~ Mundial~del Empleo)
~ Titulo: La
~ industria
~ de Bolivia
~ frente a la nueva

Poltica

Economics, Sept. 1990, No. 337.
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CHAPTER I11
PROCEDURES AND METHODOLOGY

Statement of the Problem: "Will a Women's Manufacturing Clothing Operation be Feasible in La
Paz, Bolivia?

I.

Primary Data

1.

Interviews
A.

Random Sampling; Steps:
(1)

Find at least 4 clothing manufacturers from South America and South
Florida willing to do an interview.

2.

(2)

Set up appointment.

(3)

Send a letter and a copy of questions 2-3 days before the interview.

(4)

Send a Thank You note.

Observational Data
A.

Black Market
(1)

B.

Bolivian Clothing Manufacturing Plants
(1)

11.

Actual visit in La Paz.

Actual visit in La Paz.

Secondary Data

1.

Statistics on Bolivian Clothing Manufacturers
A.

Republic of Bolivia National Institute of Statistics
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INTERVIEWS WITH CLOTHING MANUFACTURERS
Interview in Boca Raton, Florida
Phone Interview:
The White House
Mr. Rick Sarmiento

President

Interviews in La Paz, Bolivia
Personal Interviews:
MILMA LTDA.
Mr. Arthur Tracht

Managing Director
Calle Carandailll No. 1903

BATT LTDA.

Mr. Marcos Iberkleid
Managing Director

Av. Bush No. 1572

BCP ALPACA DESIGNS

Ms.Beatriz Canedo Patio
Managing Director
P. 0.Box 5619

Mercado 13
THE WHITE HOUSE
Interview:

1.

Rick Sarmiento, President of The White House Retail Clothing Store

How did you become interested in the retail clothing industry?

I would like to tell you that I had a vision or a spectacular experience and I was enlightened, but
I'd rather tell you the truth. After working as a manager of the Hyatt in Baltimore; I decided to
go work on my own. Some personnel at the Rouse Co., who own the Harborplace Mall, and
myself came up with the idea to make a niche in the clothing industry. I saw an opportunity to
make a niche by applying the right concept.

2.

How did you come up with the concept of The White House? What was your target
market?

By brainstorming with personnel fiom the Rouse Co. and several people in the industry. I liked
white linens, terry, and cottons, somet!!g the industry never exploited. I wanted to offer
something unique and different for "Ready to Wear". My market is narrowly focused, and we
have 40 stores which are privately owned.

3.

What are your expectations or plans for opening retail operations in South America, or in
Columbia or Bolivia?

I was born in Columbia, but raised in the United States. I really do not have any ties with
Columbia; I am an American citizen and have no intentions to live over there or go back to
Columbia. I don't have any plans for the immediate future in South America. However, I have
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been looking into possibly opening stores in Asia or Mexico. If I were to go to South America I
would probably go to Argentina or Chile first. These countries have a better market for my niche.

4.

What are the advantages or disadvantages of opening a retail operation?

The most important thing is to make sure your demographics match your target market. It is very
difficult to fmd your customers. Location is the most important aspect. The company needs to
research and buy the right place or space.

5.

Does The White House have an off-season? If so, does the climate influence your
merchandise? How?

Winter would be considered our off-season because white is a winter color but not a popular one.
Although with fashion that could change. However, like most retailers our Christmas sales are
usually extremely high. Therefore, it is diff~cultto estimate our off-season. The company is
doing extremely well. I am very pleased. In terms of climate, different stores in different areas
of the country, depending on the climate, carry different clothing. Up north the clothing is more
wools, as compared to South Florida's linens, silks, and cottons.
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MILMA MANUFACTURING

Interview:
1.

Mr. Arthur Tracht, Managing Director

Which market was initially the primary focus of Milma manufacturing, the local or
foreign?
We are primarily an export company.

2.

Describe the Bolivian local market for your sweaters? What is your target market in the
United States?
The local market is limited in Bolivia. Our market in the USA are upscale retailers many of
whom are in tourist areas.

3.

In what parts of the unites States are your sweaters being sold? Which South American
markets are you currently selling to?
Our sweaters are sold all over the USA, North and South. We currently are only selling our
sweaters in Ecuador.

4.

What factors influenced your choice of manufacturing location?
We are manufacturing in Bolivia due to its relatively cheap labor and availability of alpaca.

5.

What barriers have affected the manufacturing in La Paz? (Black market, purchasing
abroad)
1.

All materials are imported.

2.

Non-cooperative Labor Ministry.

3.

Non-beneficial government economic policies.

4.

Indifferent Municipal Government.
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6.

What exportation method do you employ, the free-zone or direct exporting? What iniport
taxes do you pay in the U.S.?
We ship all goods FOB La Paz through direct Exporting.

7.

Describe the Bolivian market for women's fashion. What, where, when, and how do women
buy?
1.

Milma has two retail stores which service the tourist and international La Paz community.

2.

Many Paceiios (nickname for the citizens of La Paz) buy our products for presents when
traveling.

3.

8.

June through August is our big season.

Did Milma receive any financing from the CAF or the World Bank? If not, how did you
finance your business? What source do you use for machinery purchases?

The business is self-financed through earnings or commercial bank loans.
9.

What effect has the unskilled and inexpensive Bolivian labor market had on competitive
production?

None.

10.

What, if any, effects has Milma experienced from the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade)? From the Andean Pact?

1.

Textiles is not covered under GATT.

2.

No preference.
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11.

What are the most significant key variables in the manufacturing industry?

1.
2.

Raw Materials.
Duties on import materials.
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BATT MANUFACTURING

Interview:
1.

Mr. Marco IberMeid, Manager Director

Which market was initially the primary focus of Batt Manufacturing, the local or foreign
market?
Batt is the factory that produces for the Bolivian market. The Bolivian people recognize Batt as a
local factory provision. It has 18 private exclusive agencies in La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa
Cruz. The company which exports to foreign markets is called Mex Limited.

2.

What specific market is targeted by your private line of sportswear?
The Batt sportswear market is targeted to the Bolivian market.

3.

Which South American markets are you currently selling to? Which South American
markets do you plan to sell to in the future?
Brazil as Mex, Batt in the Chilean market, and we will be opening in the Mercosur where
Argentina and Peru are part of the pact as well.

4.

What barriers have affected the manufacturing in La Paz? (Black market, purchasing
abroad)
The 4,000 feet altitude is a problem along with the Bolivian idiosyncrasies. The altitude makes it
difficult for breathing and adjusting to the climate therefore potential customers do not wish to
visit the plant causing Batt executives to travel more. The black market is not a barrier because
Batt has established its presence in the local Bolivian market. The foreign competition like
Benetton is a more expensive higher quality product that is not in competition with Batt.
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5.

Which exportation method do you employ, the free-zone or direct exporting? What import
taxes do you pay in the U.S.?
We have no taxes on imports to the states although for exports you pay 20-21% higher than
importing a Mercedes Benz to the states. Ninety-five percent of our exports are to the United
States, Europe, and Canada. The European market has strict label requirements, which must state
made in Bolivia. We experience a bit of racism ftom the European buyer when the label states
made in Bolivia or Latin America. We thought that the buyer would not care where the garment
originated ftom Sales to Europe, United States, and Canada are licensed. For example, one of our
clients in Polla Van Flors in which we manufacture under a license.

6.

Describe the Bolivian market for women's fashion? What, where, when, and how do
women buy?
The Bolivian market is not sophisticated in style and quality. It appreciates durability more.
Women buy more than men. About 60% female, 20% male, and 20% children.

7.

Did Batt receive any financing from CAF or the World Bank? If not, how did you finance
your business?

CAF will finance your textile machinery. What the industry is looking for is investment of
capital instead of loans from local banks at the rate of 14-15%. This particular company lives on
local credit £tom banks instead of investments.

8.

What effect has the unskilled and inexpensive Bolivian labor market had on competitive
production?

The labor is very trainable. Quality control is very manageable. Motivation and rules regarding
labor are very unclear.
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9.

What effects has Batt experienced as a direct result from the GATT (General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade)? From the Andean Pact?
There is no effect fiom GATT. But the Andean Pact allows us to bring in raw materials. The
problem is air transportation to Ecuador, Columbia, and Venezuela. You must make a stop in
Lima to arrive at any of these countries which causes many problems with direct trade.

10.

What are the most significant key variables in the manufacturing industry?
1.

Clarifying politics: There are 13 laws which were to be changed in 1985 - they have not

been changed. Law #21060 is not clearly defined for exportation.
2.

Financing Mechanisms - Investments instead of loans.

3.

Tax, restrictions, and interest rates prevent growth and production.
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BCP ALPACA DESIGN S.RL
Interview:
1.

Beatriz Canedo Patiao, Managing Director

Describe de Bolivian market for women's fashion. What, where, when, and how do women
buy in La Paz.

I believe that the market for women's fashion in La Paz is non-existent. The market could be
defined in 3 groups:

a)

Upper Class - well-to-do women, either with income of their own or their husbands or
families. They either buy abroad when they travel or fiom individuals that bring in
clothes by contraband.

b)

Middle Class - working women. They buy in Almacenes Ismar or La Fayette. They
carry inexpensive, ordinary type of clothes, mostly in synthetic fabrics, made in Chile,
Peni, etc.

c)

Mass population - will buy mostly cheap garments made in Bolivia, very poorly made.
Therefore, prices are low and they have access to such products.

Women of the fust group buy mostly dressy or sporty looking clothes. On the most part, they
buy for special events and they certainly look for a fine finished piece. Also, I believe they are
beginning to purchase for the season. For example, in May they start to look for warm winter
clothes.
2.

Which countries are you currently exporting to? What are the advantages or disadvantages
of exporting to each market?
We currently export to the U.S.A., Denmark, England and Chile with very good prospects to start
distributing in Argentina and Japan.
The advantages of exporting to Europe (European Community Countries) are that our product
enters their market free of duty taxes.
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The U.S.A. of course offers vast possibilities since it is the number one consumer country.
Latin America offers consumers who appreciate quality and understand the difference between a
well finished exclusive garments versus mass production.
Japan is well known for being very selective and they do not mind to pay high prices for perfectly
made clothes.
I do not see any disadvantages, on the contrary, the reason that we are in Bolivia is to export. As
long as one has a very professional and reliable shipping and customs agent, the merchandise
arrives on time.
3.

Why did you relocate your headquarters of manufacturing from New York to La Paz?
The main reason is because in New York I was established in haute-couture and designer line.
Later came the interest from stores for a ready-to-wear line at lower costs. I was unable to
produce volume orders at low prices with the expensive costs of labor and operating costs on
Seventh Avenue, New York. It is standard in the industry to mass produce in countries with
inexpensive labor. Also, I chose La Paz for its excellence in tailoring.

4.

What effect has the unskilled and inexpensive Bolivian labor market had on competitive
production?

I do not think that our labor in Bolivia is unskilled. They do have excellent knowledge of
manufacturing tailored clothes. What is needed in Bolivia is good guidance and management. I
have worked with very good Italian tailors in New York and I truly think that our Bolivian tailors
are more than capable to compete in the international market. Our labor is very creative and
versatile.
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5.

What barriers have affected the manufacturing in La Paz? (Black market, purchasing
abroad)
Definitely the barriers for manufacturing are both the black market and the purchasing abroad.
This reduces the pool of potential customers in La Paz.

6.

Which exportation method do you employ, the free-zone or direct exporting? What import
taxes do you pay in the U.S.?
We export directly. Our product pays a 20% import duty into the U.S.A. We normally sell CIF,
therefore, duties are paid by our clients.

7.

Did BCP Alpaca Designs receive any financing from CAF or the World Bank? If not, how
did you finance your business? What source do you use for machinery purchases?
BCP Alpaca Designs has not received any fmancing from de CAF. We are in a joint-venture with
the Fundaci6n Bolivia Exporta (FBE) being the World Bank one of the partners of the FBE. I
have brought most of the machinery with me fiom New York as part of my contribution to
capital. We have f m a n d the business mostly by short term loans. We have purchased three
pieces of machinery (used) directly fiom Germany in excellent condition.

8.

What are your short term goals for BCP Alpaca Designs? What are your long-term goals?
Short term goals for BCP are to start distributing the product in Argentina and Chile. Long term
goals are to reach the Japanese market (we have started already to make contacts in Japan).

9.

What are the most significant key variables in the manufacturing industry?
The most significant key variables in manufacturing could be new technology, availability of raw
materials, recession in countries importing the product etc.

Mercado 24
OBSERVATIONAL DATA
Black Market

The Black Market in La Paz is an amazing outdoor sales adventure. It is a "legalized" black market.
The market appears on a certain sheet encompassing about six blocks Monday through Saturday. Just about
everythg can be found there from women, men, children, and teen clothing, housewares, toys, linens,
furniture, can foods, china, etc. The consumers are a mixture of all social classes, mainly the indigenous
population. The market is usually very crowded at least five hundred people were there.
The prices are much lower than commercial stores in town. Most of the clothing are copies of brand
name designs (fakes) with brand name labels but made out of cheaper quality fabrics. For example, Guess
jeans with a similar logo can be found. Each vendor had a stand or area with a canvass tent on top.
Customers were allowed to negotiate prices. The vendor started with a 50% increase on the price and usually
negotiated down to 30%. For example, an item could be starting at 50 Bolivianos and can be negotiated down
to 35 Bolivianos.
There are many problems with the location. One is the weather. If it rains most customers prefer to
wait until the next day to shop. Some vendors have stores which were in buildings that ran along the sides
of the market for better shelter. The other problem is fmdmg the market is difficult. It is located in a section
of town where there are no street signs but most taxis are familiar with the location. There is no parking and
most people must take a taxi to and from the market. The area is not the safest resulting m numerous
robberies. However, there are loud speaker announcements indicating the danger about every 15 minutes.
The impact of the black market on clothing manufacturers is the piracy and the illegal manipulation
of the non-registered manufacturers. The piracy of copying styles and making fakes reduces the quality and
prestige of original designers work. This causes customers to think twice when wanting to purchase quality
designer workmanship. The illegal manipulation of non-registered manufacturers causes the government to
lean toward increased taxes and less incentives for manufacturers
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Bolivian Clothing Manufacturinv Plants

One manufacturing plant encompassed approximately 6,000 square feet. The business office located
on the second floor overlooked the actual factory plant. llus plant employed over 300 employees comprising
mainly of women. There were about 50 different rows sequenced to accomplish a certain step in the
production process. For example, one row would actually join the sweaters. The machinery was imported
with brands from Japan, Italy, and Switzerland.
The stock room stored raw materials like up to 5,000 - 10,000 kilos of yam. A computerized bar code
system was attached to each raw material to track the product around the factory. When a product had a
defect the bar code tracking system could detect the breakdown stage. Also, this system prevented inventov
shrinkage of raw materials. For example, a pocketful of alpaca yam costs U.S. $26, a significant loss to a
company.
The showroom stored the hished products. This was a showroom for potential clients to view the
merchandise. The room was designed to enhance the products like in retail showrooms.
A smaller manufacturer with approximately 50 employees worked out of one floor in a commercial
building. The factory consisted of a business office, storage room, showroom, and plant room. All
equipment and raw materials were imported. There was a large cutting table in the center of the plant room
I

surrounded by sewing machines and workers. The amount of men and women workers were the same.
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SECONDARY DATA

TABLE 1.1
Bolivia:

Census I1
1992 Economic establishments Census II - Number of Local Type Establishments for Section of Employment According to Capital City.

Manufacture of garments of clothing, except leather garments.

Source: Republic of Bolivia - National Institute of Statistics
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Bolivia:

Census I1

1992 Economic establishments Census I1 - Number of Local Type Establishments for Section of Employment According to Capital City.
Manufacture of garments of clothing, except leather garments.

Source: Republic of Bolivia - National Institute of Statistics
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Statement of the Roblem: "Mll a Women's Manufacturing Clothing Operation be Feasible in La Paz,
Bolivia?"

Tax Incentive
The Bolivian government passed a law offering an incentive for manufacturers by allowing no
taxes when exporting merchandise out of the country. Although there is a 16% value added tax (VAT) on
imported raw materials because Bolivia does not have the quality or quantity necessary for
manufacturing. This tax incentive has aided the manufacturing industry financially. However, in the past
year the government has not recognized this incentive causing major fmancial distress to manufacturers.
Currently, manufacturers are paying about 10% of the VAT.

Labor
Another advantage to manufacturing in Bolivia is the low labor cost. Also, the workers in the
clothing industry are highly trainable, and very skilled in tailoring. According to Table 1.1 there tends to
be a high employee turnover in clothing manufacturing with most employees lasting only 1-4 years. This
is due to the low wages paid to factory workers.
There are strict labor laws that must be followed. The Ministry of Labor is a reputable institution
requiring manufacturers to enforce all laws. However, there are a considerable amount of clothing
manufacturers that are not registered, therefore illegal, who do not follow any of the labor laws. Nothing
is being done to penalize these violators.
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Government
The Bolivian government has a Retax system where a manufacturer can temporarily import raw
material then in six months export the product without paying taxes. This nullifies the 16% VAT tax.
However, the clothing manufacturers do not use this system because the bureaucratic process takes much
longer than six months causing penalties and delays where fines exceed the savings.
The current political party MNR (Multi National Revolution) in the past year has decided to cut
the previously mentioned manufacturer tax incentive. According to officials, the International Monetary
Fund suggested cutting the tax incentive and MNR followed the suggestion. The clothing manufacturers
had counted on the savings in their budgets making 1996 a fmancially difficult year. If this incentive or
another policy is not enforced, clothing manufacturers are very uncertain about their future in Bolivia.

MNR has now passed a new law whereby the old 2.5% on patrimony will be switched to 25% of
corporate tax in 1997. The clothing manufacturers will be effected by their profits, most likely declaring
less or no profit. This change did not work in the past.

Bribery
Unfortunately, in order to get through the bureaucratic process, a form of bribery exists in
Bolivia. Bribery is a payment made to a person to influence a persons decision, or money offered to an
official for service, andlor money or service given to a public official to do something for you in their
country. Bribery is a white collar crime which has to do with business and usually involves less time in
jail than violent crimes. Americans are obligated not to engage in such white collar crimes of business
internationally according to the Foreign Cormpt Practices Act of 1977.

In Bolivia, the bureaucratic process can only be conquered by bribery. If a manufacturer tries to
follow the process according to Bolivian law it may take a significantly longer amount of time. Initially,
most manufacturers tried to follow the laws but realized the only way to get through the process was by
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fmding outside help. Most of the business legalities require some sort of manipulation. However, the
Bolivian people feel bribe~yis a part of their culture. This is expected behavior and an accepted practice

in Bolivia. Manufacturers feel there is no sign of change in the near future.

Piracv
The phenomenon of style piracy or "knock-off' copying occurs when one company or individual
copies and markets the designs of another more successful prestigious company. '' This occurs in Bolivia
with workers actually selling designs to other manufacturers who turn around and make a copy of the
design with slight modifications and out of lower quality materials. The workers feel underpaid and this
is a way to make extra money on the side. The manufacturers feel betrayed causing them to distrust
competitors. Most manufacturers did not really know or communicate with their counterparts.
Bolivia does have intellectual property right laws. Most manufacturers do register their designs,
however, these laws are not enforced causing knock-offs to continue to be produced. This also causes the
manufacturers to keep to themselves. If the manufacturers were more united they could possibly have
more power to make a difference.

27Sproles,George B. and Burns, Leslie Davis. (1994) Changing Avuearance. Fairchild
Pub!ications.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONlRECOMMENDATIONS

Statement of the A.oblem: "Will a Women's Manufacturing Clothing Operation be Feasible in La Paz,
Bolivia?"

Conclusion/Recommendations
Bolivia is moving toward change with its capitalization programs. The labor is cheap and very
trainable. The clothing laborers are very talented and creative. The indirect costs in Bolivia in terms of
land and overhead are very reasonable. The incentives for clothing manufacturers to export has changed
but the future holds new laws and incentives. In the future, the free zone could develop no import or
export duties to clothing manufacturers andlor no corporate duties.
The only real barriers to conquer are in Bolivia's bureaucratic process. American companies are
faced with the overwhelming dilemma to follow the Bolivian culture of bribery in order to succeed.
Currently, there are a substantial amount of American companies in Bolivia which are very successful.
With the capitalization program, more American companies are looking into Bolivia For example,
Dominion Energy recently acquired the power-generating assets for U.S. $58.8 million. Most of the
clothing manufacturers do not believe it is bribery but part of the system and culture where everyone still
pays in one form or another. Bribery is an expected behavior and an accepted practice in Bolivia's
culture making it the only current option to business.
Other barriers to Bolivia are the black market and purchasing abroad. But most underdeveloped
countries experience the same problems. Establishing a quality product can reduce the chances of being
effected by these barriers.

Mercado 32
In the clothing industry it is standard practice to manufacture in countries where the labor is

inexpensive in order to produce massive volumes at low prices. With the current political changes toward
capitalization and stabilization Bolivia is ideal for clothing manufacturing. Government officials claim
that there will be new incentives passed soon encouraging current manufacturers to remain in Bolivia.
Many companies are investing in Bolivia in all industries including mining, electric, and gas from all
countries of the world. Bolivia has great potential and success for clothing manufacturers. A women's
clothing manufacturing operation is feasible in La Paz, Bolivia.
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THEANDEANREGION
The countries of the Andean region
offer a sharp contrast to the largest
Latin American nations to the north
and south (Mexico, Brazil and
Argentina) and within themselves
exhibit considerable diversity.
Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador
and Bolivia are smaller economies,
both in terms of population and lev- .
el5 of national output; they highly
d i v d d , mainly h u e of the sig- .
nificant topographical and climatic .'
differenceswithin individual nations
and aauss the region as a whole.
The label "Andean countries" betrays the origin of some of this diversity AU but
Venezuela are strongly influenced by the Andes
Mountains running down the western edge of South
America. AU except Bolivia have access to an ocean
or, in Colombia's case, two. While these physical conditions cause considerable economic diversity in the
region, urufymg factors include the rich mineral
deposits, particularly in Peru and Colombia, and the
existence of significant reserves of oil in Venezuela,
Colombia and Ecuador. AU thxee are mapr oil
exporn, but only Venezuela is a member of OPEC.
Another unifying f e a w is that the Andean countries have become of hcrea&g interest to international
investorsover the past five or so years. Although only
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela currentlyhave stock
markets of sufficient size and openness to attract significant foreign interest, the other Andean nations have the
potential to attract long-term foreign investment AU
have, to varying degrees, taken part in the recent rush
to economic adjustment, liberalization and mmpetition
begun two decades ago by Chile and takenup in Mexico in 1988and by most of the region'swn after that.
Colombia is the region's most durable success
story. Bolstered by not d f e r h g a year of negative
:

'

-

'

economic growth since 1945or ever
having to d d u l e its external
de&, Colombia's economy and .
financial systembegan to open up
si@cantly after 1990under then
President Cesar Gaviria.
In Venezuela, by contrast, early
efforts at reform have basically
failed. Widesprrad riots after a
sharp rise in public sector prices in
1989 caused many of the dorms to
be rolled back, while President Car
Ios A n h Perez's power and influence g r a d d y diminished after two
coup attempts in 1992. He survived
these, but subsequentcorruption allegationsforced
him from office several months early
Peru is a relative newcomer to the reform program,
but President Alberb Fujirnori has begun to reverse
the countrfs decades-long decline and now heads one
of the most radical reform p m p m s in the region
Ecuador's early efforts at reform also had mixed
success. After his election in 1992, President Sixto
Duran Ballen, despite achieving stmng improvements
in economicperformance, ran into strong opposition
over his privatization progmm, while failing for severa1months to s e a m an a-ent
to restruchm debt
held by international banks.
The transformation of Bolivia, the smallest of the
+on's -mies,
is quite remarkable. From a hyperinflation nightmare, even by Latin American standards,
it has emerged with singledigit Mation accompanied
by the visionary privatization program of newly
elected President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada.
Taking each country in turn, we consider the outlook for investment in Colombia and Peru to be very
favorable. Both are seeing a significant increase in
investor inflows, which we expect to continue. Given
Colombia's strong macroeconomicpformance and

>
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the maintenance of the "aprtura" policy, the courseis
The conbast between Peru and Colombii and the
set fair for strong stock market gains over the next few ongoing problems of Venmela mukl not be moxe
e x m e The effective collapse of much of Vkzuela's
. years. The fundamentalsare impressive, with longterm potential for 4 to 5 parent atinual GDP growth
banking system has caused a huge confidence &is,
and datively stable budget and trade pitiom. The
while forcing bailouts of up to 10 pacent of GDP from
recent discoveryof huge oil -es
will bolster f o r
an already ovasketched budget. Another blow was
eign currency reserves for years. Indeed, Colombia theresignation last April of Central Bank pmident
faces an embarrassment of
Ruth de Krivoy, triggering a
riches. Allowing the peso to
run on the bolivar which lost
decline in line with relative
over 80 percent of its value in
Foreign Direct Investment
k
o months. The crisis made
inflation is preventing solid
in Developing Nations
progress towards lower inflaResident
Caldera, who took
(In $billions)
tion, which is stuck above 20
office in February, introduce
15%
price and exchange controls
percent However, if the rise
% sbvc of global inflow
SQ
in foreign currency reserves
'and efktively nationalize
ts
..thebanking system, In short,
due to higher oil revenues is
allowed to push the peso
a contractingeconomy
- .. with
m
upwards in real terms, export
and inflation rising towads
competitiveness will suffer.
70 percent, poliaea are deciPO
15
sively set in the wrong direcWe expect new President
10
Ernesto Samper to push
tion. Foreign investor flows
Colombia forward, slowly,
will not mume until the poltowards further reforms and
icy changes again.
< . ' > ( / ( I / / ( /
economic outperformance.
The markets in Ecuador
%%%%%%%%%%%
Given its late start, Peru is
and Bolivia are still too small
Mid& Ihd .adNo&&-rim
~ltinhterio
and the %hhels
now moving faster than any
to be of general intenzit to forE m p sod Cmrm A.L.
s
~
~
L
~
~
other Andean country toward
eign investors. Given the
favorable turn of events, with
economic liberalization. As
yz&";k.,,,
SO-:
world&nlr
recently as 1990, the country
the a g m e n t of a deal with
*
was in a sorry state with inflaits banking d t o x s , Ecuador
tion of over 7,000 percent, a
is making rapid efforts open
contractingetonomy and the threat of a takeover by
up its fledgling equity market. We remainnervous
Marxist terrorists. Underpinned by President Fujiover the continuingchalenges to President Sixtomori's liberalization program and strong fiscal and
Ballen but a breakthrough in the privatization p m p m
monetary adjustment policies, inflation is now
would be a signal for iniwnational investors and
slightly above 20 percent and could drop below that
would fc&c a realopening-up of equity opprhmitis.
this year, while the economy is growing at a doubleThe mnwrsion of Bolivia into an attractive investdigit rate. Foreign investment laws have been comment opportunity has o c d in two phases. Beginpletely Liberalized, and Peru is a magnet for overseas ning in 1985, when inflation hit an astonishing 24,W
capital. The first Peruvian ADR issue is expected in
percent, a radical economicadjustment p-am
was
the second halfof 1994, with many more to follow.
put in place that has reduced inflation to 8 percent and
The only serious short-term risk appears to be politi- t r i g g d a revival in the economy. More -tl%
cal, with Fujimori facing re-election next April.
President Sanchezde Lozada announced a privatizaAlthough running at fairly high approval ratings,he
tion progmm that aims to raise around $3billion.
is criticized for the country's continuinghigh levels of Bolivia's prospects'aregood and we expect a gradual
poverty and may face a strong challenge frmn forker inmaw in inby overseas investors.
U.N. Secretary&neral Perez de Cuellar.
-G m f y Dennis, s , h director, Bear, Sttzzrns
'
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CAF
AN EXPANDED ROLE IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION
The Andean Development Corporation (CorporationAndina de
Fomento, CAF) is a multi-service
financial institution that has an
increasihgly important role in
meeting the expanding financial
needs of the governments, private companies and financial
institutions in the Andean region.
Founded in 1970 to finance
regional integration projects,
Caracas-based CAF has developed a global perspective and
broadened its activities to include
commercial, investment and
development banking services,
as well as lending to financial
intermediaries. There are three
categories of shares in the corporation. Series A shares are held
by the governmentsof Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and
Venezuela, CAF's founding
members. Series B shares may be
held by the founding countries,
public and semi-public organizations, or individuals and private
companies from the Andean
region. Series B shares have been
subscribed so far by 22 commercia1 banks. Series C shares cover
countries outside the Andean
region. Holders of these shares
may be governments, international organizations, public,
semi-publicor private organizations and individuals. Chile,
Mexico and Trinidad &Tobago
now hold C shares.

CAF is an internationally recognized institution with a sound
record of growth, profitability
and diversification. It has
expanded its range of services,
made successful placements on
international capital markets,
and streamlined and upgraded
its internal organization to meet
the evolving requirements of its
clients. CAPSfive member
countries by themselves constitute a market of almost 100 million inhabitants with regional
trade last year of dose to US$3
billion.
CAF's president and CEO,
L. Enrique Garcia, sums up the
organization's mission: 'We support sustainable growth and inte
gration within the Andean region
by heIping member countries to
make their economies diversified, competitiveand more
responsive to social needs.
"We are committed to private
sector development, offer multiple financial services and attractive foreign investment to the
region We are a client-oriented
financial institution providing
quality products and services
with the help of a dedicated and
highly skilled staff."
The corporation today is
stressing efforts to develop and
expand efficient private firms
that can use the comparative and
competitiveadvantages of the

Andean region in their operations, especially in export-oriented businesses.
CAPSresults clearly illustrate
its progress and its success in
adapting to new regional financing requirements. In the first half
of 1994, CAF appmved projects
worth a total of $743.5 million,
most of which will directly or
indirectly benefit private sector
companies.
In 1993, CAF approved over
$2 billion in various types of
financial support in the five
Andean countries, including
short-, medium- and long-term
loans, technical cooperation projects, equity participations, and
cofinancings. Total lending was
18percent above 1992 and repre
sents a record high for the corporation. Over 60 percent of CAF's
credit and investment approvals
relate to the private sector.
CAF's assets grew by 24 percent last year to $1.9biion. The
corporation can sustain a high
rate of asset growth since it
simultaneously preserves adequate ratios and works within a
framework of conservative
financial policies.
Net income in 1993 inc:reased
to $38.3 million. The corporation
has adopted a prudent policy
regarding loan loss provisions
even though arrears last year represented only 0.24 percent of the
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outstanding loan portfolio.
Since CAF does not pay dividends and is tax-exempt in its
member nations, retained
earnings are used to inmase
the total capital base.
Last year was important,
says Garcia, because "CAF
approved a sigruficant amount
of loans, maintained the high
quality of its loan portfolio,
increased its capital strength
a n 8 pioneered efforts to
attract and channel financial
resources to the region!'
The corporation won especially high marks in world
financial markets. During
1993 CAF successfully entered
international capital markets with three placements (Euro
and Samuraibonds) for a total of
$289 million at competitive rates
representing the lowest spreads
paid by an issuer in Latin America. At the same time, CAF
received investment grade ratings from Moody's, Standard &
Poor's and IBCA, making it the
first Latin American issuer to
earn three investment grades
simultaneously. This year CAF
issued a US$125 million Dragon
bond which was successfully
placed in South East Asia. The
corporation expects to raise
around $900 million through
international capital market
issues in 1994and 1995.

NEW FINANCING
FORMULAS
Earlier this year CAF acquired $5
million in bonds issued by BHN
Multibanco S.A., one of Bolivia's
leading private banks, which will
use the proceeds of the bond sale

S t a t e m e n t

(InUSSdions)
.Public

m Private

to finance private sector efforts in
the same area where CAF works.
CAF also bought $7 million in
shares in Soaedad Financiera
Boliviana S.A.M., a new joint venlure between the Bolivian govenunent and private investors
that wiU provide funds to private
financial entities for projects in
production, finance and the capital markets.
CAF's services cover a wide
range. Among the most important: financing infrastructure
and regional integration projects; loans and equity for private sector projects; cofinancings
with multilateral agencies; s u p
porting energy and environmental improvement projects; loans
for feasibility studies and preinvestment programs; promotional financing for pension
funds and capital markets;
supporting privatization and
structural reforms in the governments of member states. For
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example, over the past 18
months, CAF approved a $20
million loan to increase capacity at a paper plant in Venezuela; a $60 million loan to
finance reconstruction of a 217
kilometer railroad in Colombia; a $25.6 million loan to
Petroecuador to increase oil
production; and a $60 million
iloan to the government of
Bolivia, which will channel
. the money through private
banks to a variety of private
sector projects.
CAF has also approved a
. $20 million loan to help
finance a toll road to be built
and operated in Colombia
under a government concession to a private company; a parallel financing program in which
CAF, the World Bank and the
InterAmerican Development
Bank will each lend $30 million
to Ecuador for a social development program; $9.5 million to
buy stock in Fondelec, which
will promote efficient private
sector energy companies in Latin
America and the Caribbean
(other investors are Chemical
Bank and Baltimore Gas & Electric); and $10 million to buy
shares in a new fund that will
invest in privatizations in Peru.
(Other investors in the fund, to
be administered by a subsidiary
of Montagu & Co. Ltd., are Midland Bank, Chase Manhattan
Bank, Banco del Credito del
Peru, and the IFC.)
CAF has an authorized capital
base of $2.05 biiion, of which
$1.83billion has been subscribed.
Paid in capital and merves at the
end of 1993 were US$741 million.
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BOLIVIA
SUCCESSm REFORMS CONTINUE
After just one year in office,
the Sub-RegionalAndean Pact,
Bolivia's President Gonzalo
the Amazon Cooperation Treaty
3,600 meters above
and
Rio de la Plata Basin
Sanchez de Lozada can already be
Treaty,
providing
a strategicgateproud of his record. GDP grew by
leoeb La
hi&est
4.3 petcent in the first six months
way to markets comprising some
~~~p'tal
in the Americas.
of 1994, while inflation was run230 million inhabitants.
The country's transpo* infra- ,
ning around 2.9 percent, in line
with the government's target of 5
s t r u c h indudes a network of
prcent for the year. Sanchez - a
roads and railroads leading from
self-made mining millionaire who
major mining. agricultural and
earned a degree in philosophy
manufacturingcenters to ports on
the Pacific (in Chile and Peru) and
from the University of Chicago the Atlantic (Brazil, Uruguay and
is credited with braking the
Argentina). Although Bolivia is
hyperinflation of the 1980s by
landlocked, a year-round navigainstituting free market reforms as
Ministei of Planning.
ble waterway connects eastern
Besides keeping inflation at bay,
Bolivia to Atlantic ports in
privatization is a top priority of
Argentina and Uruguay. Eight
the Sanchez administration. In
internationalairlines serve
February the president unveiled
Bolivia's four major aiqmrts, and
a modem telecommunications structure link Boli.
his "Plan for Everyone" (Plan de Todos)designed to
transform the six largest state enterprisesinto
vians to each other and to the world.
mixed-capital mrporations. Rather than sell its
A wide range of climates -from highland valassets outright, Bolivia is inviting foreign and
leys where the temperature falls below freezing in
domestic capital to invest funds equal to the value of the winter, to the moderate valleys regions and the
each companys equity and to bring in new manage- subtropical lowlands, where summer temperatures
ment techniques and technology. The companies
can exceed lM1" Fahrenheit -allows Bolivians to
will at first operate under government control but
grow a great variety of agricultural products. Leadwill ultimately be owned by private sector investors ing exports include sugar,soybeans, mtton, cihus
and by a l l Bolivians via five or ten new private penand other fruits, and grains.
sion funds expected to be created next year.
The mwlqfs best known natural resodes are
Bolivia o f f a many advantages to investors,
its h y d ~ ~ a r b oand
m minerals.~ungsten,antimony,
including free convertibility and unrestricted repa- zinc and gold have replaced the silver and tin of
triation of funds;a business sector that is eager to
colonial times as the leading exportsdOil and gas
cooperate and prosper jointly with international col- deposits, while still largely unexplored, earned $98
leagues; a low crime rate; attractive labor costs;
n
last year and have
million in f o ~ i g exchange
national treatment for foreign companies, with 100
attracted investment from smres of foreign mmpapercent ownership permitted; membership in the
nies. Potential reserves are estimated at 22 billion
Latin American IntegrationAssodation (ALADI),
cubic feet of gas and 2.2 billion barrels of oil.
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SPONSORED SECl7ON

BOLIVIA
MOVING TOWARD MODERNIZATION

Modernization has become
something of a national obses
sion in Bolivia since entrepreneurial and visionary Gonzalo
Sanchez de Lozada became the
country's thud successive democrarically elected president in
1993. After seemingly endless
military coups, the fact that civilian governments are rotating
peacefully is a major step toward
creating a modem society high
in the Andes.
In the past decade Bolivia's
economy has grown steadily, if
not spectacularly,inflation has
dropped to first-world levels,
and the overall importance of
cocoa/cocaine to GDP -wen
though the problem is still far
from an ultimate solution -has
e ined significantly.
Yet change is urgently needed. Bolivia is, after Haiti, the
poorest country in the Western
hemisphere. President Sanchez
de Lozada has embarked on a
three-part program to transform
his country and take it into the
21st century. Fit, far-reaching
educational reform is already
under way to make Bolivia's children, most of them neglectedfor decades,better prepared for
the great leap into the future.
The second item on the government's agenda is decennalization, unknown in Bolivia
since the Conquest. Local
municipalities and neighborhood organizations now manage
their own budgets instead of

I,
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in central La Paz
simply paying taxes to the cenual government Bolivians are
starting to believe the state is
their friend, not their enemy.
So far, economic stability that
many Latin American counhies
might envy has been insufficient
to eliminate widespread poverty.
Hence the third reform:
Bolivia's six principal state enterprises operating in the elecuicity generation, oil and gas,
domestic air travel, telecommunications railway, and metal
foundly sectors and together
responsible for one eighth of
GDP -will be privatized, receiving the injection of fresh capital
they need to achiwe more
dynamic growth. New "saategic
partners" will buy 50 percent of
each company's equity, with the
remaining shares distributed to
every adult Bolivian through a

-

new prime pension scheme.
Since tin prices -long
Bolivia's main source of export
revenue -collapsed in the mid1980s,the country has searched
for new sources of income.
Hopes center on becoming an
energy hub for neighboring
counhies as Bolivia's abundant
water supplies coursing down
the Andes could be converted
into cheap electricity and itsjungle lowlands contain vast gas
reselves awaiting exploitation.
F o r the past 22 years, Boli~a
has exported natural gas to
~ r ~ e n t i n 9 ~ e ~ o t i a t are
ion.s
under way to supply Brazil's
huge SCo Paulo metropolitan
area via an 1,800km pipeline.
Power-hungry mines in northem Chile and southern Peru are
other potential clients for
Boliviangenerated electricity.
Looking toward the Pacific
Rim, Bolivians beliwe they have
an advantage in their strategic
position between South
America's Pacific ports serving
the Far East and the eastern lowlands, where agriculture especially soybeans-is booming.
Upgrading highways and railroads through Bolivia will facilitate access to the ports of Arica
in Chile and Ilo in Peru, allowing soybeans from eastern
M m a and western Brazil to cut
thousands of miles from their
current route around Tierra de1
Fuego or through the Panama
Canal to markets in Asia.
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Indigenous People and Poverty
in Latin America
GEORGE PSACHAROPOULOS AND HARRY A. PATRINOS

m G E N o U s people in
Latin America live in conditions of extreme poverty,
but a recent
study sshows that by targeting
human capital-specially education-plicymakers can help
raise incomes, which, in turn,
wouM h ~ l redzlce
p
poverty.
At a time when there is growing international
interest in bringing indigenous people more
into the development process, there is also a
realization that apart from casual observation. little is known about their socioeconomic
condition. Extensive research by anthropologists documents that indigenous people are
among the poorest of the poor. But so far,
economists have ignored this problem
because of a lack of quality micm-data that
include information on the ethnic origins of
individuals What has been missing are the
economic studies-other than a few counhy
studies-that investigate the depth and per.
vasiveness of the poverty and the reasons
behind it.
In an effort to answer these question$ especially on a regional level, and to mmplement
the rich body of anthropological research at
hand, the World Bank recently hied to docu.
ment the socioeconomic situation of the estimated 34 million indigenous people in Latin
America (8percent of the region's population)
using economic m e t h d s The results confirm
that indigenous people are a seriously disadvantaged g r o u p i n areas such as education,

even worw than believed. But the results also
show that policymakers can help them
improve their plight by strengthening human
The study lmked at four countries (Holivia,
Guatemala, Mexia). and Peru), which together
have 81 percent of the continent's indigenous
population. The data were drawn primarily
from national household surveys, which were
carried out in 1989--with the exception of
Peru, for which there w a ~a 1991 Living
Standards Survey (canied out with World
Rank support). Data for Bolivia and Peru
were biased toward urban populations.
Although definitions of indigenous people
differ from country to country due to the use
of various survey instruments, the study
relied on three variables to identify the indigenous and nonindigenous populations:
language spoken, self-perception, and g e e
graphic conutntration. For Rolivia and Peru.
language was the defining characteristic In
Iblivia, it was possible to distinguish
between monolingual and bilingual (Spanish
and indigenous language) individuals, while
in Peru, only monolingual indigenous or

Spanish speakexs could be isolated. Ehr
Guatemala, self-identification or self-perception was the key, whereas in Mexico, language
and geographic concentration were used.

HOWpoor is poor?
Although the situation has improved somewhat in recent decades, there is no question
that the indigenous people of latin America
live in conditions of extreme poverty, with the
children unable to keep up with their nonindigenous counterparts
Income levels While a large proportion
of the total population of Latin America is
poor (earning Is than $2 a day), the overwhelming majority of indigenous people are
poor. In Guatemala, for example, although 64
percent of the population is poor, 87 percent of
all indigenous households are below the
poverty line. Indeed, in all the cnuntries studied, indigenous people have much lower
incomes than their nonindigenous counterparts (we table).
Living conditions Compared with the
nonindigenous population, the living conditions of indigenous people--as measured by
housing conditions and access to public services--are generally abysmal.
Although home ownership is higher in
more indigenous areas, a closer examination
reveals a clear disparity in the physical mmposition of homes In Mexico, homes in less
indigenous areas are built from higherquality
materials, such as concrete and brick. In
Bolivia, households headed by a nonindigenous person have more rooms per capita.
As for access to public services. in
Guatemala, less than one third of all indignous households have water piped to their
homes for their exclusive use, compared with
almost half of nonindigenous households, and
approximately one half of all indigenous

households have no sanitary services and
three fourths have no electricity, In Peru, only
46 percent of indigenous people's homes have
public water facilities, while 31 percent use
wells and 15 percent use the river as a source
of water; only 21 percent of indigenous homes
have public waste disposal.
An examination of rurallurban differences
further highlights the indigenous population's
deprivation. As indigenous households are
less likely to have a public source of water in
both rural and urban areas, indigenous people
are much more likely to obtain water from
wells; 16 percent of urban indigenous households and 39 percent of rural indigenous
households have wells, whereas the corre
sponding proportions of Spanish-speaking
households are only 2 percent and 10 percent.
While the proportion of rural nonindigenous
households that use rivers as their water
source is larger than in rural indigenous
households the rural prevalence of indigenous
people results in a greater proportion of the
indigenous population being exposed to the
diseases associated with poor water quality
In t a m s of fuels used, almost half of all
indigenous households rely on kerosene as a
source of light, whereas 88 percent of the
homes of Spanish speakers use electicity.
Within urban areas, the use of kerosene is
seven times greater in indigenous homes than
in the homes of Spanish speakers
Health Indigenous people are more likely
to become ill than nonindiienous people, but
they are much less likely to consult a physician or receive needed vaccinations. Although
the average cost of both hospitalization and
medicine is less for indigenous people, only 57
percent of them buy medicine, compared with
81 percent of their nonindigenous counter-

parts In Bolivia, there is a higher tendency
among indigenous people for a disability to be
sufficiently severe to keep them out of work
for more than a week.
Schooling Access to formal education has
expanded in recent years and impmvements
have occurred in indigenous areas, but indigenous people rank far lower than their non-

indigenous counterparts in this critical area of
human capital formation. Not surprisingly, the
parents' low educational attainment is
reflected in the schooling of their children.
with indigenous children more likely to repeat
grades at the primary level and more likely to
drop out of school altogether. School attendance is also affected by child labor, both in
the home and in the labor market; as hours
worked by the child increase, school attendance decreases.
In Bolivia. schooling levels are approximately three years less, on average, than for
nonindigenous individuals; the difference is
even greater for indigenous females, suggesting that they are the most disadvantaged s e p
ment in Bolivian sociefy.
In Guatemala. the majority of indigenous
people have no formal education and of those
who do, the majority have only primary education: indigenous people have only 1.3 years
of schooling on average and only 40 percent
are literate.
In Peru, nonindigenous adults have 20
percent more education than their indigenous
counterparts, of whom only 40 percent of
heads of household continue beyond primary
school and only 6 percent receive some post.
secondary education. In contrast. 62 percent of
Spanish-speaking heads of household have

some semndary schooling and !?2 percent
have some postsecondary education. Enrollment for nonindigenous children (40 percent)
is higher than for indigenous children (36percent), and school attendance is greater among
urban children.
In Mexico, where educational gains have
been particularly stmng in recent decades,
vast inequities still exist between the indigenous and nonindigenous populations, especially for women (see chart).
Labor. Labor force participation is higher
and the rate of unemployment lower for i n d i i
nous people. who are concentrated in particular sectors of the emnomy, but they tend to
earn lower salaries, work longer hours, and
hold second jobs, making a high proportion of
them "working poor." In Peru, 70 percent of
indigenous women and 63 percent of indiie
nous men are involved in agricultural activities, on average earning only one third the
salary of their nonindigenous counteparts
As for the offspring, chiid labor force participation is greater for indigenous people
than for nonindigenous people (9 percent versus 21 percent in Guatemala), with their
: incomes playing a substantial role in family
incomes, especially as the children get older.
Children of less educated parents, children of
fathers who are employed as farmers, and
children of mothers who are not in the labor
force are more likely to work.

Why is it SO bad?
Afier establishing a clearer profile of the
indigenous populations in Iatin America, the
study next tried to determine why these p e e
ple continued to remain the poorest of the
poor. In other words, which factors interact
with ethnicity to determine individual
poverty?
The study first looked at the individual's
karned income, trying to predict if the absoUte level of income would stay the same if the
ndividual's schooling attainment were higher.
t found that income would definitely be
igher. In Peru, it is estimated that the portion
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of the overall earnings differential that is due
to the productive characteristics of individuals
is equivalent to about 50 percent In other
words, if indigenous workers were em
dowed with the same productive charact e r i s t i ~ u c has education, experience, and
health-as nonindigenous workers, the earnings differential between them would narrow
by 50 percent. The remaining difference in
earnings is "unexplained:' picking up any
unmeasured difference between indigenous
and nonindigenous workers, including the
effects of differenoes in ability, the quality of
education, labor force attachment, culture,
and, of course. labor market disaimination.
Thus, increasing indigenous people's human
capital would increase their earnings and lead
to a considerable reduction in the overall earnings differential.
Next, the study looked at the poverty ratio,
a s measurd by total per capita household
income, trying to predict if the percentage of
indigenous people that are poor would be
higher or lower or the same if the level of
human capital increased. Here the study found
that the poverty ratio would dmp. The results
of a statistical analysis of the determinants of
poverty in Bolivia reveal that being indigenous increases the probability of being poor
by 16 percent However, the probability of
poverty increases by almost 45 percent for
household members whose head of household
is unemployed. This suggests that employment is more important than ethnicity. Among
indigenous heads of household, being
employed leads to a 40 percent reduction in
the incidence of poverty. Also, increasing
schooling attainment from zero to 16 years
would result in a reduction in poverty among
indigenous people from 60 to less than 30 percent. That is, the poverty ratio would decrease
by more than half if schooling were increased.
The connection, of course, is that more educated individuals are more productive and,
therefore, better able to gain access to jobs
that enable them and their families to leave the
ranks of the pmr.
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What can be done?
These findings suggest that, fortunately,
there is an unrealized potential. If policymakers concentrate on equalizing the human capital characteristicsthat is, ensuring that
indigenous people can obtain better schooling,
training, and health services-much of ,the
income differential between indigenous
and nonindigenous people would disappear
This, in turn, would help alleviate poverty
among a large segment of the Latin American
population
For education projects, knowledge about the
indigenous population can aid in determining
the location of new schools, targeting those
with poor performance, and-when and if
appropriate and in demand-providing biiin.
gual education. On the labor front, institutional issues associated with the functioning
of labor markets must be tackled. To some
extent. indigenous people receive lower earnings and have a higher incidence of poverty
because they are locked into the informal sector of the economy. This information can aid
in the creation of appropriate employment
generation schemes Regarding health, a great
deal more information is needed, but one clear
priority would be providing medical care for
pregnant women.
Finally, indigenous people should be
involved in the design and implementation of
development projects to ensure that "reforms"
reflect the local inhabitants' goals-be they
the integration or preservation of indigenous
culture. In the case of education, for example,
a lack of meaningful local participation could
result in the loss of culture and language.
Indigenous populations are different, and taking this into account means not imposing nonindigenous values. Any attempt to improve
the conditions of indigenous populations
would benefit from the consideration of "traditional" customs and expertise.

For more details, see "IndigenousPeople and
Pouerty in Latin America: An Empirical Analysis,"
edited by the authors, latin American Technical
Department, Reg'onal Studies Program, Report
Na 30,World Bank, August 1993.

BOLIVIA
Forei

direct investment idlows

Thougf?still small. flows into Bolivia have been
swelling rapidly, climbing by 93% in 1991 and 79%
in 1992. Last year Bolivia attracted direct investment
of $129 million, according to the ministry of
capitalization. The ministry expects that this figure
will almost double this year, to $250 million. In
terms of investment inflows, Bolivia attracts less
h d o r , Paryay
capital than Peru but outand Uruguay. Invcstmcnt stock stood at $951 m l ~ o n
in 1992.
Bolivia is still heavily reliant on agriculmre and
cattle ranching; thesc employ over 40% of the
economically active population and contribute 17%
of GNP. Mining and hydrocarbons arc the most
attractive sectors to foreign investors.

Privatization
Bolivia is embarking upon an extremely ambitious
privatization programme. Under its so-called capitalization scheme, the state will invite certain
investors to put forward capital equivalent to the size
of the state assct and earn a 50% stake in the new
corporations. The government will thcn distribute
its yo% share among Bolivia's 3.2 million citizens,
through a nation-wide pensions scheme.
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozado, leader ofthe centreright Movimento Nacionalista Revolucionario
(MNR), who became president in August 1993,
believes his capitalization law will raise Bolivia's
economic growth to 7% a year and crate 5oo.000
jobs. It will also transform the social security system
and free the government to manage welfare and
infrastructure projects.
By December 1991. the Bolivian government
intends to capitalize six state monopolies, beginning
with the national grid (ENDE) in November 1994.
The national oil and gas company (WFB) and the
long-distance telephone company (ENTEL) are next
on the slate followed by the railways (ENFE), the
national airline, Lloyd ACreo Boliviano (LAB), and
the smelters (ENAF). All except the railways are
profitable enterprises.
After the capitalization scheme, a further 160

smaller state-owned enterprises will be privatized.
The government intends to mmplese i n programme
by December 1997.

Investment reghions
Bolivia has dropped in insistence that most foreign
companies act in joint production with local companies, although it is still encouraging such ventures in
the mining sector.
The government is dnfdng an intellectual property law, in the hope of encouraging production of
quality products It is a h completing an arbitration
law for the settlement of trading disputes. The state
permits wholly foreign-owncd companies to operate
and there are no exchange controls.

Investment opportunities and major
prof-

Bolivia is one of only two landlodrcd countries in
the Americas. Despite the infrvrructure d i i t i e s
this causes, Bolivia hopes to entice investors with its
large neighbouring markets, ample stocks of natural
gas and tin dcposits.
National Secretary for Capitalization and Investment Ramiro Ortega Landa says investors will be
drawn into the capitalization programme because
"Bolivia is a very underdeveloped market uld thus
offcn large potential".
Bolivia has about 5.2 trillion cubic feet of proven
gas rcservcs. It has exported m its neighborn in the
past, but now hopes to pump gas to Brazil's Sao
Paulo re 'on through a 3,500 kilometre pipeline to
be comp?acd in 1997. Bolivia hopes to a m c t more
international investors with the vision of Bolivia
becoming the gas producing cenue of "the southern
cone".
The government has set low rats for mining
companies wishing m stake claims. The current rate
is $o.r$lhectare.

Taxation

Bolivia intends to introduce legislation in 1994 guaranteeing tax stability. Corporate tax varies from 10%
to a maximum 13%. Investors establishing companies also pay a tax of between 1% and 2% of the capital value of their Bolivian entity.
VAT is levied at 13%. As p u t of the government's
wealth redistribution schune, 20% of this tax
revenue is to be transferred to the provinces.
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Bolivia is still recovering from the debt overhang of
the early 1980s. In five years of recuperation, the
capital markets have absorbed $40 million, mostly as
central bank certificates of deposit, bank bonds and
fixed-term dcposits. Laws to promote the stock
market and provide greater transparency are
expected.

The countries surveyed in this guide are divided into eight
regional groups: DUD members. 8 mn-om league of htmerit leaden, olfthon centres, sub-Sahmn Yrlca, South
and Central America. hi.-PscHic, ustsrn Eump and the
former Soviet Union. 8ml the Middk East and Hath Atrlca.
Each country is given a score for cornparim with the other
countries in its group, but ems-redonal m m r i m is not
valid. For each-regbnal grouping.-the asseslment method
uses a number of indicators, dividing bmadiy into five categories (ofonomk strength, markets. resources, risk. gwemment). Each indicator is scored and converted into the
weighted scores as f o l k : the hiahest fmure in each cateaorv
- .
receives the full mark for the weigfltingr~helowest receives
zem. T h e m e for the remaininn
- finures
- Is calculated .cfowrtionately according to the formula:
rninlmum
Final scorn = (weightingl(msxlmum Rwre
figure)) x Iii#um minimum ilgure)
The exceptions to this rukare that, in U?ecaseofInflation,the
indicators are scored on their logarithmic value (negative
figures convened into positive), as is the labour force figure
fcf oEco countries. In addition, for cost of labour, the highest
figure merited zem and the lawest the full weighting mark.
The final score is a percentage of the maximum possible
score for all categories.

.

-

-

Ecomlcs(nnpth: The cconomlc i n r w s t Indlcator 6 taken
from the Eummoney Global Economrc P r o w f m s 1993-94.
the result of a bi-annul poll of e c o n o h i from leading
banks, academic lmtilutions and economic think-tanks, and
is published in the March and September -I
of
Eummoney mamzine. The analvsts were asked to score
COunlrleS in c o ~ r i s o boM
n witheach other and with prwinus years. The world's fastest-growing e m o m y in an ideal
year would score 25. the wont zero in a disastrous year. All
facton have been taken into account, including: wtalned
economic growth, monetary stability, current account and
budget surpluddeflcit, unemployment and structural imbaC
ances. The figure presented is the aggregated result for 1993
and 1934.
KwkeLS: CumuWive m l i n f l a are cJmu a t m foreign d rect
lnvestment l n f l w as measured In each repoang cluntries'
mance d payments stat stics and presented by me Imr n .ts
Infernatma1 Fmancal Sfal~stics rewrt. Reaiorul ~ N
assesses the country's catchment area in terms ofthe CNPS of
all the economies within 5W kilometres of its borders. The
measure considered only me main land massofthe nation. so
dependent territories and, in the case of the us, Hawaii and
Alaska were not taken into account.
Re10~1c.l: L h r costs per har measure the average cost
of labour in the manufacturing sector. This Includes ail
payments made to the workers as well as mandatory insurance programmes. The UN HOI (human development index) is
the yearly figure published in the UNDV Human Development
Report. The Index is "a composite measure of human deveiopment containing indicators representing three equallyweighted dimensions of human develapment - longevity (life
eKp~Ctancyat birth). knowledge (adult literacy and mean
years of schwling), and income (purchasing power parity
dollars per capita)'.
Rl* Political risk is taken from Eummoney's muntry risk
rankings, published bi-annually in March and September.
The figures presented are the results of a wll of mitical risk
analysts, risk insurance broken and bank credit officers. A
score of 50 indicates zero wlnlcal risk. C d l t risk is an
aggregate of debt indicators,access to bank lending, access
to short-term finance, access to capital markets, dixount on
forfalting. credit ratings ard debt in default or rescheduled. A
scme of 50 Indicates zero perceived credit risk.
Gowmnrent: Scores in thk section are derlved from
Eurwnoney's survey of investment agencies around the w i d .
Questionnaires were faxed or posted to 163 countries. Fw

P

those who did not reply, information was fwnd irom dher
sources, including the commercial sectlons of diplomatic
missions and professional consultancies. The nwlptionr
categmy scores countries on the following criteria: possible
foreign ownership, both wlth and without government
approval (up to 10 marks each), permissible repatriation of
orofitsand the proceeds of sale or liouidation(up to 10 marks
each), and whether or not the country is a signatory to four
key mutilateral convenths (up to 10 marks). These conventions are the convention on the settlement of investment
disputesixtween statesand natiiais of otherstates [Washinatonl.
- the cornention establishina the Muitiiateral investment Guarantee Agency (mlcnl. ~ & Y o r k convention on the
reconnition and enforcement of foreinn arbRral awards. a m
the Park convention for the
of industrial pobrty.
The maximum score b themfore 50.The lncentlrrr categoly
is scored on an analysk of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives
available to the foreign inveslor. The maximum score is 30,
based on a mideration of:
ti1 the existence and conditions of tax holidays:
(ii) concessions on import and export duties, sales tax.
withholding lax, mntributions to mandatory insurance
programmes:
(iii) grants and iaam for investment, research and deveiopment, and training:
1v) tne estabilshment d special economic zones.
The administration w r e assews the wrformance of the
agency responsible for promotine regulating or asslning
direct investment projects. The maximum score is 20. Four
marks are given if the agency is a socalled 'one-stop" or
'single window' awncv
- .(four marks are awarded autcfnalicalliif no govamment approval is required), four marks are
given for providing relevant information, six marks fora questionnaire reply and the remainder given for the fUllneSS and
aualityofthe resmse.

Sources
Asian Development Bank. Kw Indicators 1993 (1993)
Asian Devel~pmentBank. Asian Denlopment OuUmk (1994)
Economist Intelligence Unit. counlry repans and profiles
Ernst & Younn. Emeratn~Market Pm6Ies (March 1994)
~uromonitor.-ump&n Marketing Llata and Statistics (1994)
Euromonitor, International Marketing Data and Stalistics
(1994)
Eumpa Publications. The Eumw WorM Year Book 1994
119941
IMF, Balance of PaymanfsStatistics Yearbwk (1993)
IMF. InternationalFinsr~iaIStatistics(August 1994)
IMF. I n t e m a t i o ~NnanclalStatistics
l
Yearbwk(1993)
IMF, World EconomiC OuNmk (May 1994)
international Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
IICSIO)
International Energy Agency, Enerw, Prlces and Taxes
(1994)
international Labour Office. Y e a r W of Labour Statistics
(1994)
International Telecommunications Union. Yearbwk dStatistics (1994)
KPMC Peat Marwick, Invastrnenth...series
Munilatera1 investment Guarantee Paeno,
- .(MICA). warantees
department
orco. Main Economic Indicaton (Juk
19941
.
price Waterhouse. DoingBminess in... series
UNDP. Human Develonmenf R e m ~
f l 9.9-4 -) union Bank of ~witzerland.Prices and &nlnm around Me
Globe (1994)
United Nations, treaties deoartment
UN. Statistics ~ k r b w k ( l 9 i 3 3 )
us Department of Labour Statistics. Hourly Compensation
CmklorPmduction
Workers in Manufacturing(May 1994)
Wwld Bank. WorMDewIopmentReport(1994)
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Does this mean the foreign investors will have the Bolivian state as a
oartncr? Hao~ilv.no. The Bolivian
half of the privatized company's stock
wikbe handed over to privately run
pensbn plans for the binefit df the
3.5 million adult Bolivians. Two or
three yeats down the road, if all goes
accordine to Sanchez de Lozada's
plan, thLpension funds will creatc a
public market for the privatized h s ,
either by giving some of the shares
directly to the Bolivian people or by
selling shares to the public.
The Sanchez de Lozada program is
based on the economic reform that
w Christopher Palmeri
has been so successll in Chile. In
+MOTE
BOLIVIA,
a nation of 7 milChilc social security has been priva-MI
high up in the Andes, has finally $
tized, with the people allowed to ind n e d to free enterprise to rescue 2
vest their pension money in the secul e l f from poverty and economic
rities of productive enterprises. Inter~ c k w a r d n e s s .Bolivia's per capita
viewed at the Summit of the Americas
3ss domestic product is only a third
in December, Sanchez de Lozada put
-t
of neighbors Brazil and Chile.
it this way: "We are not selling assets
so much as inviting people to become
m y of Bolivia's poor are Indians
partners. That's why we call it capitalo
cannot read or speak Spanish.
:king other means of livelihood
ization, not privatization."
4 with its once rich tin mines in
In sharp contrast to Mexico's expe-ninal
decline, it is no surprise that
rience with flighty portfolio investors,
d v i a is the world's third-largcst coBolivia is looking for businesses, not
-e
producer.
institutional or private investors.
-0livia's
president, Gonzalo San- Bol~anPresdent Gomalo Sanchez de Lozada
"This is not fly-by-night capital,"
z de Lozada, is a mining entrepre- Pditlcr with an kmicrn wconL
notcs Bolivian Energy Secretary Car-r
who was raised in the U.S. and
los Miranda Pacheco. "There is a
-cated
in philosophy at the Univercommitment on both sides." ,
of Chicago. He wants badly to product is $7 billion. But money isn't
First on the block will be the pow-g
his native land into the modem the main object. The president wants er-generating assets of Empresa Na,Id. "Nations that cannot export to bring technological and manageri- cional de Electricidad (ENDE), the
ds and services," he says, "export al know-how and outside capital to his state elecmc company. Last yea? 31
d
e and drugs."
landlocked and primitive economy. foreign companies formally expressed
s his biggest step inintegrating his The Bolivian state oil company, Yaci- intcrest in bidding for ENDE. The list
rlomy with that of the outside mientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivi- includes big utilities like Dominion
I d , Sanchez de Lozada hopes to anos ( ~ F B ) has
,
already joined with Resources, General Public Util~ties
-pieces
of six state-owned compa- foreign fims like Enron, Tenneco, and Baltimore Gas & Electric, as well
. On the block: airline, phone, oil, British Gas and Australia's Broken as independent power producers like
-ad
and tin smelting operations. Hill Proprietaq to construct a natural AES, Destec Energy and Enron.
s Bolivia's minister ofplanning in gas pipeline &om Bolivia to Brazil.
"This plan will accomplish two immid-1980s, Sanchez de Lozada The combined cost of this project, portant goals," says Mark T. Cox,
-ed
with Harvard economist Jef- which includes new power plants and head of Dominion Resources' interSachs in bringing economic development of Bolivia's large gas national operations. ''Adding new ca-k therapy to Latin America, slash- reserves, is expected to top $5 billion. pacity, and getting the government
m e s , tarif&, regulations and sub- On its own, Bolivia could not raise out of the businesses."
a.The program cut inflation h m this kind of money.
By adopting the Chilean model,
1 0 0 % per year in 1985 to the
Theoilcompanyit~~lfisn~wonthe
the Bolivian president is seeking to
-1e
digits, where it remains today. privatization list. Winning bidden in give even the poorest of his people a
m c h e z de Lozada believes his this and other asset sales will receive diica stake in private cntcrprisc. $'We
-uy
is now ready for the next step 50%of the stock and complete man- want people participating [in the prih e road to capitalism. He thinks agement control of the privatized vatization] for political and social rea-an raise as much as $2 b i i o n firms. In return, they will agree to sons," Sanchez de Lozada says. "We
-gh
privatization-a lot of mon- invest a predetermined amount in want the Bolivian people reading
a nation whose gross domestic modernizing the operations.
FORBES,not Karl Ma."
I

.Mexico's troubles notwithstanding, the capitalist
'evolution continues to sweep Latin America.
Vow it's Bolivia's turn.

W'll Bolivians
read Forbes?

-

-
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US lowest rate enhanced?

hope that it would boost the retained
earnings of small businesses and make
Kepublicans in the US'S House of Repre- payment of the alternative minimum tax
senlatives want to grant tax relief to com- more attractive to more companies.
panies which elect to pay the country's
It remains to be seen how the bin would
lowest business tax rate. The alternative be financed. Under federal law. Congress
minimum tax is a 20%flat rate levied on cannot cut one source of revenue without
corporations which might otherwise compensating in some way.The long-term
claim enough deductions or credits to costs of asimilar bill seladisturbiingprece
escape income taxes altogether.
dent for this latest proposal. It is estimated
Led by Bill Archer, chairman of the that amoregenerous depreciation formula
House Ways and Means Committee. for capital intensive businesses proposed
Congressional Republicans are cam- in the Conbact with America would cost
paigning for a proposal which would aroundsf39 biiiun overthenextten yearsif
allow corporations the right to write off itbecomes law.
capital investments in plants and equip
The most painless option would be to
ment according to a standard formula. offset the cost of the new alternative tax
irrespective of the tax rate which they rate against savings made elsewhere.
Under consideration is a proposal to scale
pay.
I'roponents of the bill, which was not down a suggested reduction in corporate
included in the original tax cuts promised capital gains tax,which analysts expect to
in the 'Contract with America' proposals cost $15.1 billion in lost revenue over the
issued before last November's elections. next fiveyears.

-
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Receiver's liable in UK
A ruling by the UK's House of Lords will
make receivers and administrators liable
for the severance pay and pensions contributions of some employees of the companies they close. Under the ruling,
employees kept on for more than 14days
after their companiesgo bust are regarded as having their severance pay and
pensionentitlementsadopted.
The judgment arose from the legal
baffle fought by two pilots from Paramount Airways, a small aviation wmpany which went into receivership in 1989.
The pilots were sacked by the receivers
after the crudal 14 day period.
The Society of Practitioners of Insolvency (SPD, the indushy trade body.
says receivers could face claims worth
up to f2billion ( U S 3 biion) stretching
back to 1986, when the law which has
caused confusion was passed. The SPI
said the 20.000 cases where companies
went into reseivership before last Spring
were all potential sources of claims.
That figurr represents over 500.000
former employees entitled to demand
compensation.

Bolivian tax reforms
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The problem is simple. 'Most employees will only be entitled to statutory /
redundancy pay." says a spokesperson ;
for the SPI. "It will be the directors [of j
insolvent compani~slwho benefit And j
they're often thevery people determined !
to have caused the insolvency of the
company in the first place."
Roger Powdrill. the insohrenqparher
withTouche Ross who acted as receiver in
the Pammount case, exprrssed disap
pointment at the result He is in no doubt
that there are many wmpany directors
who "will be astute enough" to realize the
potential for retrospective claims
"The law is an ass." says Stephen Hill
of Coopers 81 Lybrand, which has the
UK's largest insolvency practice. He
points out that the ruling which the
Lords upheld started l i e as an amendment to an established bill. tagged on by
a 'bleeding heart MP", rather than as a
central object of legislation. He expects
that any further compensation would .
have to come from other creditors.
The Department of Trade and Indus
try is now under pressure to bring in retrespective legislation to protect the
receivers.

'

Since coming to power in August 1993,the
Bolivian President Gonzalo Sinchez de
Lozada has implemented a series of major
reforms. These have included constitutional reform, educational reform and
other important legal amendments that lay
down the basis for the present privatiza
tion process.
The new Tax Reform Law No. 1606,
approved by Congress on December 22
1994, is one of these important changes.
l h e law is effectiveas ofJanuary 11995. It
makes the following important changes to
theBoliviantaxsystem:
the Corporate Presumed InmmeTaxof
3%on a company's equity is abolished.
Instead of this tax companies must pay
25%income tax on their net profit This
25%income tax is also imposed on mining, petroleum and elecbic companies:
the transaction tax of 2% on the gross
income of individuals and companies.
except on employees' salaries, is raised
to3X:
the consumption of electricity over 200
kilowatt hours a month now faces a 20%
tax. However, this tax is not levied on
indusbialcompanies:
payments made abroad that benefit
from a Bolivian source of income were
formerly subject to a withholding tax of
13%. This withholding tax is cut to
12.5%;
leasing operations are now included
among those operations that pay 13%
valueaddedtax (VAT;
the Specific Consumption Tax has also
been changed. The import of cigarettes
faces a 50%tax,and vehicles an 18%tax.
However, vehicles inlended to be used
to transport passengers or trucks only
paya1Wtax:and
independent professionals have been
exempt from the 13%Complementary
VAT. Instead of this tax, such profes
sionals must pay a profit tax of 25%.The
law presumes that half of their gross
income is profit and the 25% rate is
levied on that sum. l l ~ u sprofessionals
.
must pay a 12.59; tax on their annual
grossincome.
Diego Rojas of CR&FRojas, I a Paz
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The Andean Pact:
In the Forufrorzt of
The Integration Movement
By Paul W. Moore and Rebecca K. Hunt
Office of Latin America
U.S. Department of Commerce

T

he Andean Pact. which began with the Cartagena
Agreement in 1969, is one
of the oldest free trade movements
still existing today. The original
membershipBolivia, Chile. Colombia. Ecuador, and Peru--has
changed slightly with the inclusion
of Venezuela (1973) and the withdrawal of Chile (1976). but the
Pact remains generally intact. For
nearly 20 years, its goals of
economic growth and the creation
of a regional common market
floundered. Over the past several
years, however, changes to democratic governance and developments in trade and investment
liberalization have prompted renewed interest and actions among
Pact members. These actions have
brought the Andean Pact to the
forefront of the integration movement in Latin America. The Andean Pact has progressed beyond a
free trade agreement, as it begins
to implement a customs union
similar to the European Union.
In December 1991, the Act of
Barahona was signed by the presidents of the Andean Pact nations.
This act established the outline for
the creation of a regional free
trade zone. Subsequently, Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela
established a free trade regime between themselves, and by February
1993, the free trade. zone was
complete among these four countries. Another pan of the Act of
Barahona specifies that Andean
Pact members will finalize a fourlevel, common external tariff (5,
Buslness America

10, 15. and 20 percent) effective
April 30, 1994 (this is a target
date; there have been a number of
delays to date). Currently, most
members apply tariffs within that
range but apply different tariffs to
different products. Bolivia has an
exception for its two-tiered tariff
structure, which remains at 5 percent for capital goods and 10 percent for all other imports. Ecuador
is currently negotiating for some
exceptions to the four-tier tariff
system, in order to maintain some
lower tariff rates on needed raw
materials.
Peru. meanwhile, had voluntarily
withdrawn from the Pact's Barahona commitments citing funda-

The Andean Pact's long history and recent advances
have made it a noteworthy
example of economic advancement, trade expansion,
and integration. The elements
of the Pact have been both
cause and effect of recent
trade and investment liberalizations. While the recent
trend toward free market capitalism has caused many
changes in Latin American
countries, those in the Andean Pact have made these
changes both unilaterally and
as a group, strengthening
their effect and better ensuring that these changes are
here to stay.

mental differences in economic
liberalization policies and unfair
competition from both Colombia's
and Venezuela's export sectors.
Peru began its economic liberalization later than the other members
of the Pact, and took radical steps
in order to "catch up" with the
other member countries. and actually surpassed some of them. Andean Pact Decision 353 of April
4, 1994 announced the terms of
Peru's full return to the Pact. Peru
will begin immediately to harmonize its macroeconomic policies
and external trade negotiations
with the Andean Pact. Meanwhile,
Peru will implement a zero tariff
rate on those intra-regional trade
products currently assessed at 5
percent. expanding this to all items
by December of this year. One
major policy difference exists between Peru and other Pact members, however, in that Peru desires
a flat 15 percent common external
tariff across the board, while all
other Pact members prefer the
four-tiered schedule already in
place. It remains to be seen how
this will work out, but Peru plans
on full reintegration into the Andean Pact by June 1995.
Intra-regional trade has already
increased tremendously with the
existing free trade zone agreement.
Trade between Colombia and
Ecuador reportedly increased by 76
percent from 1992 to 1993; meanwhile, Venezuela-Colombia trade
grew from $1 billion in 1992 to
nearly $2.5 billion in 1993, an astounding increase of 250 percent.
Similar gains are expected for
Peru, with full reinsertion into the
Pact. From 1992 to 1993. Peru experienced an increase of 29 percent in intra-regional Andean Pact
trade.
Over the past two years, new
Andean Pact Decisions have
helped improve investment regulations in the region, while giving
each member country the leverage

- t o set its own national standards
-higher than the framework estabdished by the Pact. Decision 291.
-+pproved in May 1991, provides
-1ational treatment to foreign indestment, including equal tax and
'iscal incentives and the eliminaion of restrictions on capital
lains. This allows foreign inves3rs the right to take full advan+ge of intra-Andean trade
-references in a combined market
~f 70 million people through oper-ions
in any one member country.
On October 21, 1993, the An:an Pact significantly improved
intellectual property rights
I P R ) regimes of signatory coune
s by approving three new
'trees-Decisions 3441345
-atents/trademarks)
and 351
~pyrights).The new measures:
-tend
the patent term from 15 to
years; provide immediate patent
~tectionfor biotechnology invenI n s and new plant varieties;
a n t protection for industrial se-ts:
narrow compulsory licensing
4 working requirements; extend
~tectionto well-known trade-ks;
and extend copyright prot i o n to scientific, literary, and
istic works (including software
4 databases) for the life of the
-hor
plus 50 years. While these
->rovements
still fall short of
objectives and the new
;IT Trade Related Intellectual
bperty agreements (TRIPS). the
-cisions represent a strong step
t h e right direction.
-n
1994, the 25th year of the
-can Pact, the commission inw
s to continue the integration
:ess through the following am,us activities:
n,
its treatment of relations
w i t h the United States, include
nevaluation of the alternatives
individual or group) for mem-er
country accession to
{AFTA.
loordinate a common position
3r the Summit of the

-

+.

Americas.
.k Study the possibilities for external relations with different
groups of countries. in particular those of Asia and the Pacific Rim.
Study the possibility of convergence of the integration
process of the Andean Pact and
Mercosur and study Brazil's
proposal for a South American
Free Zone (SARA).
Study the effect environmental
impacts and labor restrictions
can have on international com-

*
*

merce of the member countries.
* Produce
a draft decision for the
creation of a commission of
competitiveness and to hold
seminars with the region's labor
unions to discuss labor's role
in the integration process in
order to give greater importance
to social and labor aspects of
the integration process.
For further information, please
contact Paul W. Moore, U.S. Department of Commerce Desk Officer for Colombia/Office of Latin
America. (202) 482-1659.

Latin America
And Environmental
Technologies Exports
By the Office of Environmental Technologies Exports
and the Office of Latin America
U.S. Department of Commerce

n his Earth Day 1993 speech.
President Clinton directed the
Departments of Commerce and
Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other key
agencies to assess the domestic
and international competitiveness
of the U.S. environmental technologies industry and to formulate
a strategy to maximize environmental technologies exports.
Before an audience of over 200
industry members, Commerce Secretary Ronald H. Brown during his
Earth Week 1994 speech on the
"Environmental Partnership" stated
that the overall strategic framework calls for enhancing domestic
technological development and
commercialization and providing
focused and effective government
export assistance. To implement
the export strategy, the Secretary
recently appointed Anne L. Alonm

to the newly-created position of
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Technologies Exports.
The Clinton Administration has
identified environmental technology
as an industry export sector in
which the United States can lead
the world as we move into the
21st century. The environmental
technologies industry is highly diverse. It includes products designed to: monitor and access
pollutant releases; prevent pollution; control pollution; and remediate polluted air. water, and soil.
In the November 1993 Strategic
Framework Report. the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee
(TPCC)-sponsored report on Environmental Technologies Exports
called for establishing a Latin
American Environmental Initiative.
Principal goals of the Initiative include support for sound environ-
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Further repmductlon pmhlbited.

Tamed inflation fuels investment
According to IADB, 1994 will
mark the fourth straight year

ing debt, runaway inflation and
corrupt political leadership,
Brazil, Argentina, Chile and
other reform-driven nations

more dramatic than the rise in
GDP has been the free-fall of in-

m i . As expected, the threeday
meeting of 34 Western Hemisphere leaders ended with a
formal invitation for Chile
to become the "Fourth Amigo"
in the North American Free
Trade Agreement. Beyond that,
attendees also pledged to create a sprawling free-trade zone
by 2005 thatwould stretch from
Anchorage to Buenos Aires.
Within South America, trade
already is booming. Next month,
four southern neighbors-Ar-

flation from recent dizzying
heights. Argentine President
Carlos Menem has led the antiinflation revolution, rescuing
his nation from a staggering
4,900% hyperinflation rate in
1989with a model mix of broad

overnment

the Real (R$), which

Cardoso presents an
image to the world that
is in sharp contrast to
the ineffectual current
President Itamar Fran-
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bstract: Bolivia's performance in terms of international trade showed
ixed results for 1992. Export trade declined to $860 from $1 billion in
991 while imports rose to $710 million from $650 million in 1991.
evertheless, Bolivia has the lowest inflation rate in the Latin American
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exports from developing countries. To this end, a study of the Brazilian
and Bolivian exports was conducted. It revealed that trade preferences
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little to advance exports from advanced developing nations such as
Brazil.
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-bstract:
Boliviafs primary industry is mining with silver, minerals
d n d hydrocarbons as the main exports. However, progress in this sector
-as
been hindered by protectionist policies consisting of customs
.estrictions, subsidies and other mechanims. In the 1990s, the government
~f Bolivia sought to introduce reforms in its economic policies to
stablish a free market system. A number of mining laws have been passed
o attract more investments into the sector. Moroever, Bolivia has also
educed its import duties to a range of 5% to 10%. However, banking and
inance are still controlled industries. A directory of financing
nstitutions is included.
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Income distribution in the Third World: Its estimation
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=act :
A 2-stage least squares estimate of the distribution of
zome in the Third World is derived using the per capita ownership
cars, infant mortality rates, and the average daily caloric
~uirementalong with the per capita gross domestic product
lP/CAP). Using the parameters estimated via 2-stage least squares
a set of 23 countries for which the distribution of income is
-)wn, the distribution of income is estimated for a set of 43
+ntries for which these data are unknown. The results indicate
t countries like Singapore and Sri Lanka have relatively even
tributions of income for their stage of development, and countries
m e Brazil, Kenya, Bolivia, and Guatemala have highly skewed
tributions of income for their level of GDP/CAP.

-~t (c) 1995 by UMI Company.
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THATCHERISM'S MIXED LEGACY TO BOLIVIA

B

OLNIA, whence I have just returned, is one of Latin
America's poorest, and the world's p r e r , countries.
They have problems whose scale we can only begin to
imagine. Nothing supposedly "happening" in UK politics
now will merit more than a line from columnists in LaPaz,
and nothing deserves to.
Development politics, far pore than o w own
hothouse nonsense, merits our attention I have now marshalled some Bolivian thoughts and they start with a snort, in
the early '80s, in ourownHobse of Commons.
Peter Shore, much respected former minister and
veteran Labour MP,has a magnificent snort. He employed it
in the direction of a young Tory pup who had advised the
House that all that was needed to revitalise the UK economy
was a removal of taxes and regulations
and a reduction in the price of labour.
"Pffah!" came the snort ''If that were true.
then Calcutta would be a paradise. Bombay
would be an economist's dream."
I move next to a sneer: from
Michael Forsyth, the Scottish Tory W t e r
and relentless advocate of Adam Smith
economics. with a fine and contemptuous
intellect. I remember him tearing into a
group of Labour MPs who were arguing
that social regulations, industrial training
and minimum wages would banish recession. He dismissed their reasoning with a
sarcastic illustration: the "Ostrich Fee'ther
and Fancy Hat" Wages Council, apparently
still in existence, Futile, he sneered
1 have been thinking about both Shore's snort and
Forsyth's sneer. Each is fair comment on tha other's ideblogy.
Yet each misses something.
Bolivia, though desperately poor, is not a nation in
crisis. Famine, drought, catastmphe of the k
i
d which
wrecks and rocks African economies
these distortions
are largely absent. The economy -part subsistence, part (in
embryo) modern has remained rather stable. In recent
years successive administrationshave followed anag~ressively
Thatcherite policy of deregulation, pdvatisation and public
sector cuts, some quite savage. The Bolivian model, therefore,
makes a useful test-study of the operation of a free market
upon a poor, backward but viable Third World economy.
And you can add this: the Indian peasantry are
natural capitalists. At the bottom level - in the undergrowth
of the poor in the Andes - Adam Smith is allve and
astonishingly welL You want a tyre fixed? An Indian in a
shack down the mad will do it fast and cheap. You want a
porter? Twenty youths will bid each other down to the
cheapest offer, before your eyes. You want to change dollars?
On the street in La Paz, fifty Indians with pocket calculators
will pare their commission to the bone.
Your bus stops at a red light, and three old women
with baskets of hot cheese rolls bundle in (offeringthedriver

...

-
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his free sample, to look the other way), accompanied by two
little boys competing to sell you tubes of iced fruit juice. Here
at the grass mots capitalism is working. Michael Forsyth
should be cheering. There isno minimum wage, and wages
councils are unheard of.
Wbich brings us to the p a t riddle: the Feason for
Peter Shore's snort, Why is the capitalist sap, so strong in the
peasantry's m t s , not rising to the branches? Where are the
medium-sized businesses? Where are the Indians employing
other Indians and building a factory? A thousand kids will
shine your shoes for tuppence, but why can nobody plumb a
loo. or wire a house well? You can buy sweets or mousetraps
from innumerable old ladies with piles of wares, but where
is the efficient foodstore, the handy DIY shop? Indians fix
cars, so why doso few get to drive them?
Sewing machines line the streets,
each with an operator ready to mend
clothes - so why does Bolivia import
T-shirts fmm Brazil? Washing soap from
Argentina? T i e d pork from Denmark?
Within the answer, I believe, lies
the rebuke both to Chicago-school emnomic liberals and to the socialist bigspenders, once so fashionable in develop
ment politics.
Typically among Third World
emnomias. Bolivia is cruelly short of
skills and technical education. Literacy is
low, book-keeping unheard of. There are
few nlght schools or technical colleges.
And the physical infmtructure is missing,
too. Roads are bad. and often cut. Poww supplies are patchy
and unraliablq Few have telephones. The country is now
making p a t strides to remedy this -but with what? Gold,
logglng and coca are bringing in unmeasured wealth literally unmeasured: the state, with a backward civil
senrice. is mostly unable to identify or tax the buarmeers.
The pvemment should be siphoning off funds into roads,
schools, power stations. Unless it can,it is simply not true
that wealth in the undergrowth will ever produce the tall,
enduring trees which a mature economy needs.
But them is another reason why Infant entrepreneurs
neverseem togmw up in emnomies like this. Until recently,
money has never been worth saving never been worth
investing, in Bolivia. When I was there in 1983 it was carried
in suitcases. Ill-advisedspendingby unworldly governments
produced an inflation which in turn discouraged any
budding entrepreneur £rum his first step: opening an account.
This spawned a culture hcstile to planning to size, and to
permanenceinbusiness.
Thatcherism's one great giPt to Bolivia and the
developing world has been to teach the value of a stable
currency. Thatcherism's great deception has been the idea
that sound, properly manned and properly financed civil
addnistrationisanythinglessthanvital to anation.
Malthew Par&
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ract:
The future of Bolivia's novel capitalization program
wears to be secured, although the process will not proceed as
ickly or as smoothly as hoped. Other plans to slash the public
=tor are picking up steam. The government's majority in Congress
2uld prove sufficient for the passage of key legislation needed to
?italize Bolivia's 6 major state enterprises. Under the
?italization program, a management share of each company will be
lght by a private investor or consortium, and the remainder will be
dtributed as shares to Bolivians via private pension funds.
.ivia offers more immediate business opportunities than
-1ita1ization.
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lract:
Bolivia will attract growing attention from potential
zestors as a new batch of structural reforms is put into place and
a country's potential in mining and energy becomes more evident.
momic expansion will be steady and inflation low. However, the
-intry remains one of the poorest in the hemisphere. The following
d.as are discussed: 1. political outlook, 2. GDP, 3. agriculture
a fisheries, 4. industrial production, 5. government spending, 6.
-estment,
7. inflation, 8. labor, 9. credit, 10. foreign
!de, 11. balance of payments, and 12. exchange rate.
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Americas* trade zone could give U.S. textile, apparel a huge boost.
WWD, Dec 12, 1994 v168 n113 pl(2).
Author: Jim Ostroff

Abstract: Pres Bill Clinton and industry leaders met in Miami, FL, to
discuss establishing a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005. This
-agreement will eliminate any trade barriers between North and South
-America and will boost the economies of the participating countries.
Textile and apparel industry leaders are especially optimistic about this
Clinton and other leaders from Canada, Mexico and the US will
+greement.
soon meet to discuss including Chile in the North American Free Trade
qgreement

.

jubjects: North America - Relations with South America
'rade negotiations - Planning
:lothing industry
International trade
'extile industry - International trade
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tatutes: Free Trade Agreement, 1992, United States-Canada-Mexico
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Economic policy

$HE APPAREL SECTOR
lUALllY AND PRICE
-1 FIT YOUR NEEDS

More and more foreign
-)mpanies have recently been
king to Bolivia as the ideal
-shore production location to
duce their operating costs.
4estors are impressedto find very
mmpetitive labor rates, high
Auctivity, low turnover and low7
-senteeism. The work force has a
-1gstanding tradition of manual
-xterity, trainability and high work
~ic.
The country's attractiveness as
nanufacturing location is further
-eased as Bolivia does not have
3arel quotas. In addition,
.-a
il
treaties and agreements
being developed yo provide
r e r e n t i a l access to the United
-es
and European markets.
Companies looking to source
-rt-quality
garments can find
Jttractive installed capacity in
ze from which to undertake
-w-back
or full package
+tracting.
Bolinvest can provide
technical assistance to help
develop suppliers to fulfill your
-ific
needs.
I

,

Other countries offer low labor
but Bolivia goes beyond this

-)e

lowest labor cost in the
nericas
highly productive work force
3 quotas
local textile industry that allows
+rtical
integration and higher
fita ability
All of the above establishes
as the NEWEST and MOST
!ACTIVE offshore location for
-cing
apparel manufacturing
, and for contract sourcing.
dia

Fine 100% cotfwl gatmenis are
manufactured by Roytnar.

ARTHUR TRACHT

Mlllmo
i

millm ma, is the leading ~ n ~ f a c f u r e r o f
high-end a l p m sweders h Bollvia. During
the last five years, our e ~ ~ ~ r i ehas
n c been
e
highly satisfactory. Good quality natural
fibenplus a dexterous labor force, place
Millma in a highly competitiveposition to
e m profitably. We are porticvlady bppY
with fhe high work ethic of fhe Bolivian
workers This is evidenced by fhe low
turnover and absenteeism rates which are
very Important for our labor- intensive
product.=

produdiwl machinery.

I

!

i
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'HE TEXTILE SECTOR

4

E SPECIALTY
i AND MORE..

Aivian textiles have a rich
3n dating back to pre+n
times. Three thousand
390 artisans produced
i t e hand-spun cloths which to
yare beautiful and

roof.

is revealed bythedetaii ofthisancient fabric.

Today, fashions are clearly
tending towards natural- fiber
cloths which provide elegance.
comfort and thermal insulation.
Due to its unique geographic
location and topography, Bolivia
has a range of climatic environments ideal for the production of a
variety of specialty fibers to suit
consumer preferences.
Bolivian fibers such as alpaca.
llama and angora are recognized
worldwide as being of the highest
quality. The broad spectrum of
natural gray and brown tones in
which these fibers come render
dyeing unnecessary for the
<naturalist. market niche. However,
these fibers also come in white and
off-white which allows dyeing into
virtually any fashionable color.
Bolivia's vast herds of alpaca
and llama are being increased
and refined through technical
assistance programs. The fibers that
these herds aenerate have
traditionallybeen exported in raw
form, however, this is rapidly
changing with vertical integration
and the application of new
technologies.
Bolivia also produces
traditional fibers such as sheepswool and long-fiber cotton. The
textile industry has been able to
produce intertwines of exotic and
traditional fibers, which in turn have

NlELS PHRAM
Angora Sport

-1 am Danish, from Copenhagen.Eight years
ago I amved In Bollvla with my wife and 300
angora mbblts h search of the ideal place
to breed them. We found this place In To@.
and consider It to be the best place In the
world. Weproo'uce thermal undenvear and
specla1spdwear for outdoor octlvitles
based on the fiber of fhe angora rabbn
which is fhe most thermal flber h existence.
We are now succe~~fully
e W n g to cold
regions of Europe like Swiherland, Germany
We are happy to be here,
and Scandln~la~
we like the cllmate, and the government
helped us a loth ow expanslm..

Country Commercial Guide
Bolivia
Fiscai Year 1996
This Country commercial Guide (CCG) presents a comprehensive look
at Bolivia's commercial environment through economic, political
and market analyses.
The CCGs were established by recommendation of the Trade
Promotion coordinating Committee (TPCC), a multi-agency task
force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for
the U.S. business community. Country Commercial Guides are
prepared annualy at U.S. Embassies through the combined efforts
of several U.S. governement agencies.
>CHAPTER I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

-

Bolivia is the poorest country in South America. Nonetheless, it
is firmly committed to a free market economic system, and has had
positive economic growth eight years running. The
market-oriented reforms initiated in 1985 have been
institutionalized and advanced. With a low level of
industrialization, Bolivia is reliant upon imports, especially
capital and consumer goods, to meet its citizens1 needs. The
U.S. is Bolivia's largest single trading partner; in 1994 Bolivia
had a slight trade surplus with the U.S.: imports from Bolivia
were $260 million while exports to Bolivia reached $186 million,
according to U.S. Dept. of Commerce statistics.
The economic growth rate for 1994 was 4.1 percent. Bolivia's
1994 inflation rate was 8.3 percent, one of the lowest in the
region.
'

Best prospects for investment for 'U.S. companies are in the
mining', petroleum, and agriculture sectors. In addition, the
Government of Bolivia (G0B)is i n t h e process of selling off 50
percent of its sixlarg.est public corporations (electric power, .
telecommunications,'hydrocarbons,.airline, .railroad,.and
smelter). As all of the six companiesto.be partially sold. (in a
,

.
,

,
.

~

to long-term. As the new managers move in, however, the
workforce may shrink initially, as most payrolls of the public
corporations are bloated. The GOB also hopes corruption will be
lessened as a by-product of capitalization, as large numbers of
jobs and amounts of money move out of public control.
The government plans to use the money which in the past went to
the companies to be capitalized towards increased social
investment in education, public health, and roads. These sectors
should therefore be more attractive in the coming years to U.S.
providers of goods and services.
The administration of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada is
committed to keeping inflation low. In 1993 and 1994 the rate of
inflation was below 10 percent, and, while the rate has slipped
above 10 percent for the last 12 months as of May 1995, in all
likelihood the 1995 rate will also be in qingle digits, although
not falling to the government's goal of 6.5 percent. The GOB is
attempting to improve tax collection methods and has modified its
tax structure to increase revenues. It is also trying to clamp
down on tax cheats and, to a.lesser extent, on parts of the
extensive informal economy.
The outlook for Bolivia's economy remains positive for the next
two years, until the end of the present administration. While
the elections of 1997 should bring some uncertainty as to who
economic policy makers would be in a new administration, nearly
all of Bolivia's political parties are now dedicated to free
market principles, and there should be no large-scale changes.
At the same time, Bolivia's endemic poverty and public
indebtedness--the GOB has around $4.2 billion worth of bilateral
and multilateral debt--will not go away or be reduced in any
measurable way. Bolivia will remain heavily dependent upon the
kindness of strangers--World Bank, IMF, InterAmerican Development
Bank, friendly donor nations--to balance its books.
Principal Growth Sectors:
~he'twomajor sectors of the.Bolivian economy, mining and
agriculture, should see significant growth 'in 1995, for.different,

)

previous three years, shrunk significantly, to $224 million from
a 1993 deficit of $496 million. Of the 1994 merchandise exports
of $985 million, minerals accounted for $413 million, natural gas
(to Argentina) $92 million, and non-traditional exports $521
million. Imports were $1.209 billion in 1994, up slightly from
1993 figures. Consumer goods accounted for $281 million,
intermediate goods $488 million, and capital goods $424 million.
Capital goods imports accounted for only 35 percent of total
imports in 1994; they had been 43 percent of total imports in
1993. Unregistered imports in the form of contraband probably
accounted for several hundreds of millions of dollars, as did
unregistered exports in the form of consumer goods, gold, and
cocaine.
Bolivia's current account deficit in 1994 reached $133 million,
offset by a positive capital account of $389 million and
"extraordinary financingt1of $133 million ,(i.e., rescheduled debt
payments). Net international reserves indreased to $502 million
at the end of 1994, up from $371 million at the end of 1993.
Errors and omissions in the balance of payments published by the
Central Bank were a negative.$306 million.
The positive balance in the capital account came from $128
million in direct investment and $360 million in external loan
disbursements. The World Bank ($79 million), IDB ($136 million)
and CAF ($72 million) accounted for the majority of
.disbursements. The government paid $139 million on principal and
$137 million in 1994 to service its debt. Thus its net inflow
was only $84 million., Bolivia also received $267 million in the
form of assistance on a grant basis, as ltunilateraltransfersm
calculated by the Central Bank.
Bolivia renegotiated some of its debt payments through the Paris
Club of bilateral lenders in 1994. Total official debt of the
GOB at the end of 1994, according to the Central Bank, was $4.18
billion, with $1.8 billion owed to other governments and the rest
to multilateral development banks;
Infrastructure Situation:

Bolivia as a fully cooperating country in the area of
counternarcotics policy. A reinvigorated coca eradication campaign produced noteworthy results
and the GOB avoided full decertification. Equally important, a
new bilateral extradition treaty was signed in June, 1995.
Nevertheless, counternarcotics issues remain a controversial
feature of bilateral relations as the GOB'S ability to sustain
the counternarcotics effort is uncertain.
Under the direction of President Sanchez de Lozada and Foreign
Minister Antonio Aranibar, Bolivia pursues a forward-looking
foreign policy, seeking to expand markets in East Asia and Europe
and to promote western hemisphere free trade. Indeed, Sanchez de
Lozada was instrumental in developing the goal of hemispheric
free trade by the year 2005 during the Miami Summit of the
Americas.
)..

Some Pending Issues in U.S.-Bolivian Relations:
Bolivia must sustain the current coca eradication effort
throughout 1995 or once again risk decertification for not fully
complying with counternarcotics treaty obligations.
While Goni hopes to get away from foreign aid, Bolivia needs aid
for years to come, at a time of plummeting assistance levels in
the U.S. and elsewhere, in order to address balance-of-payments
and social problems. Goni hopes for more multilateral
assistance, especially from international financial institutions
for initiatives such as alternative development projects. He
also has asked for (and received) U.S. guidance and assistance on
charting a workable sustainable development strategy.

'

Bolivia needs to become more attractive to foreign investors;
e.g., by reforming the judicial system, approving a bilateral
investment tre,aty,eliminating bureaucratic impediments,
downsizing and modernizing Bolivia's parastatal corporations
(which Goni hopes will be partidlly bought off by investors: his
I1capitalization"plan),and
tackling the recalcitrant labor
.
unions,.
,

Bolivia has begun its own "good gov.erkanceft
'initiative,.crucial
to attracting investment and improving Bolivia's image,\but the.
road ahead will not be smooth. . The,Goniadministration first

.S.-Bolivia

president Sanchez de Lozada interpreted his 1993 election victory
as a loud call for change and embarked on an ambitious
legislative program promoting capitalization (privatization), and
electoral and education reform. Unfortunately, the government's
implementation of these legislative successes has been slow,
resulting in growing disenchantment. Voter frustration over the
government's ineffectiveness, as well as over continued high
levels of poverty, will likely be an important factor in the '97
general election.
Challenges and changes
The major challenge confronting President Sanchez de Lozada as he
approaches his administration's half-way mark will be to fully
implement the legislative change passed in 1994 - capitalization,
educational reform and popular participation. Each of these
three areas remains highly controversial, and tackling any one of
them would be difficult. To fully succee&, Sanchez de Lozada
will have to overcome his natural reluctance to use his
congressional majority and forcefully push through his program.
To his credit, his majority did use its pull in early July 1995
to pass the Telecommunications Law, an important step in the
capitalization process.
This will be complicated by the fact that the government
coalition, which commands only a slight majority in the lower
house, is shaky. After eight months in the opposition, brewery
owner and UCS leader Max Fernandez led his 21 UCS deputies back
into the government in June, but he remains an unreliable
partner. Meanwhile, the leftist MBL, never a entirely
comfortable fit, is increasingly restive and will try to water
down if not thwart key aspects of the GOB'S counternarcotic and
political reform policies.
Outline of political system
Three branches of government:
EXECUTIVE: Eleven-member cabinet, most recently shuffled in
March 1994. President elected to five-year term,(starting in
1997), but cannot serve consecutive terms; If no candidate wins
an absolute majority of the popular vote, a president is elected
from the top two finishers by Congress.
PRESIDENT
MINISTE~OF GOVERNMEN
DEFENSE.MINISTE
MINISTEROF;THE,

serve one ten-year term. The Attorney General, independent from
the Executive Branch, is also appointed by the President,
confirmed by the Congress and serves a ten-year term.
--CHAPTER IV. MARKETING U.S. PRODUCTS AND SERVICES

-

Distribution and Sales Channels:
Import Channels: There are four principal types of commercial
import channels: commission or independent sales agents or
representatives, import houses, subsidiaries of foreign firms,
and direct importation by government agencies.
It is important not only to select the type of distribution
system most suitable for the exporting firm and its product, but
also to appoint an experienced, aggressiye, financially solvent
representative. Capital goods exporters'should ensure that
potential representatives have access to key decision-makers.
Most heavy equipment, machinery, and general merchandise must be
delivered through seaports in Peru, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina.
Occasionally, bad weather, landslides, port congestion, or other
factors may block all import channels. It is important to
cooperate closely with Bolivian importers in arranging
transportation and preparing and submitting shipping documents.
Air cargo transportation may at times be desirable even for heavy
items.
USE OF AGENTS/DISTRIBUTORS, FINDING A PARTNER

Most of the numerous agents, distributors and representatives in
~oliviaare very effective in dealing with government agencies,
as well as with private industry. Commission agents take orders
on a direct shipment basis. Some specialize in certain products
or in supplying customers engaged in specific activities. These
agents and representatives do not stock products. Agents are
required to have a minimum paid-in capital of $2,000 to initiate
a business activity in Bolivia.
I

Agents must also meet certain other requirements and register
with the National Chamber of Commerce, the Internal Revenue. '

,:

'
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Joint venture operations are ruled by the Investment Law and the
Supreme Decree 22526 of June 13, 1990.
A joint venture in Bolivia is defined as a specific business
venture carried out by two parties with separate legal licenses.
Once the objectives are clearly defined, a contract is signed
between the parties and each party is liable for the percentage
owed. If one of the parties has other business interests, these
are not included in the joint venture operations, unless
specifically stated. Corporations and/or individuals, foreign or
domestic, may enter into joint venture agreements. Foreign
companies are not required to have a local legal license in
advance. However, they must have legal documents that show their
legal status in the country of origin.

STEPS TO ESTABLISHING AN OFFICE
.:

Foreign investments are welcome in Bolivia. There are specific
laws designed to facilitate the bureaucratic requirements in
order to establish an office in Bolivia.
We strongly suggest that companies wishing to establish an office
in Bolivia hire the services of a local attorney to avoid
unnecessary delays and pitfalls.
Under Bolivia's commercial code, business can be conducted under
the following types of business entities:
1. Corporation (Sociedad Anonima, S.A.) .
Owners of capital are described as shareholders.
2. Private companies (Sociedad de Responsabilidad
Limitada, S.R. L. )
Owners of capital are described as quotaholders and
limited liability.
3. General Partnership (Sociedad Colectiva, S.C.)
Participants are described as partners. Partners
responsible for joint and individual liability. ,

have

are

radio spots. Other media such as movie theaters, neon signs,
billboards and direct mailing account for the remaining five
percent.
Television: Except for one government-owned national TV
broadcasting station, all other regional TV stations are in
private hands. Eight belong to the major state universities.
Only the government station is considered "national" because it
alone transmits to all areas of Bolivia. The other stations beam
their signals only to the major cities. All privately-owned
regional and university TV stations have to rent the
interconnection system from ENTEL, the national
telecommunications company, to broadcast nationally. There are
also nine private cable TV systems in the cities of La Paz,
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. One of them, Video Cable Universal,
wholly-owned by the U.S. company Comtech Supply Inc., has
installed the latest fiber optic technology (1994). There is
currently a small-scale price war in La Paz between the hard-wire
VCU and the UHF-based cable companies.
Latest data available on the profitability of the TV and radio
broadcasting industry showed a total profit for all companies of
$18 million (not all companies are profitable). The industry is
currently (June 1995) regulated by the Direction de
Telecommunicaciones (Telecommunications Directorate), but would
be regulated by a Superintendency of Telecommunications once
ENTEL is capitalized in the fall of 1995. The Directorate
controls hours for broadcasting but no price controls on
commercial time exit.
La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba combined have 30 of the
countries 84 broadcasting stations, 74 of which are VHF, the
others UHF. All TV stations have color transmission, using the
U.S. system (NTSC), with 525 lines and'50 cycles. In 1994, there
were approximately 250,OO black and white TV sets and 500,000
color TV sets in use throughout the country.
RADIO: All but two radio stations are in prfiate hands (one of
the two belongs to the military, the..other'to the central
-government) Radio stations are popular here, ih part 'because
vast
radios are cheap 'and can bring entertainmentand news,~to.the
kajority of the population that.canft afford television. . It,. i s

.-
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equipment, materials, and other products and services. They are
legally required to call for bids when proposed purchases are
above 100,000 Bolivianos (notated as "Bs." and equivalent to
approximately 4.78 Bs. per U.S. dollar exchange rate as of
mid-June 1995). Although any local or foreign firm can present
proposals for government bids, only those firms legally
established under Bolivian law may sign contracts, if awarded,
for government purchases. Thus, it is important for U.S.
companies to have a local agent.
Due to the capitalization process, and because most of the larger
governmental entities will have private administration by the end
of 1995/mid-1996, the Bolivian Government decided that as of
March 20, 1995, all public entities interested in purchasing
goods or contracting services will have different options based
on the amount of the transactions (per Supreme Decree 23981 and
Supreme Resolution 215475), as described below:
A) Small purchases: Each institution may purchase directly from
its own budget without calling for bids, if the purchase does not
exceed 20,000 Bs. (approx $4,184 at the exchange rate of 4.78
Bs./dollar as of June 1995).

B) Direct invitation: When the purchase is above 20,000 Bs but,
does not exceed 600,000 Bs.
C) Exceptional contracts: Purchases of national security items
for the Armed Forces or any other products or services of
national interest, with no limit in value.
D) Public bid: When the purchase is above 600,000 Bs. (approx
$125,523 as of 6/95).
Bid specifications containing technical and commercial
requirements will be available through the relevant government
entity and will be published three times consecutively in local
media at least 30 days before the bid deadline.
-The two contracting offices currently working in Bolivia, the
British Government corporation Crown Agents,'-and'the ~ r e n c h .'
Government corporation C3D, with whom the Bolivian Government
signed contracts years ago to administer government purchases,

TOTAL TARIFF, TAXES AND FEES TO WITHDRAW
USD 5,338.76
CAR FROM CUSTOMS :
(OR 44.15 PERCENT OF THE CIF BORDER VALUE)
As noted in paragraph 5, the $1,723.80 value added tax paid by
the importer reduces the importer's tax liability when the car is
resold. So subtracting that amount means the actual import
tariff and fees amount to $3,614.96 or 36.14 percent of the CIF
border value.
IMPORT LICENSES
Import licenses are currently required only for firearms.
Pharmaceutical products have to be registered in the Secretariat
of Health and approved under World Health Organization
guidelines.
USED GOODS

:.

Import permits from the Secretariat of Industry and Commerce are
required for used clothing qnd rags. The permit must be obtained
prior to shipping. These items must also have a sanitary
certificate from the proper health authorities in the exporting
country. There are no special non-tariff requirements affecting
the import of other used goods.
EXPORT CONTROLS
In order to become a legal exporter from Bolivia, the interested
company must obtain a legal solicitorship.
Once the solicitorship is obtained, the local company must
register with SIVEX, the Exporters Single Window System (Sistema
de Ventanilla Unica del Exportador) at the Secretariat o'f
Industry and Commerce.
In order to proceed with an export shipment, the exporter must
present the following documents: commercial invoice, packing
list, and a certificate of inspection issued by one of the two
government-contracted inspection companies. Then the Customs
authority issues the exporter's bond. If the exported product is
animal or vegetable, a sanitary certificate must be obtained from
the Secretariat of Agriculture.
.

,

SIVEX then grants the certificate .of origin which makes t h e

-
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analysis in Spanish, which may be issued by a reliable
manufacturer. This certificate must include expiration dates.
Labels on pharmaceutical products should be in Spanish. In
addition, pharmaceuticals must be registered with the Secretariat
of Health before they are imported.
Food shipments require a sanitary certificate issued by the
pertinent authority of the exporting country, i.e. the U.S. Dept.
of Agriculture. Foodstuffs may be subject to analysis by an
official entity in Bolivia, and most food and beverage labels
must be registered in Bolivia. Exporters are encouraged to check
with importers regarding relevant policies prior to shipment.
For specific information regarding existing foreign agricultural
standards and testing, packaging and certification systems,
contact the
:.
Technical Office for International Trade, U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture, Building 1072, Barc-East, Beltsville, MD 20705, tel:
301-344-2651.
For more information on procedures relating to animals and
plants, and their by-products, contact the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 6505 Beltcrest Road, Hyattsville, MD 20782; Tel
(301) 436-8590 (Veterinary services)/X8537 (Plant inspection).
APHIS maintains a service office in Lima headed by an officer
based in Caracas, Venezuela.
AIR CARGO
Air cargo shipments require airwaybills instead of bills of
lading. Follow IATA and/or ICAO rules governing labeling and
packaging of dangerous and restricted goods as well as for
issuance of the special shipper's certificate required under IATA
rules for such items. Airlines will supply information and forms
upon request.
PARCEL POST
An authorized customs Groker must intervene for any parcel'post
valued at over $100.. A private person.may receive parcel post

This market is supposed to be opened to competition as part of
the capitalization of YPFB, but details are still forthcoming.
In the last couple of years the GOB has allowed private airlines
to compete with the state-owned airline, LAB, on domestic routes.
Purchasers of property/businesses should consult legal counsel
before entering into contracts. Under Bolivia's Investment Law,
foreign investors enjoy the same rights as domestic investors.
PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Bolivia's existing Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) legislation
is weak and government enforcement efforts are nil. The only way
currently to ensure protection is to hire a good local attorney
to chase down offenders and take them to court.
The government is aware of the problem and,\istaking steps to
modernize its legislation and implementation capabilities. The
government has agreed to a modification of Andean Pact Decision
313, Decision 344, which at least would provide a higher floor
for patent and trademark protection. The agreement increases
patent protection from 15 to 20 years, offers parallel
;*rotection, gives patent protection to plant species, and makes
tne agreement the floor, not the ceiling, for individual
agreements that Bolivia may strike with other countries on IPR.
The government will use Decision 344 as a guideline in the
legislation it is drafting to improve protection of intellectual
property rights. The GOB also negotiated a free-trade agreement
with Mexico in 1994, which requires a higher standard of IPR
protection.

he current administration plans to enact a Supreme or
Ministerial Decree to. implement those portions of Decision 344
which do not conflict with existing law* Even though the Andean
Pact Decisionsshould have become law when they were published in
the Andean Pact Gazette, the GOB feels it needs to make the
decisions a part of Bolivian law for them to hold credence in

law;.regulat
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thus siphoning off business from the normal cycle of cinemas,
pay-for-TV/cable, home video, and network TV. Many stations do
not pay rights for showing TV programs.
REGULATORY SYSTEM: LAWS AND PROCEDURES
TRADE AND INVESTMENT BARRIERS

The Bolivian government has almost no trade or investment
barriers. Import licenses are required only for medicines,
weapons, and chemicals which can be used for processing cocaine.
Products imported from the other Andean Pact countries
(Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) enter Bolivia free of
duty, which gives them some advantage over products imported from
the United States. However, Bolivia imports much less from its
Andean Pact neighbors than it does from the U.S. The U.S.
remains Bolivia's major trading partner.
The Investment Law of 1991 guarantees that foreign investors will
be accorded national treatment. It also guarantees remittances
of profits and dividends as well as convertibility of currency
and unrestricted imports required by domestic investments.
Foreign investors may own up to 100 percent of a Bolivian firm.
The only restrictions on foreign investments are the prohibition
on mining and petroleum concessions to foreigners within 50
kilometers of the border. However, the 1991 Mining Law allows
foreign investors access to the border areas as partners with
Bolivian companies which have the concessions.
It is Bolivian Government policy to promote free market
competition. However, there is no anti-monopoly law and there
are still state-owned monopolies, including the national
long-distance telephone company (ENTEL), the national railroad
(ENFE), the national petroleum company (YPFB), and to a lesser
extent the national mining company (COMIBOL) and the national
electric company (ENDE). The government, as part of its
capitalization plan, approved legislation in 1994 creating
independent Superintendencies which will regulate and control
utilities. Free competition in those sectors will eventually be
allowed; for example, with ENTEL, the new owners will have a
six-year monopoly on long-distance service, while local
cooperatives will have the'same period.to offer local phone
service without competition (assuming they meet service and
growth goals in their Contract with the GOB). After six years
the entire telecommunications market will be -thrown open.

nearly 90 percent of all sales since 1990 have gone to the
private sector.
The best sales prospects for mining equipment: equipment for
medium-sized open pit mines and heap leaching operations, and for
small- and medium-sized alluvial gold mining cooperatives.
For medium-sized open pit operations, best prospects include
drills (open pit production drills), crushers and pulverizers,
conveyors, compressors, front-loaders, bulldozers, 15- to 30-ton
heavy-duty trucks, gravimetric or flotation concentrators, and
pumps.
For the small miners, best prospects include small drills,
front-loaders, crushers, concentration tables, flotation
concentrators, hand tools, and explosives.
PART 3.
1994
1995
1996
A. TOTAL MARKET SIZE
B. TOTAL LOCAL PRODUCTION
C. TOTAL EXPORTS
E. IMPORTS FROM THE U.S.

9.032

12.0

14.0

0
0

0
0

0
0

3.056

4.2

5.0

,

The above statistics are unofficial estimates, in U.S. dollars.
PART 1. HYDROCARBONS SECTOR, RANK 2, (OGS)
PART 2. Narrative: The chief potential trade opportunity in the
hydrocarbons sector for -1995-1996 is the proposed $600 million
gas pipeline (488 kms) to Brazil from the city of Santa Cruz (the
Brazilian portion of the line is estimated to beworth over $1.5
billion). A 1993 contract to carry out'the project, with a total
length of 1,800 kms and.estimated total cost of $2.5 billion, is
still being renegotiated with the Brazilians as of June.1995.
Price and market issues arelstill unresolved. YPFB, the
.state-owned Bolivian petroleum company (until its capitalization'
in late 1995/early .1996), ahd Petrobras of Brazil have agreed on
the relative percentages of participation in the,pipeline.- Enron
Development Corp. 'of Houston is the strategic partner of YPFB,
while the.BTB consortium (British Gas, Tenneco, and.BHP) is
helping Petrobras. Petrobras will have '15 percent of the.
Bolivian portion o f the pipeline,' with YPFB havingthe balance'
'
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official GOB inspection companies, charge 1.92 percent of the FOB
cost of the imported product.
3. Customs tariff: a 10 percent flat rate is applied to (I),
unless the products are listed as capital goods by Bolivian
presidential decree, in which case the rate is 5 percent.
4. Customs Warehouse fee: for GOB customs warehouses (AADAA)
within the country not yet privatized, a 0.5 percent fee is
charged on (1). If products remain in the warehouse over 30
days, a 2 percent fee is charged on (1) for up to 90 days.
Private customs warehouses, now in operation at the El Alto
(which serves La Paz), Cochabamba and Santa Cruz airports, allow
only a five day grace period, and base their rates on weight
rather than value. The GOB plans to eventually privatize all
customs warehouses.
Internal Revenue Service (Renta) fees9 Value added tax (IVA)
is charged at 14.94 percent effective rate on
(1+2+3+4+7+8A+8B+9). Note that this IVA tax payment can later be
offset against the importer's value added tax liability, upon
resale. Using the example of the imported car described below in
paragraph 9 , if the importer retails the car for $18,000, he is
obliged to pay 13 percent of that amount, $2,340, to the
government as a value added tax. However, that amount can be
reduced by the $1,723.80 of value added tax paid at the time the
car was released from Customs.
5.

A problem arises if the importer does not sell any product
domestically, as is the case with petroleum companies in the
exploration phase. This applies to the equipment imported by the
oil companies that cannot be re-exported, like pipe and drill
bits. Machinery that will be re-exported, such as helicopters
and seismic equipment, can be imported free of duty and taxes
under the RITEX system, which allows for the temporary import of
equipment.
6. Specific consumption tax (ICE) is. charged at an additional
percentage rate on (1+2+3+4+7+8A+8B+9) if the product is defined
as a luxury good, such as automobiles (18%), household appliances
(lo%), perfumes (20%), cosmetics (30%), liquors (50%), cigarettes
(50%), and beer (60%).

7. Customs forms and fees: the ~olivianCustoms office charges
between $50-60 for the forms and fees reqQired for each shipment.

All goods shipped by ship to Bolivia pass through foreign ports
of entry. Packages and containers should clearly indicate gross
weight in kilograms, serial numbers, and the words "en transit0 a
Bolivia." For Chilean ports, markings must be stenciled.
PROHIBITED IMPORTS
Prohibited items include: firearms and other weapons without
special permission from the Ministry of Defense; pharmaceuticals
and drugs not registered in the country; spoiled or adulterated
beverages and food products, or products that contain noxious
substances, selected liquors, such as pisco and similar products;
diseased animals; plants, fruits, seeds and other vegetables that
contain parasites and germs, or plants that are declared harmful
by the Secretariat of Agriculture;.foreign lottery bills;
advertisements imitating money or bank certificates, postage
stamps and other government-valued paper& pornographic books,
booklets, paintings, engravings, figures and other obscene
objects; roulette machines and devices used for gambling;
merchandise with the same registered trademark as a product made
in Bolivia; used clothing without a sanitary certificate from the
country of origin (except in personal baggage); used hats and
shoes (except in personal baggage); vicuna skins, hair and
products.
FREE TRADE ZONES/WAREHOUSES
Bolivia has established eight free trade zones (FTZ), five of
which are now in full operation: El Alto (serving La Paz), Puerto
Aguirre, Cochabamba, Sgnta Cruz and Oruro. The others in
Desaguadero, on the border with Peru, San Matias in Santa Cruz,
and ~uayaramerinin the Beni, are not yet in full operation. The
other in Cobija (in the northern part of Bolivia), although
established years ago is not attractive to investors because of
the lack of roads and other basic infrastructure. Bolivian FTZs
are regulated by the National Council of Free Trade Zones
,.(CONZOF), created in the 1990 Investment Law. FTZs are operated
':by private companies which are selected by the government through
public bid. There are special procedures which,must be followed
to obtain approval to operate in these zones. Export processing
zones have up to 180 days duty-free treatment (RITEX) to assemble
kits and produce parts for reexport.

i
SPECIAL IMPORT PROVISIONS

it

i

and smelting (tin, antimony) sectors. These companies are
supposed to be under private management by the end of 1995,
except for the smelter, which is planned for 1996. The GOB also
realizes it needs the management expertise of the private sector
to help reduce waste, corruption and mismanagement in its public
corporations. Many of the sectors could stand an infusion of
newer technology as well. In the mining sector, the GOB is .
willing to sell post-revolution mines and concessions, and to
enter into joint-venture or leasing contracts for mines
nationalized in the 1952 revolution, all in the hope of
reactivating the sector.
Since 1985, 100 percent foreign ownership is allowed with no
requirement to register foreign investments. There is no
screening of foreign investment or preferential or discriminatory
treatment applied to foreign investment.
In 1990 and 1991, the government passed three important laws
designed to set forth clear rules of the game for private
investment. The 1990 Investment Law guarantees all investors
national treatment, free currency conversion, unrestricted
remittances, and the right to international arbitration in most
industries. New mining and hydrocarbons laws authorize joint
ventures with the state-owned corporations and provide a new tax
system designed to allow foreign firms paying taxes in Bolivia to
obtain foreign tax credits in their home countries. The Mining
Law also allows foreign firms to operate within the 50-kilometer
border belt in joint venture or service contracts with Bolivian
mining companies, with the exception of firms from the country
adjacent to such border. The Hydrocarbons Law, however, does not
permit international arbitration in all cases, and this
restriction has kept the U.S. from signing a bilateral investment
treaty with Bolivia. The GOB is working on a new hydrocarbons
law as part of its capitalization program; its most recent draft
includes a provision allowing international arbitration. The
government hopes to have the law approved by Congress in August,
1995. The GOB has consistently failed to meet previously
scheduled dates for capitalization, however.
.

.

New laws regarding banking and'exports were 'passed in 1993; The . ' Banking Law .legalized many.activities .that,w.ere
previously not
clearly legal , such as 'fa~torin~,~,~leasing,~'~issuing
-stocks:
'and
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Bankscan now maintain accounts in foreign currencies (as a
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research programs. Work permit, visa and residence requirements
are not discriminatory. There are no special incentives for
investment, other than new tax systems for hydrocarbon and mining
companies which could permit foreign companies to receive foreign
tax credits in their home country.
Bolivia has signed Bilateral Investment Agreements with Germany,
Italy, France, Spain, Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru,
Argentina, ~razil,Mexico, China, Canada, Belgium, Great
Britain, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands.
CONVERSION AND TRANSFER POLICIES
There is free currency conversion at local banks and exchange
houses. The official exchange rate is set by a daily auction of
dollars managed by the Central Bank. The Central Bank offers ten
million dollars each day but sets a secretly held minimum floor
price for the dollars. In this way the Central Bank has managed
a steady depreciation of the Boliviano in line with the inflation
rate since 1985. The Central Bank cannot ignore market forces
because dollars can be legally bought and sold on the streets and
at the exchange houses. Since 1985, there has always been
adequate foreign exchange, so no queuing has been required. The
unofficial, street corner exchange rates are always within one
percent of the official rate. There are no restrictions on
remittances. There is little risk of devaluation of the
Boliviano. The currency depreciates at a regular rate, according
to market forces. Depreciation in 1994 was around 7 percent.
Depreciation will be roughly 7-10 percent in 1995, if trends
continue (inflation is running at around 10 percent for the last
12 months as of May 1995).
EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION
Article 22 of the Bolivian Constitution provides that
expropriation may be imposed for the public good or when the
property does not complete a social purpose, if carried out in
accordance with laws and with just compensation. The Mining and
Hydrocarbons Laws also provide for expropriation of land when
needed to develop the underlying mineral or hydrocarbon
concession.

Bolivian mutual funds which have been approved by the local
regulatory authority, the National Stock Market Commission. The
Commission is on the right track as a regulatory agency, but is
still in the initial phase of training its personnel and
establishing procedures. No companies issue stock. Hostile
takeovers are therefore non-existent.
Boliviats banking system currently has around USD 2.3 billion in
deposits. In 1985 that number was around USD 70 million.
On paper, Bolivian accounting principles meet worldwide
standards. In fact, auditing standards are nowhere near world
standards and many businesses prefer the system of three sets of
books to evade taxes. In addition to the general problem of lack
of prompt, effective judicial decisions, lenders have great
difficulty in foreclosing, and there is a poor registry for
creditors to register liens.
BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
Bolivia has bilateral investment agreements in force with the
U.K., Germany, and Switzerland, and has signed BIT'S with Spain,
Belgium, Sweden and Argentina. The Argentine agreement is
interesting because it allows international arbitration which
goes against the current Hydrocarbons Law. The agreement will
not be submitted to Congress for ratification. The U.S. has not
signed a BIT with Bolivia based upon Bolivia's unwillingness to
allow international arbitration in the hydrocarbons sector. As
mentioned, the GOB is addressing the problem in the draft .
legislation for the hydrocarbons sector. Some members of the
government have indicated that the GOB is anxious to discuss a
BIT with the U.S., but only after the proposed changes to the
Hydrocarbons Law are (hopefully) approved by Congress later in
1995.

OPIC'AND OTHER INVESTMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS
An investment insurance agreement signed in 1985 by Bolivia and
the Overseas -private Investment Corporation (OPIC) provides for a
. full range of OPIC programs, including insurance'; financing and
use of OPICrs opportunity.bank. . OPIC provides financing
assistance through direct loans and through guarantees in loans
by private U.S. financial institutions'for,U.S.. investments in

untrained and uneducated workers in the mining industry have
learned how to use high-tech equipment at the country's largest
private gold mine owned by a U.S. company.
FOREIGN TRADE ZONES/FREE PORTS
Bolivia has established eight free trade zones (FTZ'S) in which
foreign investors enjoy the same investment opportunities as
domestic investors.
Due to its land-locked status, neighboring countries also have
granted Bolivia duty-free zones. While most freight enters
Bolivia via Arica, Chile, the free trade zone in Puerto Suarez,
on the border with Brazil, has seen business boom in 1994-95.
CAPITAL OUTFLOW POLICY
The Bolivian Government does not restrict'~capitaloutflow, nor
does it encourage it.
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT STATISTICS
The Bolivian Government does not collect or publish data on the
stock of foreign direct investment, or on the flow of outbound
investment by Bolivians in other countries. The government
estimates the inflow of foreign investment based upon surveys and
extrapolation from economic growth statistics. The requirement
for investment permits was eliminated in 1985. The Bolivian
Central Bank estimated that foreign direct investment in 1994
came to USD 128 million. The general consensus is that most
foreign direct investment is in the mining and hydrocarbon
sectors.
MAJOR FOREIGN INVESTORS
The U.S. is the largest foreign investor in Bolivia,
predominately in the hydrocarbons and mining sectors.
Brazil, and Chile are other important investors.
-CHAPTER VIII: TRADE AND PROJECT FINANCING
DESCRIPTION OF BANKING SYSTEM

-

Argentina,

operational inefficiency. Foreign companies are eligible to
borrow from the local financial system.
HOW TO FINANCE EXPORTS/METHODS OF PAYMENT
TYPES OF AVAILABLE EXPORT FINANCING AND INSURANCE (INCLUDING
BILATERAL - E.G. EXIMBANK, MULTILATERAL, AND LOCAL SOURCES)
International and bilateral organizations provide some credit
lines at lower interest rates. These lines come from the
Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the Andean
Development Corporation. They are channeled through the Central
Bank for on-lending to private Bolivian banks that make loans to
the productive sector. OPIC and EXIM currently offer insurance
and/or financing products tp the private sector.
PROJECT FINANCING

.:

Interested parties should consult the private lending offices of
the IDB, World Bank and CAF. OPIC and EXIM should also be
consulted.
LIST OF BANKS WITH CORRESPONDENT U.S. BANKING ARRANGEMENTS
(Interested parties should consult ASOBAN, the local association
of banks, for the most up-to-date information): BHN Multibanco,
Banco Boliviano Americano, Citibank, Banco Mercantil, BISA, Banco
de la Nacion Argentina, Banco Nacional de Bolivia, Banco de
Credito de Bolivia, Banco Real, Banco Santa Cruz, Banco de la
Union, Banco de La Paz, BIDESA. (The Economic/Commercial section
of the U.S. Embassy has a list of bank officers, addresses,
phone and fax numbers.)

--

CHAPTER IX: BUSINESS TRAVEL-

BUSINESS CUSTOMS
.Most members of ~ o l i v i a ~private
s
sector are experienced
entrepreneurs with ample direct exposure to U.S. and European
business customsand procedures. Visiting U.S. travelers find.
their Bolivian counterparts for.themost part adept and
sophisticated in their.various fields ,of interest. The local
representative is a vital component in the.successfu1 operation
of foreign-based.firms. In the case of investment contracts; . '

and Foreign Affairs requesting indefinite residence; medical
certificate issued by the National Institute of Employment
Health; Police security clearance issued by Bolivian Police;
legal address registered with Bolivian Police; payment of $50 to
the National Treasury; birth certificate legalized by a Bolivian
consulate; police security clearance, issued in the country of
origin and legalized by a Bolivian consulate; indefinite visa
request form, change of visa request form, work contract
legalized by the Ministry of Labor. (note: the GOB reserves the
right to accept or deny the indefinite residence of foreigners in
Bolivia. )
B. The above categories cover principals, managers, trained and
specially qualified employees involved in the company's
operations.
C. No special qualifications are required,to secure entry. The
person/investor is not limited in the typ& of work he/she can
perform. There are no limits to the amount of money invested to
qualify for entry.

D. There are no specific restrictions for a person/investor
entering Bolivia. There is no requirement to train nationals. A
businessperson may remain as long as required. There is no need
for a person/investor to have been previously employed with a
related company outside Bolivia. There is no numerical
limitation on the number of businessperson~s/investors from the
U.S. that may enter Bolivia. The spouse and children of the visa
holder are entitled to enter the country with the visa holder:
however, their names must be included in the legal petition to
the Director General of Immigration and Foreign Affairs.

E. The qualifications or restrictions referenced above for U.S.
businesspersons/investors do not differ from those for
individuals from other countries.
The head of immigration is Victoria Baldivieso, Directora
Nacional de Migracion y Extranjeria, Ministerio de Gobierno, La
Paz, tel (591) (2) 359665 or 370475, fax 376701.

lunch break in the middle of the day.
HEALTH CONDITIONS/PRECAUTIONS
La PazJs altitude may cause headache or more serious health
problems for individuals with heart or lung ailments. It is a
good idea to consult a doctor before coming to La Paz. Recent
arrivals are advised to limit their activities while they
acclimate. sanitary conditions are such that it is advisable to
boil water at least 20 minutes or to consume bottled water.
There are, however, many good and safe restaurants in the major
cities. Hepatitis and rabies are endemic in Bolivia, although
with proper caution both can easily be avoided.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
National and international telephone and cable services are
available in La Paz and other major cities. Direct dialing is
available between the cities of La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba,
Oruro, Tarija, Potosi and Sucre. Many business establishments
operate telex machines. Direct dialing to the U.S. and most
other countries is available.
TRANSPORTATION
Taxi fare's from the El Alto airport to La Paz vary according to
the number of passengers, but generally the charge is 5 Bs per
person for a collective taxi. Individual taxi fares average
25-30 Bs. Within the city, fares average about 1.80 Bs during
the day and 2 Bs at night. Rental cars are available, but this
service is expensive and frequently includes a driver who also
must be paid. U.S. drivers licenses are valid in Bolivia for 90
days after arrival.
The major cities of Bolivia offer a radiotaxi service with
special fares. Fares within downtown La Paz cost 5 Bs for one to
five persons. Fares from downtown to the peripheral areas are
10-20 Bs. This service may be rented for a full day at a special
cost.
CLIMATE
;
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lf: Bolivia experiences a ra.iny season during the summer
months (Dec-Mar). The average daytime temperature i s 6 0 degrees
fahrenheit for most of-theyear, but evenings are much cooler. . - .
Daytime weather is usually' pleasant;.. ' Santa 'Cruz is a tropical
milder.
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interest, USD 985 million exports)
U.S. ECONOMIC/MILITARY ASSISTANCE (F): USAID: 89 million;
counternarcotics: 23.3 million; military: 22.4 million; Peace
Corps: 1.8 MILLION
(A) Embassy estimate
(B) GOB estimate
(C) INE - National Institute of Statistics
(D) Based on surveys of urban areas. Data does not consider
underemployment
(E) Central Bank of Bolivia
(F) FY 1995, U.S. Embassy La Paz, estimate
(G) All government spending as percent of GDP, 1994
--APPENDIX C:

TRADE

-

TOTAL EXPORTS (A): 985 million
TOTAL IMPORTS (A): 1209 million
U.S. MERCHANDISE EXPORTS TO BOLIVIA (B): 186 million
U.S. MERCHANDISE IMPORTS FROM BOLIVIA (B): 260 million
U.S. SHARE OF BOLIVIAfS.IMPORTS:15 percent
BOLIVIAN MERCHANDISE TRADE BALANCE WITH-U.S., 1994 (B): plus 74
million
PROJECTED AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE FROM WORLD THROUGH 1996 (C):
n/a; imports grew by 12 percent in 1993 and were flat in 1994
U.S. IMPORTS PROJECTED ANNUAL GROWTH RATE THROUGH 1996 (B): n/a;
U.S. exports to Bolivia declined by 14 percent in 1994 and by 3
percent in 1993.
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994

IMPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL GOODS
TOTAL 1994 WORLD IMPORTS: 145 million
AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS FROM THE U.S. IN 1994 (B): 25 million
AGRICULTURAL GOODS TRADE BALANCE: 7.5 million deficit for Bolivia
(Embassy estimate using Central Bank aggregate figures)
TRADE BALANCE WITH THREE LEADING PARTNERS 1994 (A) (millions of
U.S. dollars):
BOLIVIAN EXPORTS
U.S. 302
ENGLAND 151
ARGENTINA 144
BOLIVIAN IMPORTS
U.S. 229
BRAZIL 183
..JAPAN-174 ',
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Lic. Freddy Teodovich, National Secretary of Transportation,
Communication and Civil Aviation, Palacio de Communicaciones,
Piso 5, tel 377222, fax 371395
Lic. Douglas Ascarrunz, National Secretary of Industry and
Commerce, Av. Camacho esq Bueno, tel. 372041, 372042, fax 358831
Ing. Edgar Talavera Solis, National Secretary for Agriculture,
Av. Camacho 1471, tel 361348, fax 357535
Director General of Customs, Ing. Javier Calderon, calle
940, tel 371321 or 371378, fax 392505

P O ~ O S ~

MINISTRY OF CAPITALIZATION:
Lic. Alfonso Revollo, Minister of Capitalization, Palacio de
Communicaciones, Piso 17, tel 377222, fax 377451
,.

~ i c .Edgar Saravia, National Secretary of Capitalization, Piso
20, tel 356738, fax 08112823
MINISTRY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
Lic. Alberto Bailey Gutierrez, National Secretary of Culture
(copyright issues), tel 378128, fax 378128
MINISTRY OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT:
Ing. Luis Lema Molina, Minister of Sustainable Development and
the Environment, Av. Arce 2147, tel 367449, fax 392892
Other important contacts:
Empresa Nacional de Television Boliviana (National Bolivian
Television Company), General ~anagerLic.Miguel Montero Vaca,
Casilla 900,'tel 376356, fax 359753
Administracion de ~eropuertosy Servicios Auxiliares a la
Navegacion Aerea -(AASANA, the Airportand Auxiliary.Services
Administration), ~xecutiveDirector Ing., Alvaro Echenique, ,
Casilla 4382, tel 351341, fax 342731
Banco Central de Bolivia (Central Bank of Bolivia), President
Lic. Fernando Candia, Casilla '3118, tel 374151, fax.392.398 . '.
.
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Banco Nacional de Bolivia, Av. Camacho esq Colon, Casilla 360,
tel 354616, fax 371279
Banco Real, Av. 16 de Julio 1642, tel 366603, fax 391413
BHN MULTIBANCO, Casilla 4824, tel 320789, fax 391358
Banco Ganadero, 24 de Septiembre 110, Santa Cruz, tel 591 3
391616, fax 361617
Banco Industrial, Av. 16 de Julio 1628, tel 323343, fax 392013
Banco de la Nacion Argentina, Av. 16 de Julio 1486, tel 359211,
fax 391392
Banco de La Paz, Av. 16 de Julio 1473, Cas,illa 6014, tel 390950,
.:
fax 08112875
Banco de Credito, Calle Colon esq. Mercado, tel 391722, fax
391044
Citibank, Plaza Venezuela 1434, tel 369955, fax 08112894
Banco Economico, Av. Camacho 1245, tel 354341, fax 08112745
Banco Internacional de Desarrollo (BIDESA), Calle Potosi 1285,
tel 360820, fax 361130
Banco de la Union, Av. Camacho 1416, tel 360431, fax 325880
Interbanco (bought out Banco Boliviano Americano 6/95), Casilla
14758, Calle Mercado 1046, tel 317707, fax 316787
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS
World Bank, representative Isabelle Giradot Berg, BISA Building,
on the Prado, 9th floor, tel (591)(2) 356844, fax 391038, La Paz
InterAmerican Development Bank, representative avid' Atkinson,
BISA Building, on the Prado, 5th floor, tel (591) (2) 351221, fax
39108,9,La Paz
~orporacion~ n d i n ade Fomento (CAF), the Andean Development
Corporation, representative Dr. Hernan Escudero, calle Esmeralda
no. 4, tel (591),,(2) 357735 or 363934, fax 391032, La Paz ,

Center, Suite 5215, New York, NY 10048, Manager Jorge Palacios,
tel 212 839-7086
Below is a list of selected current reports on commercial and
economic conditions in Bolivia available from various sources.
U.S. Department of Commerce Publications: some of these reports
were prepared within the Office of Latin America (OLA), while
others were submitted by the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service and
the Economic/Commercial section of U.S. Embassy La Paz.
These reports and those of the Department of State are generally
available through the U.S. Government Printing Office, tel 202
783-3238, unless otherwise indicated. The reports are also
available on the National Trade Data Bank (NTDB), tel 202
377-1986, which may be accessed at most local or university
libraries. In addition, there are a number of valuable reference
works and periodicals, the most important:of which are listed
below. The best way to obtain guidance on using these
information resources is to contact the Bolivian desk officer,
Room 3025, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 20230, tel
202 3771659.
U.S. Exports/World Areas by Schedule E Commodity Grouping Report,
FT 455, annual
Industrial Outlook Report: Minerals, annual
Industrial Outlook Report: Petroleum, annual
Financing Guide (available free of charge from the Latin
America/Caribbean Business Development Center, U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, tel 202 377-0703, 377-0841), and the Guidebook to the
Andean Trade Preference Act (also available free of charge from
the same source)

Background Notes: Bolivia, available periodically from the Dept.
of State, Office of Public Communications, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Washington, D.C., 20520. Background Notes provides
political and other background information on Bolivia (annual
subscriptions to the Background Notes series may be purchased by
contacting the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing
Office,.Washington, D.C. 20402)
ir
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phase in June when the three generating units of the electric
power company, ENDE, were sold to three U.S. companies. Their
combined bids were USD 140 million, USD 40 million over book
value.
Bolivia has an investment law which guarantees national treatment
and free convertibility of currency. However, potential
investors should be aware that the criminal and civil justice
system is rife with corruption.
Country commercial guides are available on the National Trade
Data Bank on CD-ROM or through the INTERNET. Please contact
STAT-USA at ~-~OO-STAT-USA
for more information. TO locate
country commercial guides via the INTERNET, please use the
following World Wide Web address: Www.stat-usa.gov. CCGs can
also be ordered in hard copy or on.diskette from the National
Technical ~nformationService (NTIS) at ;S-800-553-NTIS.
CHAPTER 11. ECONOMIC TRENDS AND OUTLOOK
Major Trends and Outlook:
Bolivia has had eight years of moderate economic growth through
1994, and this trend should continue, with 1995 growth around 4
percent through the first trimester. Inflation was 8.3 percent
in 1994; inflation has risen to an annualized rate of just above
10 percent through the first five months of 1995 but should
finish in single digits for the year. Reserves are roughly
equivalent to five months of imports, about where they were in
1994. Banking deposits are around $2.3 billion as of 6/30/95, a
@ade under 1994 levels but not too unhealthy considering two
banks failed in late 1994. Two of Bolivia's largest commercial
banks acquired foreign partners/ownership in June 1995; this is
in general a positive trend, adding new capital to a relatively
fragile system.
The imminent capitalization (a form of privatization in which the
government sells off only.50 percent of companies, instead of an
outright.sale) of the Bolivian ,Government's six largest companies
should 'give a boost to economic.growth. Three and perhaps four.
of the .six companies will most 1ikely.besold by the end of 1995,
with the.largest, the oil company YPFB, to be sold by
early/mid-1996 (the-GOBsays b y t h e end of 1995 but we don't see'

IRECTLY TO PRIVATE ARGENTINEAN DISTRIBUTORS. ON MARCH 18, 1994,
BOLIVIA AND ARGENTINA SIGNED A 3-YEAR NATIJ.RAL GAS SALE/PURCHASE
AGREEMENT UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THE 1992 AGREEMENT. THE CONTRACT
WAS SIGNED BY YPFB AND YPB S.A. OF ARGENTINA TO BUY ABOUT 210
MMCFD OF NATURAL GAS AT AN AVERAGE PRICE OF USD 1.07 PER THOUSAND
CUBIC FEET (MCF). A FLOOR PRICE OF USD 1.05 AND A CEILING PRICE
OF USD 1.10 WAS AGREED FOR LOW AND HIGH SALES PEAKS. WITH
LIQUIDS THE PRICE RISES TO AN AVERAGE OF USD 1.21 PER MCF.
THE ARGENTINE PRIVATE COMPANIES IMPORTING GAS ALSO REMAIN UNDER
THE UMBRELLA OF THE 1992 AGREEMENT AND WILL NOT HAVE TO PAY TAXES
AND TARIFFS ON THE BOLIVIAN GAS. FOR THE PAST 22 YEARS THE GAS
HAS BEEN ENTERING FREE OF DUTY AND TAXES AS A GOVERNMENT
PURCHASE.
IN 1994 BOLIVIA'S EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA TOTALLED USD 160.0
MILLION, WHILE IMPORTS WERE VALUED AT USD 119.4 MILLION. THE
VAST MAJORITY OF BOLIVIA'S EXPORTS TO ARGENTINA CONSISTED OF
NATURAL GAS SALES.
BOLIVIAN

-

BRAZILIAN TRADE AGREEMENT

UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THE LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION ASSOCIATION,
(ALADI), BRAZIL HAS A BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT WITH BOLIVIA BY
WHICH IT GRANTS TARIFF-FREE TREATMENT TO SOME 580 BOLIVIAN
PRODUCTS. BOLIVIA ALSO GRANTS THE SAME BENEFITS*TO,SOME100
BRAZILIAN PRODUCTS.
UNDER PRESENT MERCOSUR GUIDELINES, BRAZIL MAY GRANT NO MORE THAN
A 50-PERCENT TARIFF REDUCTION ON PRODUCTS NOT PREVIOUSLY COVERED
IN A BILATERALAGREEMENT.

,

THE PORTS OF MONTEVIDEO AND NUEVA PALMIRA. ALSO, PORT
AUTHORITIES IMPOSE PREFERENTIAL PRICES FOR HANDLING BOLIVIAN
MERCHANDISE AT THOSE TWO PORTS. BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAVE ALSO
DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING PRIVATE FREE-TRADE
ZONES. IN 1994, BOLIVIA'S TOTAL EXPORTS TO URUGUAY WERE OF USD
4 , 8 MILLION AND IMPORTS WERE USD 3.5 MILLION.
THE ANDEAN PACT
THE ANDEAN PACT INITIATED FREE TRADE AMONG ITS MEMBER COUNTRIES
IN 1992. IT HAS RECENTLY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE ON A COMMON
EXTERNAL TARIFF SYSTEM, WITH TARIFFS FOR PRODUCTS FROM THIRD
COUNTRIES VARYING BETWEEN 5, 10, 15, AND 20 PERCENT. BOLIVIA
PUSHED FOR LOWER TARIFFS FOR ITSELF DUE TO.THE FACT THAT THE HIGH
COST OF SHIPPING TO BOLIVIA ALREADY ADDS A CONSIDERABLE "TAX" TO
PRODUCTS SHIPPED INTO THE COUNTRY. AS A RESULT, UNDER A SPECIAL
AGREEMENT, BOLIVIA WAS ALLOWED TO KEEP ITS CURRENT TARIFF RATES
OF 5 PERCENT ON CAPITAL EQUIPMENT AND 10 PERCENT ON EVERYTHING
ELSE.
PERU MAINTAINS ITS SUSPENDED STATUS, AND IT IS NOT YET
MEMBER OF THE ANDEAN PACT.

A FULL

'

BOLIVIAN

-

PERUVIAN AGREEMENTS

BOLIVIA AND PERU SIGNED A FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT IN NOVEMBER 1992,
IN WHICH PERU GRANTS FREE TARIFF DUTIES ON BOLIVIAN GOODS WITH
THE EXCEPTION OF EIGHT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. ON THESE EIGHT
PRODUCTS, PERU GRANTED BOLIVIA A 50-PERCENT TARIFF REDUCTION.
THIS AGREEMENT WAS RECENTLY RENEWED FOR ANOTHER YEAR.
IN JANUARY 1992, THE PERUVIAN AND BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENTS SIGNED AN
AGREEMENT BY WHICH PERU GRANTED BOLIVIA AN INDUSTRIAL DUTY-FREE
ZONE AND A TOURIST ZONE AT THE PERUVIAN PORT OF ILO. IN TURN
BOLIVIA GRANTED PERU A FREE-TRADE ZONE IN PUERTO SUAREZ, A BORDER
PORT WITH BRAZIL, WHICH WILL ALLOW PERU ACCESS TO THE ATLANTIC
VIA THE PARAGUAY-PARANA RIVER.

'

:TO MAKE THEILO DUTY-FREEZONE PRODUCTIVE, BOTH GOVERNMENTS
AGREED TO UNDERTAKE VARIOUS .INFRASTRUCTUREDEVELOPMENTS. THESE
INCLUDED THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRIAL DUTY-FREE ZONE, THE
CONSTRUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE PORT FACILITIES, AND ROAD
CONSTRUCTION FROM ILO TO LA PAZ.

THE INDUSTRIAL DUTY-FREE ZONE AT THE PORT~OFII;O IS NOW

. . . .

,

'

BOLIVIA MAY START PLANS TO BUILD A GASLINE TO TOCOPILLA OR
ANTOFAGASTA, AT A COST OF APPROXIMATELY USD 400 MILLION, TO
PROVIDE NATURAL GAS TO THE CHUQUICAMATA MINING CENTER, THE
WORLD'S LARGEST COPPER MINE.
IN 1994 BOLIVIA'S EXPORTS TO CHILE TOTALLED USD 23.5 MILLION,
WHILE IMPORTS WERE VALUED AT USD 171 MILLION.
BOLIVIAN

-

MEXICAN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

THE FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT WITH MEXICO WAS SIGNED ON SEPTEMBER 10,
1994. BY THIS AGREEMENT BOLIVIA EXPECTS TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE
NAFTA COUNTRIES. THE TOPIC OF "ORIGIN" WAS ONE OF THE STICKIEST
ISSUES, WHILE THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT DEAL WITH LABOR OR
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES.
THE AGREEMENT IS EXPECTED TO BE PHASED IN SLOWLY, BECOMING FULLY
EFFECTIVE BY THE YEAR 2005.

GRUPO DE RIO
A MEMBER SINCE OCTOBER 1990,' BOLIVIA HAS SUPPORTED THE GROUP'S
EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND
PROMOTE DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE REGION.
ALADI
TRE LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION ASSOCIATION (ALADI) WAS
ESTABLISHED IN MONTEVIDEO TO ENCOURAGE THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
INTEGRATION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. ITS PURPOSE AND
OBJECTIVES ARE THREATENED BY THE FLOWERING OF REGIONAL GROUPS
THAT HAVE OTHER GOALS AND OBJECTIVES.

RELATIONS WITH EUROPE
BOLIVIA QUALIFIES FOR PRIORITY STATUS WITH GERMANY, SPAIN,
BELGIUM, GREAT BRITAIN, ITALY, NETHERLANDS, AND SWITZERLAND.
BOLIVIA HAS ALSO REACHED AN AGREEMENT TO EASE INVESTMENT BARRIERS
AND AVOID DOUBLE TAXATION WITH FRAHCE, SPAIN, ,GERMANY,SWEDEN,
ITALY, BELGIUM, AND GREAT BRITAIN.
IN 1994, BOLIVIA'S EXPORTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TOTALLED USD
291.1 MILLION, WHILE IMPORTS WERE VALUED'AT USD 148.1 MILLION.
USA

VEHICLES, ARE A GOOD TARGET MARKET, CURRENTLY DOMINATED BY THE
JAPANESE. ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTER GOODS ARE ALSO IN DEMAND, AS
ARE SOME PACKAGED FOOD ITEMS.

have a monopoly on this service for six years, until 2001 (the
new co-owner of ENTEL will also have a six year monopoly on
long-distance service). The cooperatives have not kept up with
modern technology; their installations costs are high and service
is poor. Cellular phones are becoming increasingly popular with
businesspeople and government officials. One private company
offers cellular phone service in Bolivia's largest cities and
continues to expand service areas. With the capitalization of
ENTEL in the fall of 1995, the new owner/manager of ENTEL will
most likely use ENTELts B band to offer cellular service.
ENFE, the national railroad, is also to be capitalized in late
1995. It has suffered from years of underinvestment. Its hauling
capacity is also limited by Bolivia's mountains and by its narrow
gauge track (built by the British at the turn of the century).
The rail system consists of two independent lines separated by
the eastern range of the Andes. The wes$ern line connects the
cities of La Paz, Cochabamba and Oruro wlth northern Argentina
and the Chilean ports of Arica and Antofagasta. The eastern line
connects the city of Santa Cruz with western Brazil and northern
Argentina. Rolling stock is transferred from one system to the
other at a connection in northern Argentina.
There are two air carriers, American Airlines and the
government-owned Lloyd Air Boliviano (LAB), which offer daily
service to Miami. LAB is one of the companies to be capitalized
in the fall of 1995. A U.S. cargo company flies to and from
Bolivia twice weekly. Regional airlines as well as LAB offer
flights to neighboring countries, most on a daily basis. A
private airline, Aerosur, competes with LAB on national flights.
--CHAPTER
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THE BOLIVIAN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT-

Nature of political relationship with the U.S.:
The United States remains Bolivia's largest provider of foreign
assistance, its major trading partner, and its largest foreign
investor. The U.S. has considerable influence at nearly all
levels of Bolivian politics, society, and culture, despite
Boliviats past reputation as a hotbed of,anti-American leftism.

legal/judicial cooperation in areas such as extradition.
signing of a new extradition treaty in June '95 marks an
important step forward in this regard.

The

From the U.S. Government perspective, the overarching,
interrelated policy goals in Bolivia shared by the current and
former governments of Bolivia, are the "three D'sM: nurturing
the democratic process, encouraging economic development and
stability and eliminating the illegal drug (coca/cocaine)
industry and drug trafficking.
Major Political Issues affecting business climate:
The election of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada as president in 1993
not only marked the fourth successive peaceful transfer of power
but clearly demonstrated the growing maturation of Bolivian
democracy. By all accounts the 1993 eleqtions were generally
open and honest. Once known for political instability and a
dizzying string of military coups, Bolivia is among South
America's leaders in building democratic political institutions
and in the opening of its economy. This political stability has
no doubt helped the economy recover over the last 10 years, and
is one reason foreign investors have come. Still, the government
must continue to fight corruption at all levels of government,
the judicial system needs to be updated and streamlined, and the
legislature must pass laws that create clear rules of the game
for business.
Synopsis of political system, schedule for elections, and
orientation of major political parties:

:

Bolivia's plurinominal electoral system encourages multiple
parties, and greatly limits the ability of any one party to gain
a clear majority. Consequently,.coalition governments, with
little room to maneuver, are the rule. Parties retain total
control in nominating candidates for congressional office.
However, recent changes to the constitution will allow the direct
election of deputies in fifty percent of the congressional
districts in 1997. This change reflects President Sanchez de
Lozada's desireto makegovernment more responsive to the average
..
citizen..
.

'

,

I

,

,

Sanchez ,de Lozada's MNR party won a n impressive 34% of the v o
in a crowded field ,of; 1 4candidates in the presidential :

..

MINISTER OF SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT
MINISTER OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
MINISTER W/O PORTFOLIO
(for Capitalization)
LABOR MINISTER
JUSTICE MINISTER
MINISTER OF SOCIAL
COMMUNICATION

Enrique IPINA
Luis LEMA Molina
Alfonso REVOLLO
Reynaldo PETERS
Rene BLATTMAN (IND)
Ernesto MACHICAO

Unless indicated, ministers are members of the MNR party.
LEGISLATIVE: Two-chamber congress; 27-member Senate (chosen by
party slate; three per department (or state). 130-member Chamber
of Deputies, apportioned roughly by population. Senators and
1997), elected from
:.,
Deputies serve five-year terms (starting,in
party slates, and may be re-elected.
The following major parties are currently represented in
congress:
GOVERNING COALITION

--

MBL

Free Bolivia Movement (leftist)

-- MNR
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement
(centrist)
-- MP
Patriotic Movement (split from CONDEPA)

-- MRTKL Tupac Katari Revolutionary Liberation
Movement (indigenous)
-- MUP
Unity and Progress Movement (split from
CONDEPA)
-- UCS
Civic Solidarity Union (populist)
OPPOSITION

--

ADN
National Democratic Action (center-right)
CONDEPA Conscience of the Nation (populist)
MIR
Movement of the evolutionary Left
(center-left)

---

The governing MNR-MTKRL-UCS-MBL-MP-MUP coalition has:

--, .

.

i8 of 27 Senate seats
85 of 130 House.seats

. .

.

.
,'

.

.

,

,

.

IMPORT HOUSES
Import houses in Bolivia are normally relatively large, although
there are some small, well-established importers. These firms
import for their own use and also represent foreign firms on a
commission basis. Many operate general merchandise outlets.
Larger importers have subsidiaries and branches throughout the
country, as well as sub-distributors, and a sales force to
canvass retailers, wholesalers, and consumers. This method
offers the U.S. exporter a degree of financial security, as the
importer assumes the risk of importing general merchandise. More
importantly, U.S. exporters via their agents are also allowed to
sell to government agencies in response to tenders.
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MERCHANDISING
Thousands of Bolivians are engaged in merchandising, usually in
small facilities or as street vendors. Although many goods are
available through wholesalers, a significant percentage enters
the country as contraband, thus avoiding the usual tax and tariff
regulations. In addition, many wholesalers import directly and
then distribute goods through their own retail outlets in major
cities plus through other firms.
Many retail establishments are small operations, often family
owned. Others are direct outlets run by local producers. Over
half of Bolivia's manufactured products are nondurable consumer
goods such as food, beverages, coffee, clothing, and shoes.
DISTRIBUTION AREAS
The main distribution center is La Paz, Bolivia's largest city
and the seat of government. Most import houses, distributors,
and agencies use La Paz as their major central outlet, though
some are located in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz.
FRANCHISING

.

..

There is nospecial~legislationregarding £.ranchising in Bolivia.
However, any foreign company'wanting to grant a specific
franchise in Bolivia must first register the brand name with the
Office of Industrial Property, in the Secretariat of,Industry and

.

,

,

.

7. Sole Proprietorship.

The corporation, private company and branch are the most common
vehicles for foreign investment.
Taxation on foreign companies is similar to that applied to local
companies. Starting in 1995 all companies are compelled to pay a
tax equal to 25 percent of profits as of the end of the year.
The previous system required a tax paid equivalent to three
percent of a companyls declared assets. The new system should be
more beneficial to foreign investment, especially for U.S.
companies, because they should be allowed to use their tax paid
in Bolivia as a tax credit in the U.S., under the world-wide
income taxation system. Companies should consult a knowledgeable
accounting firm in Bolivia for more detailed information.
SELLING FACTORS/TECHNIQUES

>\

It is essential that U.S. firms be formally represented in
Bolivia through import houses, commission or independent sales
agents, local distributors,'or local subsidiaries.
Periodic visits by representatives of U.S. suppliers are
likewise essential in order to provide training and assistance to
the distributor or agent and to establish personal contact with
customers.
ADVERTISING AND TRADE PROMOTION (INCLUDING LISTING OF MAJOR
NEWSPAPERS AND BUSINESS JOURNALS)
The Bolivia advertising industry has grown and is now more
professional and competitive than before. The tremendous
increase in private television channels now in operation prompted
the industry to devote special attention to TV commercial spots.
La Paz remains the principal advertising center. Nineteen ad
agencies operate in Bolivia, of which Contacto Ltda, Prisa Ltda,
Avila Publicidad, and Multicomunicacion are the leaders. All 19
are members of the Association of Advertising Agencies. The
Association's address is:
Asociacion Bolivians de ~genciasde Publicidad, ~asilla985,
Calle Vicenta Eguino 408, La Paz, Bolivia.' Telephone (591-2)
363133, Fax: (591-2) 363312, Cable: ABAP. La Paz contact is
-Edgar Aguirre, President.
, .

Curtis B. Kamman, Ambassador

15

Robert Perry, Deputy Chief of Mission

10

Paul Larsen, Economic ~ounselor/~ommercialAttache 60
Dirk Hofschire, Economic and Commercial Officer

50

Fernando Urquidi, FSN-Senior Economic Specialist

15

Jaime Bilbao, FSN-Senior Commercial Specialist
Luisa San Martin, FSN-Commercial Secretary

100
90

WASHINGTON-BASED USG COUNTRY CONTACTS
,i,

Bolivian Government Representation in the United States
Embassy of Bolivia, 3014 Massachusetts Ave NW,
20008, tel 202 483-4410, fa.x 328-3712

Washington, DC

Consulates General:
25 SE Second Ave. Suite 545, Miami, FL 33131 tel 305 358
3450/3451, fax 374-8636
211 East 43rd St, Room 802, New York, NY 10020, tel 212
687-0531/0530, fax 687-0532
870 Market St, Room 255, San Francisco, CA 94102, tel 415
495-5173, fax 399-8958
Honorary Consuls:
Luis Zambrana, 7710 Carondelete Ave, St. Louis, MO 63105, tel 314
725-9966, fax 725-9103
Ricardo Antezana, 13933 SE 60th St, Bellevue, WA 98006, tel 206
244-6696, fax 243-3795
David C. Mitchell, 1801 Gilbert Ave, Cincinnati, OH 45262, tel'
513 271-5381, fax 271-8189

Camara Nacional de Comercio (National Chamber of Commerce),
Executive Director Fernando Caceres, Casilla 7, tel 378600, fax
391004
Camara Nacional de Industrias (National Chamber of Industries),
General Manager Dr. Alfredo Arana Ruck, Casilla 611, tel 374476,
fax 350620
Camara Bolivians de la construction (Bolivian Chamber of
Construction Companies), President Oscar Cobarrubias, Casilla
3215, tel 370981, fax 370981
Camara Nacional de Mineria (National Chamber of Small Mining),
Casilla 2022, tel 325140, fax 379653
Asociacion Nacional de Mineros Medianos (National Association of
Medium Miners, President Raul EspanaSmith, Casilla 6190, tel 352223, fax 354124
Camara Agropecuaria del Orignte (CAO) (Eastern Agricultural
Chamber), General Manager Walter Nunez, Casilla 116, tel (591)
(33) 44966 or 51391, fax 22621
Asociacion de Bancos Privados de Bolivia (Bolivian Private
Bankers Association, ASOBAN), Executive Secretary Carlos
Iturralde B., Casilla 5822, tel 321379, fax 391093
Asociacion Nacional de Industriales ~ex'tiles(National
Association of Textile Industries), President Carlos Morales,
Casilla 3836, tel 343467, fax 343467
COUNTRY MARKET RESEARCH FIRMS:
All market research and consulting companies are required to
register with the National Association of Consulting Companies
(ANEC), Casilla 8560, President Oscar Aguilar Orellana, tel
324532, fax 354351
The Society of Engineering Consultants may be contacted at
Casilla 6113
COUNTRY COMMERCIAL BANKS
MAJOR COMMERCIAL BANKS -IN BOLIVIA

PRINCIPAL U.S. IMPORTS FROM BOLIVIA (B):
7113 GOLD JEWELRY
105
8001 TIN
52
4407 WOOD
29
1701 SUGAR 11
2607 LEAD ORE
9.3
(A) Central Bank of Bolivia
(B) U.S. Dept. of Commerce
(C) INE
--APPENDIX D: INVESTMENT STATISTICS

-

Investment statistics are not available. The government dropped
the requirement for registration in 1985.

COUNTRY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
(Please contact the Economic/Commercial section of the U.S.
Embassy in La Paz for a complete list; all phone/fax numbers use
country and city code (591) (2) unless noted;-alladdresses are
in La Paz unless noted; Casilla means P.O. Box)
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS AND WORSHIP:
Lic. Antonio Aranibar Quiroga, Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Worship, Plaza Murillo, esq. Ingavi, tel 371150, 371151, fax
371155.
Dr. Mario Reyes Chavez, National Secretary for International
Economic Relations, same address, tel 369824, fax 371155
MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT:
Lic. Carlos Sanchez Berzain, Minister of Government, Av. Arce esq
B. Salinas, tel 370460, 371355, fax 371334
'MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE:

Lic. Raul Tovar P., Minister of Defense, Plaza Abaroa, tel
359461, 371365, fax 353156
.MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:

PHYTOSANITARY REQUIREMENTS, QUALITY CONTROL AND PACKAGING AND
HANDLING REQUIREMENTS, ARE THE MAJOR FACTORS HINDERING BOLIVIA'S
PENETRATION OF THE U.S. MARKET.
ACCORDING TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS, BOLIVIA'S
EXPORTS TO THE U.S. IN 1994 TOTALLED USD 357.3 MILLION, WHILE
IMPORTS WERE VALUED AT USD 240.3 MILLION. (THE U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE REPORTS U.S. EXPORTS TO BOLIVIA AT USD 185.8 MILLION
F.O.B. AND IMPORTS FROM BOLIVIA AT USD 260.2 MILLION C.I.F. FOR
1994. )
GATT/WTO
BOLIVIA WAS ACCEPTED AS A NEW GATT MEMBER IN JULY 1989, BUT ITS
FULL ADHERENCE WAS ONLY RATIFIED BY THE BOLIVIAN CONGRESS IN
SEPTEMBER OF 1990. THE GOB IS PLEASED WTTH THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE BOLIVIA IS A NET EXPORTER OF
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES. THE BOLIVIAN CONGRESS HAS NOT YET
RATIFIED THE ADHERENCE OF BOLIVIA TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
(WTO), HOWEVER, IT IS EXPECTED TO DO SO BY END OF 1995.
BEST PROSPECT EXPORTS.
A. MINING SECTOR: BEST OPPORTUNITIES ARE FOR SALES OF MINING
EQUIPMENT TO MEDIUM MINES AND TO COOPERATIVES.
B. HYDROCARBONS SECTOR: A PROPOSED GAS PIPELINE TO BRAZIL WILL
BRING GREAT OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. COMPANIES IN THE SERVICES AND
PIPELINE EQUIPMENT BUSINESS. ONGOING EXPLORATION AND
EXPLOITATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS ALSO MEANS POTENTIAL BUSINESS
FOR U.S. COMPANIES, BOTH WITH PRIVATE COMPANIES AND WITH YPFB,
THE STATE-OWNED OIL COMPANY.

,

C. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR: STRONG GROWTH IN THE AG SECTOR AROUND
THE CITY OF SANTA CRUZ OFFERS GOOD POSSIBILITIES FOR FARM
EQUIPMENT AND MACHINERY.

D. GOVERNMENT PURCHASES: ALTHOUGH THE GOB IS TRYING TO.,GETOUT
OF THE PRODUCTION SECTOR; IT REMAINS A -LARGE PURCHASER'OF
PRODUCTS AND SERVTCES. PAYMENT OF BILLS HAS BEEN A PROBLEM'FOR
SERVICE COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS WITH YPFB, THE STATE-OWNED OIL
COMPANY, HOWEVER.. ROAD CONSTRUCTION WILLBE ONGOING THROUGHOUT
THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS,'MOST OF IT T O B E FINANCED BY IFIS AND
.. . . , .
BILATERAL ASSISTANCE. OPPORTUNITIES ALSO -EXISTIN .
TELECO~NICATIONSAND ELECTRIC ENERGY, ALTHOUGH THE'GOB'S'
' ,

.

.

.;

.

i

.

. . .

.

.
. . .

INTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ( I D B ) .
THE ASPHALTING CONTRACT
HAS BEEN AWARDED AND THE ROAD SHOULD BE DELIVERED BY END O F 1 9 9 6 .
WHEN THE ROAD I S CONCLUDED AND TOTALLY PAVED, THE ESTIMATED
.
DRIVING T I M E W I L L BE SIX-AND-A-HALF
HOURS.
THE PERUVIAN EMBASSY
P R E D I C T S THE ROAD CONSTRUCTION W I L L BE F I N I S H E D BY THE END O F
1996.
I N 1 9 9 4 B O L I V I A ' S EXPORTS TO PERU TOTALLED USD 1 2 2 . 6 M I L L I O N ,
WHILE IMPORTS WERE VALUED AT USD 6 4 . 9 MILLION.
BOLIVIAN-CHILEAN

TRADE AGREEMENT

A 10-YEAR BILATERAL AGREEMENT SIGNED I N A P R I L 1 9 9 3 I N SANTA CRUZ
WILL ALLOW 2 0 2 ITEMS FROM B O L I V I A TO ENTER C H I L E DUTY F R E E , AND
1 4 5 ITEMS FROM C H I L E TO ENTER B O L I V I A , ALSO DUTY FREE.
I N THE
PAST A T A R I F F O F ELEVEN PERCENT AD-VALOREM
WAS
P
A
I
D
ON
ALL
,.
BOLIVIAN EXPORTS TO C H I L E .
THE AGREEMENT E S T A B L I S H E S FOUR B A S I C CATEGORIES:
1 9 BOLIVIAN ITEMS THAT MAY ENTER CHILE DUTY
A. THE FIRST ANNEX:
FREE, WITH NO R E C I P R O C I T Y INVOLVED, BUT S U B J E C T TO A MAXIMUM
QUOTA O F U S 30 M I L L I O N A YEAR.

B. THE SECOND ANNEX:
7 4 CHILEAN ITEMS THAT MAY ENTER B O L I V I A
DUTY FREE,. TEN O F WHICH HAVE RECIPROCAL DUTY-FREE TREATMENT.
T H I S ANNEX ALSO INCLUDES A L I S T O F ANOTHER 51 CHILEAN PRODUCTS
THAT WERE UNDER THE REDUCED T A R I F F PREFERENCES SYSTEM, BUT ARE
NOW TOTALLY DUTY FREE.
C. THE T H I R D ANNEX:
9 4 BOLIVIAN ITEMS THAT MAY ENTER C H I L E DUTY
FREE, TWENTY O F WHICH HAVE RECIPROCAL DUTY-FREE TREATMENT.
THIS
L I S T I S SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE ONE BOTH COUNTRIES WERE NEGOTIATING
EARLY T H I S YEAR AND INCLUDES NEW-TO-EXPORT BOLIVIAN PRODUCTS.
D. THE FOURTH ANNEX:
R A T I F I E S THE REDUCED T A R I F F PREFERENCES ON
E I G H T BOLIVIAN AND CHILEAN ITEMS PREVIOUSLY NEGOTIATED BY BOTH
COUNTRIES.

. , .
THE REAL BENEFIT FOR BOLIVIA WILL BE THE- O P P O R T U N I T Y F O ~ NEW
PRODUCTS, SUCH AS WOODEN FURNITURE, WOODEN MANUFACTUREDPRODUCTS,
.

MARKET.

.

.

.

.

THIS AGREEMENT, BOLIVIA HOPES TO BE ABLE TO SELL BRAZIL BETWEEN 8
AND 16 MILLION CUBIC METERS OF NATURAL GAS PER DAY FOR THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS.
THE PROPOSED GASLINE WILL RUN
SANTA CRUZ TO SAO PAULO, WITH
BOLIVIAN SEGMENT IS ESTIMATED
AN ADDITIONAL USD 850 MILLION

A TOTAL OF 2,187 KILOMETERS FROM
AN EXTENSION TO PARANA. THE
TO COST ABOUT USD 500 MILLION AND
FOR FIELD DEVELOPMENT.

THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT ALL
INTERSTATE GAS FLOWS BE UNDER STATE CONTROL. YET THE STATE OIL
AND GAS COMPANY, PETROBAS, CANNOT AFFORD THE COST OF THE PROJECT.
AT THE END OF 1994, YPFB AND PETROBRAS SIGNED A JOINT VENTURE
OPERATION WITH ENRON AND THE BTB CONSORTIUM TO CARRY-ON THIS
PROJECT. THEY SHOULD REACH A FINAL AGREEMENT ABOUT THE GAS PRICE
AND VOLUMES OF EXPORTS BY AUGUST OF 1995,L INMEDIATELY THEY WILL
DISCUSS THE FINANCIAL TERMS OF THE PROJECT.
BOTH, THE WORLD BANK AND THE IDB HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN
PROVIDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, IN THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS
WILL BE A PRIVATE-SECTOR PROJECT.
WHEN COMPLETED, THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT EXPECTS THE GAS SALES TO
BRING AN INCOME OF USD 175 MILLION PER YEAR DURING THE NEXT TWO
DECADES. THE AGREEMENT CALLS FOR A PRICE ADJUSTMENT EVERY TIME
THERE IS A CHANGE IN THE PRICE OF ALTERNATIVE FUELS TO THE
END-USERS IN THE BRAZILIAN MARKET.
IN 1994, BOLIVIA'S REGISTERED EXPORTS TO BRAZIL TOTALLED USD 34.8
MILLION, WHILE IMPORTS WERE VALUED AT USD 175.2 MILLION.
REPORTEDLY, A FAIR AMOUNT OF GOLD AND COCAINE IS SMUGGLED FROM
BOLIVIA TO BRAZIL, AS WELL AS SOME ELECTRONIC GOODS WHICH ENTER
FROM THE PACIFIC COAST PORTS AND TRANSIT BOLIVIA.
BOLIVIAN

-

PARAGUAY AGREEMENT

DURING THE 1992 MERCOSUR PRESIDENTIAL SUMMIT HELD IN-LAS PENAS,
ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA,SIGNED AN AGREEMENT WITH THE MERCOSUR

;

SEEN BY THE ,VISIT

List available and upcoming DOC/ISAS and IMIS
Computers and peripherals Sector, April 1995
~edicalequipment -Industry Sub-sector analysis
--APPENDIX G: TRADE EVENT SCHEDULE1) Santa Cruz International Trade Fair, September 1427, 1995, Event type: TFO, Santq,Cruz, Bolivia, Industries: GIE
(U.S. pavilion to be managed by the AMCHAM Bolivia (La Paz
office), with U.S. Embassy providing guidance).
2) Infrastructure USA, November 16,17, 1995, RC, ID 96000439,
Industry:GIE, La Paz (catalog show)

,<;
3) New Products USA, February 8,9, 1996,RC, ID 96000437,

Industry: GIE, La Paz (catalog show)
4) Multi-State Trade Days, September 19-20, 1996, MSTD, ID
96000000, Industry: GIE, La Paz (catalog show)

have been buying more land to bring it into production; Bolivian
investors are also increasing their land holdings.
The hydrocarbons sector is also important. U.S. and foreign oil
companies continue to look for oil and gas throughout the
country. A proposed gas pipeline to Brazil, while still in the
planning stages, is increasingly looking like a reality, as U.S.
and international companies have entered into partnership with
both YPFB and Petrobras, the Brazilian state-owned oil company,
to help bring the project to fruition. Construction of the
pipeline should begin in 1996 or 1997. Once online, the pipeline
will bring substantial export earnings to Bolivia. The
construction of the pipeline on the Bolivian side will cost an
estimated $500 million, and will have a significant impact on the
regional economy of Santa Cruz department.
Government Role in the Economy:

:..

Total governmental spending accounts for around 40 percent of GDP
(1994 GDP of around $7 billion). As mentioned above, the GOB
hopes to significantly reduce its presence as an economic player
by selling off its six largest companies under the process of
capitalization. It also plans to privatize some 70-75 smaller
companies, the most significant of which are regional dairies,
hotels, and spinning mills. The GOB sees its new role as
primarily one of exercising a role as a supervisor and overseer
of economic activity, leaving actual production concerns to the
private sector. It wants to increase its public investment in
education, health and infrastructure.
In 1994 the GOB began the process of popular participation,
whereby for the first time it gives money from the central
government directly to the city governments of some 300-plus
communities throughout Bolivia. This means,that some areas which
have never received money from the central government now have
control over money to go towards maintaining and building
infrastructure--roads, schools, health units, etc.--where they
live:
While not having much of an economic impact in macro.
terms, the significance in social terms of giving control to
regions cannot be overemphasized.
.

.

Public investment will not .: significantly in,creasein 1 9 9 5 ,
primarily due to the'capitalizationprocess:.' Estimated planned

Quechua .
NEWSPAPERS: Newspapers are the second most important advertising
vehicle. The five newspapers in La Paz have a daily circulation
between 30,000 and 80,000 copies. The major La Paz newspapers
are Presencia, La Razon, El Diario, Ultima Hora and Hoy, all of
which are circulated nationally. The major newspapers from Santa
Cruz, El Mundo, and from Cochabamba, Los Tiempos, are also sold
nationally.
THEATERS: There are about 25 motion picture theaters in La Paz,
with an estimated total seating capacity of 20,000.
Only two U.S. market research firms, Coopers and Lybrand and
Price Waterhouse, currently operate in Bolivia. However, 10
Bolivian market research firms represent foreign consulting
companies. Most of these firms also proyide engineering and
industry feasibility studies. An updated'list of consulting
firms and their services is available in the Economic/Commercial
section of the U.S. Embassy in La Paz.
All market research and consulting companies are required to
register with the National Association of Consulting Companies.
All correspondence to the Association may be addressed as
follows:
Asociacion Nacional
Casilla 8560, Edif.
6, La Paz, Bolivia.
telephone (591) (2)

de Empresas Consultoras (ANEC)
Mutual La Primera, Bloque B, Piso 5, Oficina.
Contact is Maria Eugenia Leon, Secretary,
324532, fax (591)(2) 354351

PRICING PRODUCT
Boliviats open market economy does not impose price controls on
most products. Price is set freely by supply and demand, except
for two commodities, petroleum, set by the central government,
and the most commonly sold bread rolls, whose prices are set by
the municipal government.
SALES SERVICE/CUSTOMER SUPPORT
The service and maintenance'provided by local'agents of U.S.
companies are .probably the most important competitive factor in
., :
helping them compete successfully against other-.foreign
suppliers.. U.S. suppliers have traditionally provided saies :
,

including tax. Several new hotels have recently been built,
including the Radisson Plaza, the Plaza, the Presidente, the
Palladium and the Libertador. There are also several good hotels
in Santa Cruz (Taj ibos , Yotau) and Cochabamba (Portales, Grand)

.

--
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APPENDIX A:
A. COUNTRY DATA
POPULATION 1993 (A):

6.94 million

POPULATION GROWTH RATE (A): 2 percent
DISTRIBUTION: roughly 58 percent of the population lives in urban
areas.
RELIGION: Catholicism is the dominant religion; freedom of
religion exists.
GOVERNMENT SYSTEM: Executive, legislative and judicial branches
are separate. President elected every five years, upper and
lower houses of Congress elected every five years; independent
judiciary appointed by executive branch, with Supreme Court
judges appointed for 10 years.
LANGUAGES: Spanish (official), Aymara, Quechua, and other native
tongues.
WORK WEEK: Monday through ~riday,9-12, 2-6:30; see "Business
Customsl1 above for more detailed information.
(A): ~ationalInstitute of statistics (INE)
--APPENDIX B: DOMESTIC ECONOMY-

(billions of dollars)
GDP (E)
,

..,

.

Oruro Day
Tarija Day
Sucre Day
La Paz Day
Cochabamba Day
Santa Cruz Day
Pando.Day
Potosi Day
Beni Day

February 10
April 15
May 25
July 16
September 14
September 24
September 24
November 10
November 18

BUSINESS INFRASTRUCTURE (E.G. TRANSPORTATION, LANGUAGE,
COMMUNICATIONS, HOUSING, HEALTH, FOOD)
Transportation is hindered by a lack of developed infrastructure.
Bolivia has just over 50,000 kms of roads, of which just over
2,000 kms are paved. There are paved roads from La Paz to Lake
Titicaca, Cochabamba, and Oruro. Most df the road between
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz is paved. No paved roads exist to
neighboring countries. The national railroad system has a total
of 3,651 kms of track, divided into two non-connecting segments.
The western segment of 2,234 kms is the longest and serves the
Pacific ports of Arica and Antofagasta, Chile, as well as the
lake port of Guaqui and the major cities in the Altiplano and
valleys. It connects with the Argentinean rail system. The
eastern segment of 1,377 kms links Santa Cruz with Brazil and
Argentina. Grain export facilities on the Paraguay river near
Brazil are being improved. Airline connections to other Latin
American countries and to Miami are reasonable.
Utilities are adequate to good. Electric power is reliable in
the major cities. Residential current in La Pa2 in 110 and 220
volts, 50 cycles. Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and most other cities
operate on 220 volts, 50 cycles. Water shortages may occur in
the dry season in La Paz. Water may not be considered potable by
American standards in any Bolivian city, although the major
cities have improved their water supply systems in recent years.
LANGUAGE

-

handling of communications, cannot be overstated. After a firm
business relationship has been established, local distributors
and agents generally expect to be extended an offer to visit the
foreign company's plant facilities and head offices in order to
become more acquainted with the company's personal and operating
techniques.
Although capitalizing and privatizing, Bolivials economy remains
heavily public-sector oriented until those processes are
completed sometime in 1996. Businesspeople should be prepared to
deal with government officials and their procedures. U.S.
exporters or shippers should adhere to the instructions of the
Bolivian importer, as well as to the instructions in the trade
regulations section of this report regarding shipment of goods in
order to avoid difficulties and Customs fines.
Corruption exists in both government andj.,business. U.S.
companies should exercise the utmost care and discretion in their
business dealings.
TRAVEL ADVISORY AND VISAS
Visas: Any foreigner that wishes or needs to work in Bolivia
must first obtain a working memorandum from the Ministry of
Labor. To do so, they need to present a legal request and their
passport with a valid visa. The GOB has three different
non-immigrant categories for the entry of any foreigner into
Bolivia. These are:
1. Tourist visa, free of charge and valid 30 days. This visa is
valid for business purposes and may be extended for another 30
days, upon the payment of $30 in the offices of the Immigration
Service.
2. Temporary residence'visa, with the following requirements:

valid passport containing specific-.
purpose visa (for any purpose other than tourism); legal petition
addre'ssed to the Director General of Immigration and Foreign
~f fairs, requesting temporary- residence; work contract legalized
by the Ministry of Labor, specifying the duration of the . ~ ,
contract; certificate from the institution for which the person - . .
is going t o work (0r.acertificate o f studies, for students
:- . .
only) ; police security clea,rance, issued by the.Bollvian Police;
..
,

'

,

'

.

~

deposits for both checking and savings accounts and offering
loans on short and medium term. Local banks are authorized to
hold dollar-denominated time deposits. The Central Bank
performs functions similar to those performed by the U.S. Federal
Reserve. The Central Bank also provides government guarantees on
loans to official agencies.
A new banking law, aimed at modernizing the Bolivian banking
system, has been in effect since April 1993. The previous
banking law dated back to 1928 and had been amended numerous
times, resulting in a web of conflicting regulations. The new
law, while not perfect, addresses such emerging areas as
factoring and leasing, parameters for bank holding companies,
regulatory roles of the Central Bank and the Superintendency of
Banks, how banks will interact with capital markets, and
generally ensures compatibility with the Commercial Code.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROLS AFFECTING TRAD~NG

There are no foreign exchange controls. See the section entitled
'Conversion and Transfer Policies" under the Investment Climate
section.
The Boliviano (BS.) is divided into units of 100 centavos,
although coins denominated at less than 50 centavos are rarely
used. Travelers checks, dollars and other currencies can be
readily exchanged in exchange houses, banks and major hotels. It
is difficult to cash personal checks in Bolivia as a nonresident. The Boliviano is freely convertible for all
transactions. As of June, 1995, the rate of exchange was 4.79
Bs. for one U.S. dollar.
Several money exchange houses legally operating in Bolivia offer
prompt conversion of several currencies at legal rates, in
addition to transfers.
'For more detailed information on Bolivia's financial system,
including information on securities -exchanges,debt-equity
investment bonds, export financing lines 'for Bolivian exporters,
'
project facilities',and financing for privateenterprise
Development Center.
,

.

In late 1993, the U.S. EXIMBANK decided to increase its exposure
in Bolivia. It has entered into three USD 10 million credit
guarantee facilities with local banks, with terms of up to five
years. EXIM has indicated its willingness to work directly with
qualified private companies on loans and insurance. EXIM is also
willing to consider individual transactions with Bolivian banks
that do not yet have sufficient net worth to qualify for the USD
10 million credit guarantee facility.
'EXIM is not ready to do
business with the government, however. EXIM is also offering its
political and commercial insurance programs in Bolivia.
LABOR

Labor Force: Of the 7-million people living in Bolivia, an
estimated 2.3 million are in the labor force. According to a
recent survey of commercial establishments in the urban areas,
688,000 people work for private and pub1,uc companies, 173,000
people work for government agencies (central, regional and
municipal), 104,000 are unemployed and some 516,000 are
underemployed. That means about 820,000 people work in
agriculture. In fact, the.1992 census found that 42 percent of
the population still lives in the rural areas.
The legal minimum wage is only 42 dollars a month but the average
wage for a factory worker is about 100 dollars per month.
Benefits, including a Christmas bonus equal to one month's salary
as well as retirement payments, add another 30 percent to the
wage bill for most companies.
Most companies are unionized; all unions belong to the
Confederation of Bolivian Workers. However, the militant leaders
of the Confederation are often ignored by the rank-and-file
workers. The labor law permits Bolivian workers the right to
organize and bargain collectively.
Bolivia has an abundant low-cost labor force. The official
unemployment rate in urban areas is-7 percent. That rate does
not take' into account underemployment or rural unemployment. For
purposes of the,official unemployment rate, a part-time street..
vendor is considered employed. Foreign investors have found-the .
labor 'force to be stable with low rates of turnover, and with

Property and contractual rights may be enforced in Bolivian
courts, but the legal process is very time-consuming at best, and
corrupt at worst. For that reason, the National Chamber of
Commerce, with assistance from the U.S. Agency for International
Development, has established a local arbitration tribunal. The
Investment Law provides that investors may submit their
differences to arbitration in accordance with the constitution
and international norms. However, the Hydrocarbons Law permits
international arbitration only for disputes over Mtechnicalw
issues. This restriction has prevented the U.S. from signing a
bilateral investment treaty with Bolivia. Most oil companies
which have exploration contracts with YPFB, the state-owned
petroleum company, define issues that will be considered
"technicalH in their contracts.
Corruption is an endemic problem; two Supreme Court judges,
including the Chief Justice, were removed from their positions in
1994 after they were found guilty of asking for and accepting
bribes. There is no overt government interference in the court
system, but judges in Bolivia are political appointees and often
respond to political pressures. Bolivia does not accept nor
enforce judgments of foreign courts. It has a functional
commercial code that dates from around 1939. There is no
bankruptcy law. Most, if not all, loans are therefore secured
ones. Creditors often will press criminal charges against
debtors, although imprisonment for debt was abolished recently.
Property interests are recognized and enforced. The GOB accepts
binding international arbitration in all sectors except
hydrocarbons.
Bolivia has signed the convention to become a member of the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), but has not yet submitted the convention to its Congress
for ratification. Bolivia's Congress is currently considering
ratifying the New York Convention of 1958 on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS/INCENTIVES
Bolivia im\poses no performance requirements as Conditions for
establishing, maintaining, or expanding an establishment, or for
access to tax or investment incentives.
'

RIGHT TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND ESTABLISHMENT/PROTECTION OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS
t

capitalized which means only 50 percent will be sold. The GOB
has earned a little over USD 20 million for firms privatized to
date. The largest sale was USD 10 million for a sugar mill. The
government hopes to privatize between 75-100 companies in
1995/96, with a combined worth of USD 60-100 million.
All oil exploration activity currently must be carried out via
contract with Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos
(YPFB), the government-owned petroleum company. Most of the
mines currently owned by Comibol, the state-owned mining company,
may not be purchased outright, but may be operated in a joint
venture or leasing contract with COMIBOL. COMIBOL, however, is
currently near bankruptcy, and has now stated its willingness to
enter into joint ventures or leasing contracts for all of its
holdings (previously Comibol had mines and areas off limits to
foreigners). Bolivia's long-distance telephone and railroad
companies are state-owned. The railroad,company has large debt,
antiquated lines (narrow gauge) and equipment. The telephone
company, ENTEL, however, is a solid money-maker, and has been
eager to enter into joint ventures with foreign firms to provide
additional services. ENTEL.earns a profit (USD 25 million in
1992, 20 million of which reverted to the government). Although
there is no restriction on foreign ownership of land, the current
land title system, dating from the 1952 revolutionis agrarian
reform, makes direct investment difficult in some rural areas of
Bolivia. It is easier to contract or form joint ventures with
local agricultural producers. The GOB has said that amending the
agrarian titling law is also a priority and hopes to have the
Congress consider a bill next year.
Bolivia has one of the simplest and lowest tariff regimes in the
region. Capital goods are currently subject to a 5 percent
tariff, with all other imported goods taxed at 10 percent. An
elimination of the capital goods tariff was proposed by the
current government in its pre-election platform. Since taking
office in August 1993, government officials have dropped this
proposal because they discovered the fiscal cupboard to be bare.
The list of products defined as capital goods has been expanded
' considerably, though some investors believe it needs to be
updated annually in a systematic manner. Despite the simple
tariff structure, imports are subject to a number of additional
taxes and fees which can amount to another 15-35 percent. The
Bolivian Customs system is being partially privatized, with the,
goal of increasing efficiency and eliminating opportunities for
, corruption.

DUTY EXEMPTIONS AND REDUCTIONS
Exemptions/reductions are permitted for: imports made under
current international agreements and government contracts;
imports under intraregional agreements that specifically provide
for duty exemptions; imports made by diplomatic and consular
corps; travelers' personal effects not exceeding $300; imports of
gold, except jewelry.
MEMBERSHIP IN FREE TRADE ARRANGEMENTS
Bolivia is making a determined effort to save its existing
bilateral trade agreements with Mercosur countries, and hopes to
acquire preferential status as Mercosur moves toward imposing a
common external tariff. At the same time, Bolivia intends to
continue as a member of the Andean Pact,;,whichhas removed all
internal trade barriers. Bolivia has signed bilateral trade
agreements with other South American countries, eliminating or
reducing tariffs on limited lists of products. Bolivia most
recently signed a free trade agreement with Mexico in September,
1994. The European Union, Japan and the United States allow most
Bolivian exports to enter their markets at duty-free or dutyreduced rates. Bolivia acceded to the GATT in 1989, and ratified
its membership in September, 1990. The Bolivian Congress should
ratify Bolivia's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO)
sometime in late 1995.
The following is a list of the countries with which Bolivia
currently has trade agreements: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
Uruguay, Andean Pact (Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela), Peru,
Chile, Mexico, EU, USA (ATPA trade preferences, not a trade
agreement).
--CHAPTER VII: INVESTMENT CLIMATE
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OPENNESS TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The Bolivian government is anxious,:to ;..attract
for,eign...investors..~?~~
~t~v.kn&s.
.that..
larg=?..in.ffigi&n=:::-of.'..foreigh
i:in+e&,enc.;&eneeded to
achieve'.'skgni'fi~anY-''per-capita,~~~qrowth~;'~~~'
The GOB'in late'June ,1995
completed the capitalization process with the first 09 its six.
largest parastatals to b e partially 'sold to foreign investors.
ENDE, the electric power.company.,"sold its three generating

30,001
50,001
100,001

to
50,000 is 1 percent
100,000 is 0.75 percent
to
and above
is 0.5 percent

B. In addition, customs brokers charge 17.65 percent over the
value of their bill to cover their IVA tax liability.
9. Specific chambers, such as the Chambers of Commerce,
Industry, and Construction, charge an additional fee between .03
and .04 percent of (1).
CUSTOMS VALUATION
Because of the complex Bolivian Customs system, we urge U.S.
exporters to verify the real amount of total duties payable to
enter Bolivia. The Economic and commercial section of the U.S.
Embassy in La Paz can provide a list of reliable customs brokers
who can expedite paperwork.
Following is a practical example of how Bolivia import charges
are imposed on an automobi1.e with a FOB price of $9,000 and a CIF
border value of $10,000.
IMPORT STRUCTURE

IMPORT CHARGE

1.

USD 10,000.

CIF BORDER VALUE:

2. INSPECTION COMPANY FEE : 1.92 PERCENT
OF USD 9,000
USD
172.80

3. CUSTOM TARIFF : 10 PERCENT OF USD
10,000
USD

1,000

4. CUSTOMS WAREHOUSE: 0.5 PERCENT OF USD
10,000
USD

50

5. VALUE ADDED TAX (IVA) : 14.94 PERCENT
OF USD 11,538.10 (10,000+172.80+1,000+50
+50+200+35.30+30)
USD 1,723.80
6. SPECIFIC CONSUMPTION TAX (ICE) : 18
PERCENT OF USD 11,538.10 (10,000+172.80
+1,000+50+50+200+35.30+30)
-USD 2i076.86

YPFB1s capitalization program is a great opportunity for U.S.
investors, and U.S. petroleum companies are interested in the
plan.
A total of 19 foreign companies have exploration/exploitation
contracts with YPFB, including U.S. companies Diamond Shamrock
(formerly Occidental Bolivia), Tesoro Petroleum, Chevron, Mobil,
Santa Fe, Texaco, Exxon and Phillips (Maxus, recently purchased
by YPF of Argentina, also is here). Other foreign and U.S.
corporations have or are in the process of negotiating contracts.
Bolivia allows exploration of large blocks up to 1.5 million
hectares.
YPFB is currently the largest user of oil and gas equipment.
However, exploration and exploitation by private companies are
increasing, and thus their need for drilling machinery equipment,
pipelines and services will expand rapidly
:.. if large oil or
natural gas fields are discovered.
The Bolivian-Brazilian gas pipeline project will generate a
tremendous demand for pipel.ine goods. YPFB will continue to need
pipeline and drilling machinery and equipment, wellheads and
pumps. The capitalization of YPFB in late 1995/early 1996 should
see even more investment as the private partner comes on-line.
Currently most of the foreign oil companies contract or purchase
exploration drilling equipment.
PART 3.
1994

1995

1996

A. TOTAL MARKET SIZE
TOTAL LOCALPRODUCTION
C. TOTAL EXPORTS
D. TOTAL IMPORTS
E. IMPORTS FROM THE U.S.

2.9
0

5.0.

1.4

B.

0 '

0

0

0

2.9
1.63

1.4

0

5.0
3.5

.8

The above statistics areunofficial estimates, in U.S. dollars.
--CHAPTER VI : TRADE REGULATIONS ..AND STANDARDS
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of 1994 gives the Central Government rate-setting authority in
sectors to be capitalized, which included the energy sector.
Municipalities still possess authority to set water, garbage
collection, and intra-city public transportation rates.
Bolivian tax laws are simple and fairly applied. Not too long
ago, the government modified its hydrocarbon and mining tax
systems to allow foreign investors to obtain foreign tax credits
in their home countries. The government sets a minimum monthly
wage, currently around USD 42 (the average monthly wage is closer
to USD 100). Although nearly all workers earn more than the
minimum, it is significant because other benefits, such as
pensions, are pegged to the minimum wage. Factory workers earn
around USD 100 per month plus benefits. The government plans to
privatize the state social security system via capitalization.
It is possible for a company to obtain an exemption from the
state health care system if the company,&iemonstratesthat it will
provide adequate health services.
Bureaucratic procedures have been reduced, but plenty of.red tape
and archaic policies stil1,exist. One example is that all
documents to be notarized must be handwritten. The current
administration, as did the last, has vowed to de-bureaucratize .
the government and reduce "hypercorruption," but this is proving
a difficult task. Bribes paid by hapless businessmen and women
to move their paperwork through the bureaucratic maze are common.
EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
Historically, Bolivian commercial banks were closely-held
operations that lent only to those persons well known to,the bank
or to blue-chip companies.. Bolivian bankers are now becoming
more sophisticated and capable of evaluating future cash flows
and expected rates of return. Nevertheless, some foreign
investors may not qualify for loans due to Bolivian bankers'
preference for local collateral.' Si.nce commercial credit is
generally extended on a short-term basis at fairly high ihterest
rates, -most foreign investors prefer to obtain credit elsewhere.
Foreign Eanks have recentiy (June 1995) begun to enter the

.,'as published (end June 1995) the International Intellectual

roperty Association (IIPA) has petitioned the USG to end
Bolivials privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) and the -Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). .
Patent registration requests are reviewed by clerks for form
rather than substance. A notice of the proposed patent
registration is then published in the Official Gazette. If there
are no objections within 50 days, a patent is then granted for a
15-year period. The patent must then be used in Bolivia within
two years in order to be valid. Protection for the layout design
of a computer chip is not specifically protected under any law,
but apparently can be patented.
Trademark registration is carried out similarly to patents,
except that the period for objections to a trademark registration
is 18 months. Once obtained, a trademark is valid for a
ten-year, renewable term. It becomes ndll if not used for an
18-month period. There are no provisions to protect trade
secrets.
The Bolivian Copyright Law; passed in April of 1992, provides IPR
protection to literary, art: tic and scientific works for the
lifetime of the author plus 3 years. It protects the rights of
Bolivian authors, of foreigi. authors domiciled in Bolivia, and of
foreign a. Yors published for the first time in Bolivia.
'~oreignersnot domiciled in ~oliviawill enjoy protection under
this law to the extent provided in international conventions and
treaties to which Bolivia ic a party. ~oliviancopyright
protection includes the exclusive right to copy orreproduce
work; revise, adapt,or prepare derivative works; distribute
copies of the work; and publicly communicate the work. The
exclusive right to translate the work is not explicitly granted
in the law, but the law does prevent unauthorized adaptation,
transformation, modification and editing. The law provides for
1PR:protection for computer programs and data bases to be
promulgated by separate regulations; Draft regulations for IPR
on software have been finished but are awaiting presidential
approval. The law does provide .IPR protection to musical
compositions, but does not provicle specific protection to sound
recordings. ' Implementing regulations are still. forth coming.^.
.

.

Bolivian customs maintains warehousing facilities in these ports
where incoming goods may be stored for 90 days. The charge for
Customs storage is 0.5 percent of CIF for goods stored for each
30-day period or fraction thereof. Once clearlng documents are
signed, goods must be removed from storage within eight days to
avoid an additional charge of two percent of CIF.
Imported merchandise may be considered abandoned either by an
explicit request or by failure to claim it within the required 9 0
days. By law such goods are subject to public auction, the
proceeds of which go to the interested party after expenses are
paid.
If the importer wishes to remove his/her merchandise after the
90-day period but before the auction takes place, he/she must pay
a 5 percent charge over the Customs tariff.plus 2 percent of CIF.
Due to the expense and time involved in'i-eshi~ment, U.S.
exporters usually prefer to sell refused goods in Bolivia.
TEMPOMRY ENTRY

Manufacturers may distribute products through international trade
fairs. When this channel is used, capital goods destined for the
productive sector enter under temporary import permission for an
exhibition period of 90 days, with a bank guarantee note of one
percent over CIF value. Within this period the goods may be
nationalized or reexported. If nationalized, duties for certain
capital goods may be discounted by 5 0 percent under the
preferential customs policy granted to international trade fairs.
--heTemporary ~mportationPermit (TIP) is issued by the Customs
administration for goods intended as samples, exhibitions,
natural disaster relief machinery and equipment, equipment and
apparatus for testing and scientific research, aircraft and
vehicles for tourism, equipment for petroleum exploration and
exploitation and other similar items intended for reexport, and
are allowed entry without payment of duty under a bank bond
covering all duties and customs fees and the guarantee of a local
customs brokers.

SELLER'S COMMERCIAL INVOICE
This invoice may be completed in either Spanish or English on the
shipper's letterhead. The invoice must include a detailed
description of the products by item, the unit price, and the
total FOB price. The invoice must also include the freight
costs, either air or ocean, and the insurance to the port of
destination. If the invoice does not include insurance and
freight, ~olivianCustoms will charge 5 percent of the FOB price.
This is necessary because the value added tax is calculated on
the basis of the CIF price.
BILL OF LADING OR AIRWAYBILL
The bill of lading must be presented with two original bills,
signed and sealed by the freight forwarder, and two
non-negotiable copies. One of the bills of lading, or a copy,
should accompany the original bill and the commercial invoice.
Bills of lading may not be drawn to the order of the shipper.
However, they may be drawn to the order of the consignee, who is
permitted to endorse it to a third party. For air cargo, the
airwaybill is the bill of lading.
INSURANCE POLICY
Customs requires a copy of the insurance policy to calculate the
value added tax.
PACKING LIST
The packing list facilitates Customs inspections and is
beneficial to the importers in case of loss.
INSPECTION CERTIFICATE
Pre-shipment inspection is required on imported products with a
FOB value of $1.00 or more. Overseas agencies under contract to
the Bolivian government administer the program; inspections may
be performed in the port of origin or in Bolivia by either SGS
Control Services in New York at (212) 482-8700, or SGS Government
Programs in Miami at (305) 592-0410, or by ~nspectoratein Miami
at (305) 599-1124.
SPECIAL DOCUMENTATION

technical staff of the public entity. Domestic goods and
services receive a 10 percent preference in any bidding in order
to protect local industry.
When a project is financed by an international institution (World
Bank, Inter-American Development Bank), the bids follow that
institution's own rules.
The proposals must be presented in Bolivian territory. Bolivian
law specifies that American or other foreign firms interested in
providing goods and services to the Bolivian Government must have
a local address in Bolivia and a legal representative or a local
agent in order to sign the contract, if awarded.
Bid specifications will include specific instructions on how to
present the bid. Tender terms vary according to the requirements
of the government agency issuing the tenqer. Both the price and
the quality of the product/service will fie considered when
awarling the contract.
PROTECTING YOUR PRODUCT FROM IPR INFRINGEMENT
A foreign company wishing to market and protect its
product/trademark/name in ~oliviamust first register the
brandname, etc. with the Office of Industrial Property in the.
Secretariat of Industry and Commerce, located on the Avenida
Camacho, corner with Calle Bueno in downtown La Paz. Protection
of intellectual property in Bolivia is nearly non-existent;
companies should be prepared to take their case to the courts in
order to protect their IPR rights.
NEED FOR A LOCAL ATTORNEY
A local attorney will be required in order to establish a company
in Bolivia or to register a brand name with the Office of
Industrial Property. A complete list of patent and commercial
attorneys, as well as general practice attorneys, ,is available in
the Economic/Commercial section of the U.S. Embassy in La Paz.
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